When the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was formed in 1968 and subsequently enforced in 1970, after a deadlock of many years of negotiations on establishing the three fundamental pillars of the NPT (a) non-proliferation, (b) peaceful uses of nuclear technology, and (c) nuclear disarmament the major nuclear weapons states, now called the P-5, promised to pursue nuclear disarmament under the NPT.
They did not keep their promise of complete disarmament. They failed miserably, despite the indefinite extension of the NPT at the 1995 NPT Review Conference. The commitments to nuclear disarmament were overshadowed by the harsh strategic realities of international politics.
The good news is that there are only nine nuclear-weapon states in the system, despite the perceived danger of a cascade of nuclear proliferation across the board. However, aspirant states seeking to acquire nuclear weapons were either forcefully prevented by the United States or pre-empted through preventive strikes by others, such as Israel and the United States.
Israel pre-empted Iraq, Syria, and, more recently, Iran’s nuclear facilities because of its fear of an “existential threat” from other countries possessing nuclear weapons. Yet Israel remains the only country to possess nuclear weapons in the region while rejecting the proposed nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. This became one of the reasons for the failure of the NPT Review Conference.
The United States did not allow others to acquire nuclear weapons, except the United Kingdom and France, for two simple reasons. First, the United States seeks to promote non-proliferation imperatives by providing a nuclear umbrella (extended deterrence) to its allies and partners, thereby discouraging them from developing their own nuclear capability. Second, many security analysts argue that this approach serves the United States’ vital security interests by retaining its power projection and security dominance over its allies.
The bad news is that the NPT remains weak and ineffective, not even preventing nuclear-weapon states from striking non-nuclear-weapon states that are parties to the NPT. The NPT may not prevent recognised nuclear-weapon states from using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states that are parties to the treaty. This has potentially created a dangerous precedent and a security concern between the “haves” and “have-nots”.
The very foundation of the NPT was based on discrimination between these “haves” and “have-nots”. The NPT continues to live with this dilemma. Since its inception, only those states that had already acquired nuclear-weapon capability before 1 January 1967 have been recognised as nuclear-weapon states, while the rest are treated as outliers within the NPT framework.
There is no clear evidence that disarmament is taking place anywhere in the world
It is because of this foundational weakness that the NPT is widely regarded as a fragile and potentially unravelling treaty, despite its longevity, its extension, and its near-universal membership of 191 states, making it one of the largest surviving treaties in the world. The question remains: is nuclear disarmament taking place anywhere in the world? If not, who will be the first to fulfil their pledge?
In fact, the strategic realities are far more complex than we ideally perceive. Both the United States and Russia continue to possess almost 90 per cent of the world’s total nuclear forces. All major nuclear-weapon states remain unwilling to fulfil their commitments to ultimate nuclear disarmament. Even President Barack Obama’s Prague speech in April 2009, which aspired to a world without nuclear weapons, acknowledged that this goal might not be achieved within his lifetime. Today, all major nuclear states are not only modernising but also expanding their nuclear arsenals, alongside developing increasingly sophisticated delivery systems.
This trend is reinforced by emerging technologies and the temptation to integrate them into both conventional and nuclear domains. None of the major nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT aspires to relinquish its nuclear arsenal, despite possessing strong conventional military capabilities. Except for China, recognised nuclear-weapon states continue to adhere to doctrines that allow for the first use of nuclear weapons in the event of a serious military crisis. The United States, despite its overwhelming conventional superiority, still retains a first-use option. Others follow suit. All nuclear-weapon states recognise the strategic value of nuclear weapons as the ultimate deterrent against potential adversaries.
If nuclear weapons did not carry such deterrent value, major powers would have committed to disarmament long ago. This, however, is not the case. The experiences of states that lacked nuclear weapons—such as Ukraine, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya—illustrate the vulnerability of non-nuclear states. In contrast, North Korea has drawn strategic lessons by withdrawing from the NPT and developing its own nuclear arsenal.
Today, despite its conventional weaknesses and economic fragility, adversaries think carefully before confronting North Korea. The strategic reality is that North Korea has established a credible deterrent. It is now too late for the NPT and global powers to consider its denuclearisation; instead, efforts focus on preventing the use of its nuclear weapons.
Similarly, in South Asia, if Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons, India—with its expanding conventional and nuclear capabilities—might have had greater incentives to initiate conflict. Arguably, Pakistan’s credible nuclear capability, specifically oriented towards India and supported by sophisticated delivery systems, has helped establish strategic balance in the region. Pakistan’s Full-Spectrum Deterrence, within the framework of Credible Minimum Deterrence, has deterred both large-scale and limited war.
Given these realities, the commitment to nuclear disarmament is significantly weakened. There is no clear evidence that disarmament is taking place anywhere in the world. Even established arms control agreements such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and the New START Treaty have eroded or collapsed. This creates incentives for both the United States and Russia to continue modernising and expanding their arsenals.
Consequently, nuclear disarmament is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Nuclear-weapon states will continue to retain these weapons primarily for security purposes, as ultimate deterrents against adversaries. In light of recent developments in Ukraine and Iran, more states may aspire to acquire nuclear weapons for their own security. Those that already possess such capabilities are likely to further modernise and expand them for reasons of security, escalation dominance, and power projection.
Given this context, Pakistan may consider the following policy options. First, it should continue to maintain its nuclear capability focused on deterring India, as long as nuclear weapons exist globally.
Second, despite its contributions to broader non-proliferation efforts, Pakistan has never been part of the NPT due to India. Therefore, it should not join the NPT or the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) under conditions that require relinquishing its nuclear weapons or accepting a non-nuclear status. Instead, Pakistan should advocate for structural reforms within these regimes that accommodate its nuclear status.
Third, Pakistan should not join the NPT even if India were to do so without nuclear weapons, due to the growing conventional asymmetry between the two states. India’s advanced conventional capabilities could still incentivise military action in the absence of nuclear deterrence.
Finally, Pakistan should continue to support universal principles of equity, transparency, and non-discrimination regarding the three core pillars of the NPT: non-proliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear technology.
In sum, the current NPT Review Conference, beginning on 27 April, is unlikely to achieve its major objectives, including the establishment of a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, agreement on complete nuclear disarmament, and resolution of the enduring divide between nuclear “haves” and “have-nots”.