The terrorist attack on the US on the 11th of September 2001, was the most horrible attack on American soil since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Both attacks caught the US off guard. According to documents that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has released, the CIA had been informing various US agencies going back to Bill Clinton’s presidency that the US was likely to be hit with a big terrorist attack. Just weeks before 9/11, on the 6th of August 2001, it issued a warning that a big terrorist attack was imminent. But the warning was dismissed. The Bush administration’s officials were only familiar with conflicts between nations, such as the Korean War or the Cold War.
On 9/11, nearly 3,000 people were killed, a few hundred more than were killed in the attack on Pearl Harbor. The twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City were destroyed and the myth of American invincibility was shattered.
Unlike the wars that the US had fought in the past, in which the enemy was a foreign country, this attack was carried out by 19 individuals who hijacked four American airliners to carry out their mission. The US traced the attacks to a terrorist organisation, Al Qaeda, headed by Osama bin Laden, who was believed to be residing thousands of miles away in Afghanistan, which was governed by the Taliban. He had been active in fighting the Soviets during the 1980s with the US but had turned against the US once its forces landed on Arab soil to fight Saddam’s forces which had invaded Kuwait in 1991.
The US asked the Taliban to hand him over. When they refused, saying he was their guest, the US decided to wage an all-out war against the Taliban. Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary in the US State Department also reached out to Pakistan’s ruler, General Pervez Musharraf, and demanded his cooperation. He warned that unless Pakistan cooperated with the US, it would be bombed back to the Stone Age. Musharraf promised unstinted cooperation.
The US bombed Afghanistan massively in October and then sent in its ground troops. The Taliban were deposed in December. But the US failed to capture Osama. He escaped to Tora Bora in the eastern mountains and, as we would learn later, eventually crossed the border into Pakistan. No one knew at that time the US would occupy Afghanistan for two decades, despite capturing and executing Osama in Pakistan in May 2011, a decade after 9/11. Not one or two but three US presidents were at the helm in the White House when Afghanistan was occupied. Finally, a fourth president, Biden, decided to evacuate American forces from Afghanistan but the hurried withdrawal was chaotic, further damaging America’s reputation across the globe.
A parallel development in Iraq was also triggered by 9/11. As reported by Peter Bergen, on the afternoon of that ill-fated date in history, Dick Cheney, the US Vice President, began planning an attack on Iraq. Soon afterwards, George W. Bush, the president, began to state with great confidence that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) that it could transfer to al-Qaeda, which would then wreak havoc in the globe. He began to lay out a plan to expand the War on Terror to Iraq and effect regime change in Baghdad.
The Bush Doctrine singled out the Muslim world as an incubator of terrorism, and the message was very clear: Muslim governments that did not comply with US dictates would be forced out
Prior to the vote in Congress, Bush spoke in Cincinnati and said that no definitive proof of Iraq’s intentions was needed, since the only “smoking gun” we may live to see is a mushroom cloud over a US city. A war hype swept throughout the US, but even then, several public rallies took place in major US cities saying, “No to the War for Oil.”
Genuinely alarmed, many experts cautioned the US against engaging in a large-scale war. The renowned British historian of war, Sir Michael Howard, wrote in The Times that the rhetoric and expectations of ‘war’ are counter-productive and much military experience is irrelevant when dealing with transnational terrorism. He said that what is required is skillful political management and patient police work, backed up where necessary by military force in aid of civil power.
However, such a nuanced approach was nowhere to be found anywhere in the document on the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, which was issued by the White House. This document was the clearest statement of the Bush Doctrine and sought to implement the vision that was presented during the presidential elections of 2000 by the Project for a New American Century (PNAC). Written for former Secretary of Defense and later Vice President Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, Bush’s Defense Secretary, the PNAC document described American armed forces abroad in glorious terms as “the cavalry on the new American frontier.”
The Bush Doctrine singled out the Muslim world as an incubator of terrorism, and pledged to support “moderate and modern government, especially in the Muslim world, to ensure that the conditions and ideologies that promote terrorism do not find fertile ground in any nation.” The message was very clear. Muslim governments that did not comply with US dictates would be forced out.
Seeking to deflect criticism that the Bush Doctrine espoused American global domination, a White House spokesperson said that the US had consistently worked for the advancement of “good over evil” during the 20th century. He glossed over the well-known fact that during the second half of the past century, the neo-imperialistic policies of the US made “Yankee Go Home” a household phrase throughout the third world.
These policies also led to the writing of a political novel which later became a movie, The Ugly American. Anti-Americanism was visible everywhere in the globe, since US involvement in overthrowing governments and installing tyrants was well known. The CIA indulged in a rogue campaign of botched up assassinations around the globe, resulting in a presidential order that banned such attempts on foreign heads of state. Examples include Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, Augusto Pinochet in Chile, Suharto in Indonesia, and Mohammad Reza Shah in Iran.
To add insult to injury, the US got involved in a civil war in Vietnam that resulted in 58,000 American casualties and millions of Vietnamese casualties. Graham Greene’s political novel about Vietnam, The Quiet American, was a bestseller. The release of its movie-version was delayed because of 9/11.
The Bush Doctrine stated that while the US would seek allies in the battle against terrorism, as the US had done during the Gulf War, which happened during Bush’s father’s presidency, it would not hesitate to act alone. That included “convincing or compelling states to accept their sovereign responsibilities” not to aid terrorists.
As evidence of civilian casualties in Afghanistan mounted, American historian Howard Zinn noted that while fighting terrorism was a just cause, the White House had confused fighting for a just cause with fighting a war. A war that killed thousands of innocent people and drove hundreds of thousands from their homes could not be considered a just war, regardless of the provocation. It was likely to alienate large numbers of people in the Muslim world.
Yet the US failed to realise that its overwhelming military supremacy across the globe was of limited application when fighting a war among the shadows. Yale historian Paul Kennedy astutely observed: “In today's fractured, war-torn, neo-medieval world, it is quite inadequate to guarantee lasting peace and security, even in the American homeland itself, let alone in the protection of US interests abroad.”
The US sought to pursue an anti-terrorism policy that was entirely focused on exterminating terrorists, without thinking of what factors led some people to turn into terrorists. Like other criminal problems, terrorism has a supply side and a demand side. The US focused exclusively on the supply side and deployed military forces to eliminate the existing terrorist networks. This was an incomplete cure at best. Killing terrorists does not eliminate terrorism, since it also involves killing thousands of innocent people. Thus, for every terrorist that is killed, another one is created.
Of course, the experts who cautioned against going to war did not say that the US should condone acts of terror. They said it should continue to fully prosecute terrorists under the law. However, without condoning terrorism or letting terrorists go free, the US should also focus its energies on preventing future terrorists from being created. It should seek to understand the political problems that are leading large numbers of young people throughout the Muslim world to become terrorists. It should find a way to communicate with these people. It may never be able to convince the likes of Osama bin Laden, but it may be able to reach large numbers of their existing and future followers. Then it should be able to develop political solutions that pull people away from a path where they are willing to sacrifice their lives, to take other lives. Only then would the demand for terrorism diminish.
In some ways, the problem of fighting terrorism is analogous to that of fighting narcotics trafficking. If all the US does is to go after the sources of narcotics, it will fail because the users will find other sources. It would also need to go after the users, their family and friends, and educate them about the harmful effects of using narcotics. It will never get all users to quit, but it may be able to deter a large number from using drugs. In other words, it should also focus on the demand for narcotics, and not just on the supply. The same applies to terrorism.
Even General Pervez Musharraf, who offered unstinted cooperation to the US, advised caution in engaging in a War on Terror. In a press conference, the general compared terrorism to a tree. One can pluck off its leaves, or even cut off its branches, but the tree will grow them back again unless one cuts off its roots. The root causes of terrorism must be tackled, and they are often political. They cannot be solved through military means but require deft political maneuvering.
To this day, whether the U.S. military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq were “necessary” remains one of the most hotly debated questions in modern foreign policy, with stark differences between the two conflicts. While the initial overthrow of the Taliban was swift, most experts question the rationale of letting the war drift into a protracted 20-year nation-building exercise that ultimately failed since the Taliban reclaimed power in 2021 after the US pulled out of Afghanistan. It’s worth noting that while the war began under President Bush, it was supported by two other presidents: Obama and Trump, who rarely saw eye to eye on anything.
As for the Iraq War, the rationale proved to be false. No active WMD programs existed in Iraq nor did Saddam Hussain have any direct or indirect links to the 9/11 attack. By and large, historians and foreign policy analysts regard the invasion of Iraq as an unnecessary and catastrophic strategic blunder. It diverted critical military resources and focus away from Afghanistan, destabilised the Middle East, and severely damaged the global standing of the United States. Furthermore, it led to the creation of ISIS, yet another terrorist organisation, which took the place of Al-Qaeda. A sectarian conflict overwhelmed Iraq. The only winner of this conflict was Iran. It won the war without firing a shot.
How did the US end up blundering not once but twice within the span of two decades? It seems that the U.S. Intelligence Community operated under a rigid, unverified assumption that Saddam Hussein had actively reconstituted his nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs. Intelligence analysts fell victim to a phenomenon known as “herding,” where any data confirming Hussein’s guilt was amplified, while contradictory evidence was ignored or dismissed.
The Bush administration was dominated by experts who lived in an echo chamber where strongly pre-conceived opinions about the Muslim world prevailed. These experts succeeded in convincing the president that Iraq was connected to 9/11 and to other, not yet realised global terror threats. Public communications glossed over deep internal uncertainties within US intelligence agencies. Officials cherry-picked raw, unvetted field reports to present an unambiguous narrative to the United Nations, misrepresenting an environment driven by guesswork as one of absolute certainty.
The so-called War on Terror imposed heavy costs not only on Afghanistan and Iraq, but also on the people of the United States. Data from the Watson Institute’s Costs of War Project at Brown University underscore the starkly uneven burdens of these long-running conflicts.
The numbers show that while the Afghanistan conflict lasted twice as long, the Iraq War yielded significantly higher local civilian casualties and similar long-term financial strains.
Summary of Costs (Post-9/11 Wars through 2026)
| Metric | Afghanistan War (2001–2021) | Iraq and Syria Operations (2003–Present) |
| Direct Financial Cost | $2.3 Trillion | $2.89 Trillion (Includes Syria/ISIS counter-ops) |
| US Military Direct Deaths | ~2,456 U.S. Troops | ~4,500+ U.S. Troops |
| Local Civilian Direct Deaths | ~47,000+ Civilians | Over 300,000+ Civilians |
| Local Military/Police Deaths | ~69,000+ Afghan forces | ~45,000+ Iraqi/Syrian forces |
| Future Veterans' Care Costs | Projected $1T+ by 2050 | Included in total long-term estimates |
The financial totals heavily outran initial 2003 Pentagon predictions of a $50–$60 billion conflict in Iraq. Because these wars were largely funded through emergency borrowing rather than taxation, interest obligations alone will cost the U.S. trillions more over the coming decades.
The numbers above account only for direct violent deaths. The Costs of War Project estimates that structural damage—including destroyed healthcare systems, contaminated water, and severe displacement—led to an additional 3.6 to 3.8 million indirect deaths across all post-9/11 war zones.
Some analysts go to great lengths to justify the War on Terror by saying that it prevented another 9/11 attack from occurring. But that is a non-sequitur. A more focused approach directed at terrorist groups, accompanies by a messaging and educational campaign to nip terror at the source, would have been equally successful at preventing another attack, and it would not have resulted in the horrific damage the was inflicted on the citizens of Afghanistan and Iraq and on the Muslim world more generally which is home to a quarter of the world’s population.
And it is worth emphasising that the unbridled War on Terror has imposed a heavy burden on America’s own population. The US needs to rethink its Grand Strategy and find a way to engage peacefully and cooperatively with the world. It is evident even to the casual observer that US popularity has tanked globally, and not just in the Muslim world. It is time for the decision makers in Washington, DC to read this seminal article by Sir Michael Howard that was published in 1979 in Foreign Affairs. It is entitled, “The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy.” It deemphasises a hard, military-centric approach to dealing with conflicts and emphasises the softer dimensions of strategy, such as politics, economics and culture.