I write these lines in the early hours of 12 October 2025, the very date, twenty-six years ago, when General Pervez Musharraf took control of this country. Today, on this same anniversary, two erstwhile allies, Afghanistan and Pakistan, have exchanged heavy fire across their border. That, at least, is what media reports suggest at the time of writing. These latest clashes follow a series of terrorist attacks on Pakistani security forces in areas adjoining Afghanistan, within Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Pakistan has reportedly carried out retaliatory strikes inside Afghan territory, possibly including airstrikes, which are said to have eliminated senior TTP commanders in Kabul. These claims, however, remain unacknowledged by either side.
In response to these incidents, the Director General of ISPR, Lieutenant General Ahmad Sharif, held a detailed, hour-and-a-half-long press briefing in Peshawar. He articulated the stance and resolve of the Pakistan Armed Forces in confronting the menace of terrorism emanating from Afghan soil, terrorism he reminded, that operates with the support and connivance of the Indian state. It was the language of a soldier whose comrades had been targeted and who has sworn to defend his nation. General Sharif’s remarks also carried an undertone of frustration with Pakistan’s political leadership, which, despite formulating a 20-point National Action Plan to counter terrorism in the wake of the 2014 APS tragedy, has failed to see it through. As a result, the military as an institution now finds itself grappling simultaneously with security, economic and diplomatic challenges, a formidable triad of responsibilities.
While General Sharif was addressing the media in Peshawar, the Afghan Taliban’s Foreign Minister was in India, meeting his counterpart, S. Jaishankar. When asked about the reported strikes in Kabul, he chose his words with care. He refrained from directly accusing Pakistan, instead expressing a desire for friendly relations with both Pakistan and India. General Sharif, for his part, was equally measured, drawing a clear distinction between the TTP militants and the Taliban-led government in Kabul.
Public sentiment in Pakistan, however, is one of anger and disillusionment: we sheltered millions of Afghans for decades, and this is the return we get? Such frustration is widespread. Yet this also invites a deeper question: how did we reach this point? The historical dimension must be left for another occasion; for now, we turn to the future.
One would have to be extraordinarily naïve to believe that the Afghans are unaware of these regional undercurrents
What are Pakistan’s long-term interests in Afghanistan? What implications do these developments hold for our iron brother, China? For our neighbour and partner, Iran? And ultimately, what do they mean for us? Afghanistan is a country with which Pakistan’s western regions share deep cultural and historical ties. Its stability and security are vital to Pakistan’s economic and strategic future, from projects such as the Tajikistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan Gas Pipeline to potential rail and road links providing access to Central Asia. These ambitions cannot materialise without a stable and cooperative Afghanistan. The Afghans, of course, understand this and use that understanding as leverage in pursuit of their political and strategic objectives.
What, then, is Pakistan’s counter-leverage? A clue lies in Amir Khan Muttaqi’s recent statement from Indian soil, where he hinted at the prospect of transit trade through the Wagah border. Should such an arrangement materialise, it would provide Pakistan with a valuable bargaining tool, ensuring that, in return, Afghanistan guarantees Pakistan’s security and facilitates its connectivity to Central Asia and the broader Eurasian bloc discussed by Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit last September. Shall India agree to this proposal in such a hostile atmosphere, following the May clashes? Perhaps it would be wiser to let the Afghans manage that aspect, since it is their desire.
On the other hand, an expanded Indian presence in Afghanistan would be viewed with deep unease not only in Islamabad but also in Beijing and Tehran. For Pakistan, increased Indian involvement in Afghanistan is far from welcome, and for obvious reasons. During the two-decade-long US presence in Afghanistan, it was common knowledge that India operated several consulates close to the Pakistani border. These served the dual purpose of advancing US and Indian objectives: to destabilise Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan and thereby impede progress on the CPEC projects, with the ultimate aim of undermining them. China and Pakistan’s collective resolve resisted this threat, but the effects were nonetheless felt.
Similarly, renewed Indian activity in Afghanistan would make China uncomfortable for several reasons, given their mutual relationship dynamics. Firstly, the Chinese have invested substantially in Afghanistan. Secondly, former US President Donald Trump openly expressed his intention to regain access to the Bagram airbase, situated only a few hundred kilometres from Chinese nuclear facilities. Though Indo-US relations may appear strained at present, a future reset could provide Washington with a pathway to Bagram through an Indian foothold in Afghanistan. Talks of Pakistan doing it for the US could be just a short-term distraction from the real plan.
The Iranians, too, are unlikely to be at ease for similar reasons. The India–Israel nexus is no secret. And who better than the Iranians, along with the Qataris, to understand how that alignment manifested in their conflict with Israel last June? One would have to be extraordinarily naïve to believe that the Afghans are unaware of these regional undercurrents.
Given these outcomes and potential scenarios, it is difficult not to conclude that the Afghan leadership is consciously cultivating leverage, positioning itself to negotiate with its neighbours on its own terms. In the longer run, however, they also recognise the perils of granting India an excessively deep or widespread foothold, knowing that New Delhi’s loyalty to Israel is unquestionable and its future beyond the orbit of American influence unimaginable. It is not too hard to conclude what it could mean for Afghanistan itself.