Defining Pakistan’s Power Market Beyond Legacy Power Purchase Agreements

Pakistan must move beyond power purchase agreements and guaranteed returns by settling disputed IPP obligations, redefining commercial risks and ensuring that DISCO privatisation follows framework for investment, affordability and sustainability

Defining Pakistan’s Power Market Beyond Legacy Power Purchase Agreements

Pakistan’s electricity debate remains dominated by old power purchase agreements: their costs, returns, equity claims and risk allocations. These legacy transactions must be verified and settled. But the central question is what model will govern future generation, distribution and supply and who will bear commercial risk as the sector moves towards competition.

Agora Energiewende’s June 2026 study, Reforming Power Purchase Agreements for Flexible Coal Power, offers a useful framework. Written by Ernst Kuneman and Anatole Boute, it examines contracts and legal arrangements across Pakistan and four other Asian power systems. The study argues that legacy contracts can adapt to changing system needs if due process and the legitimate economic bargain are preserved. For Pakistan, the larger lesson is forward-looking: sovereign-backed demand risk and guaranteed returns cannot remain the default model. The country must define its future market before selling major assets or inviting new investment.

Why the existing contracts no longer fit the system

Pakistan’s thermal power agreements were designed to attract investment in new capacity. Investors accepted construction, operating and financing risks; the state assumed substantial demand, dispatch, payment and regulatory risks. Capacity payments, guaranteed offtake and sovereign support made projects bankable.

The system has since changed. Distributed solar has reduced daytime grid demand, while variable renewables require plants that can ramp output, operate at lower loads and provide reserves. Agora notes that Pakistan’s coal plants reduced output as solar deployment accelerated between 2022 and 2025, although flexible coal operation has not been formally adopted as a transition strategy.

The system needs flexibility, but contracts reward baseload availability and production. Even technically capable plants may not be compensated for cycling, maintenance, lower efficiency or investment needed to operate flexibly. The report cites a 50 per cent minimum-offtake provision for the 1,320 MW Sahiwal plant. Output below that threshold triggers payment obligations, with energy credits allowing the shortfall to be dispatched over the next two years. This protects investors against demand risk but can encourage later coal generation just as the system absorbs more low-cost solar.

Exceptional returns and disputed equity must be resolved

Reform must address evidence that some legacy independent power producers (IPPs) earned exceptional returns from low-risk, government-guaranteed investments. The Muhammad Ali Committee reported in March 2020 that 16 IPPs established under the 1994 policy had invested Rs51.8 billion, earned profits exceeding Rs415 billion and distributed more than Rs310 billion in dividends. Six recorded average annual returns on equity of 60 to 79 per cent and four earned around 40 per cent. For 2002-policy plants, the committee estimated that 11 IPPs had received Rs64.22 billion above the regulated return during the period reviewed.

These were disputed committee estimates, not final legal determinations. They warrant verification of invested capital, tariff costs and recoveries. Alleged “ghost equity” must be distinguished from recovery of a sponsor’s initial investment: early dividends alone do not invalidate regulatory equity or agreed returns. The committee also identified a Rs32.46 billion difference between set-up costs allowed by the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) for Sahiwal and Port Qasim and costs reflected in their accounts, recommending forensic examination.

Claims of ghost equity require project-level examination of invoices, bank records, loan drawdowns, related-party contracts, equity injections and dividends. Substantiated excess payments should be recovered or offset; valid claims and arrears must also be recognised. Settlement requires both sides of the ledger. The deeper defect was demand-risk allocation. Capacity-based and take-or-pay arrangements insulated available plants, leaving the state and consumers to absorb weak demand, technological change and surplus capacity. Without meaningful demand exposure, sponsors had little incentive to challenge optimistic forecasts. A technically sound, properly financed plant could still be economically unnecessary.

The central question is what model will govern future generation, distribution and supply and who will bear commercial risk as the sector moves towards competition.

A disadvantageous bargain is not automatically unlawful. Pakistan must distinguish valid obligations, terms amendable by agreement and substantiated errors requiring legal correction. That distinction is essential to closing the legacy chapter rather than perpetuating renegotiation.

Legacy obligations still require orderly settlement

Contractual credibility does not protect misrepresentation or unauthorised payments. Corrections must follow applicable law and contractual procedures, including limitation periods and determination by the competent forum. Remedies should address quantified errors, not become a pretext for wholesale political renegotiation. Nor does credibility require preserving every operating assumption. Pakistan’s standard agreements contain change-in-law, force-majeure, tariff-adjustment, modification and termination mechanisms to address changed circumstances and their financial consequences.

Agora recommends regulatory intervention followed by structured renegotiation. The regulator should define required ramp rates, minimum loads, reserves and dispatch obligations, then assess each plant’s technical and financial response. Where obligations alter costs or expected returns, contractual adjustments should preserve the legitimate economic balance. This respects regulatory authority and legitimate investor rights while reducing arbitration risk. Foreign-investor claims depend on the applicable contracts, treaties, jurisdiction and facts; neither protection nor compensation is automatic. Due process is more defensible than improvised pressure.

Pay for the services the system requires

Reform should define the service being purchased. Inflexible baseload capacity is not equivalent to capacity that can start quickly, reduce output during solar hours, ramp for evening demand and support grid frequency. Tariffs should reward the services the system needs. For single-buyer systems, Agora proposes three payments: flexible firm capacity, time-differentiated energy and ancillary services. Capacity payments would reward availability within required notice periods; energy premiums would reflect valuable operating hours; ancillary payments would compensate frequency response, reactive power and other grid support.

This is more rational than rewarding installed availability regardless of changing system needs. It could also support transition to the Competitive Trading Bilateral Contract Market. As liquidity and settlement improve, some capacity could face short-term energy and reserve prices, with financial hedges retaining appropriate revenue certainty. Sequencing is critical. Pakistan cannot abruptly transfer demand and price risk to a shallow wholesale market. Replacing physical contracts requires reliable metering, transparent dispatch, enforceable settlement, open transmission access, creditworthy buyers and safeguards against market power.

Define the future market before privatising distribution companies

Pakistan must clarify the pace of wholesale competition, separation of distribution from retail supply, customer choice, legacy capacity obligations, uniform tariffs, subsidies and supplier-failure rules. These decisions define the businesses investors will acquire and the risks they will assume.

The distribution company (DISCO) privatisation process illustrates the problem. FESCO, GEPCO and IESCO have advanced through restructuring and investor prequalification, while tariff methodology, regulatory responsibilities, market structure and residual liabilities remained under consideration in November 2026. The government acknowledged further technical and policy work. This suggests that transactions are advancing ahead of the framework determining their value and viability.

Before selling a DISCO, the state must specify the assets and obligations transferred: networks, land, receivables, debt, pensions, litigation, subsidies and legacy power purchases. It must define whether the buyer acquires a regulated network, a retail supplier or both; how customer choice and open access work; and who bears deviations in demand, collections and procurement costs.

Risk and return must be explicit. Regulated networks may earn an allowed return on verified, efficient assets, subject to investment and service obligations. Competitive suppliers should bear the results of procurement, collections and customer retention. Neither should receive implicit protection against commercial losses. Otherwise, bidders will discount prices, demand guarantees or seek relief after purchase.

Reform must deliver reliable electricity at the lowest sustainable cost, targeted support for vulnerable households and tariffs that allow efficient exporters to compete. Export-led growth is central to Pakistan’s foreign exchange, productivity and employment prospects. Every market, tariff and privatisation decision should therefore pass two tests: does it improve consumer service and affordability, and does it strengthen export competitiveness? Merely reallocating losses while preserving high costs fails both.

The sequence is clear: approve the market architecture, allocate legacy assets and liabilities, establish licensing and tariffs, define risk and return, and make settlement and open access operational. Privatisation should follow, not precede, these decisions. Pakistan cannot replace the old IPP model with an undefined one. It must settle yesterday’s obligations and decide how tomorrow’s sector will invest, trade and compete without returning commercial losses to the state.