Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), long seen as close partners in the Gulf region, have increasingly diverged in their strategic priorities, leading to open tensions in recent years. What began as subtle competition over economic influence and foreign policy has escalated into proxy confrontations, particularly in Yemen and Sudan, as both nations vie for regional dominance amid a shifting Middle East landscape.
This rift, often described as a "cold war" between the two oil-rich monarchies, reflects deeper ideological and practical differences: Saudi Arabia's emphasis on stability and centralised control versus the UAE's more aggressive support for non-state actors and secessionist movements to expand its influence. By late 2025 and early 2026, these frictions burst into public view, with Saudi airstrikes on UAE-linked assets in Yemen marking a significant escalation.
The Yemen Flashpoint: Separatism vs. Unity
Yemen has emerged as the most visible arena of conflict between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Both countries initially aligned in a Saudi-led coalition against the Houthi rebels starting in 2015, but their approaches diverged sharply by 2019. The UAE has backed the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist group advocating for southern Yemen's independence, which aligns with Abu Dhabi's strategy of supporting fragmented entities to secure strategic ports and trade routes like the Bab al-Mandab Strait. In contrast, Saudi Arabia prioritises Yemen's territorial unity to protect its southern border and prevent instability from spilling over.
Tensions peaked in December 2025 when the STC launched an offensive, seizing oil-rich provinces like Hadramawt and al-Mahra near the Saudi border. Riyadh responded with airstrikes on a UAE weapons shipment at the port of Mukalla on 30 December 2025, accusing Abu Dhabi of undermining Yemen's political process and fragmenting the anti-Houthi front. Saudi officials viewed this as a direct threat to national security, leading to demands for the UAE's withdrawal from Yemen within 24 hours.
The UAE announced a "voluntary" pullout shortly after, but analysts suggest this was a face-saving measure following the strikes, which destroyed military equipment and highlighted Riyadh's resolve. This incident not only exposed mutual distrust but also underscored ideological divides, with Saudi Arabia alarmed by the UAE's perceived promotion of separatism that could benefit Iranian-backed Houthis in the long term.
Sudan and the Horn of Africa: Proxy Wars and Resource Control
Beyond Yemen, the rivalry extends to Sudan, where the two Gulf powers support opposing sides in the ongoing civil war. Saudi Arabia backs the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the central government, positioning itself as a mediator focused on stability and state-to-state relations. Conversely, the UAE has been accused of arming the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group implicated in atrocities, to gain leverage over gold mines, Red Sea ports, and trade routes. This support forms part of what experts call the UAE's "axis of secessionists," a network spanning Sudan, Libya, Somalia, and Yemen, aimed at creating an alternative regional order through non-state actors.
While direct conflict is unlikely, experts predict a "very public divorce" with ongoing proxy rivalries, potentially recalibrating in Saudi Arabia's favour as reputational costs mount
In the broader Horn of Africa, divergences are evident in Somalia and Somaliland. The UAE maintains military and economic ties with Somaliland, including a base at Berbera port, and has aligned with Ethiopia, while Saudi Arabia supports the federal government in Mogadishu to counter fragmentation. Recent Israeli recognition of Somaliland, condemned by Riyadh but not Abu Dhabi, has amplified Saudi concerns about encirclement, especially given the UAE's close ties with Israel. These proxy engagements risk escalating into broader instability, with Saudi Arabia reportedly coordinating with Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan to restrict UAE activities, such as limiting overflights suspected of supplying the RSF.
Economic and Energy Rivalries: Competing Visions for the Future
Economic competition underpins much of the rift, as both nations diversify beyond oil under ambitious visions—Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 and the UAE's similar initiatives. Disputes within OPEC+ have been a flashpoint: The UAE resents Saudi-led production cuts that constrain its output, viewing them as favouring Riyadh's dominance. In 2021, Abu Dhabi threatened to exit the cartel, and tensions persist over quotas amid plans to expand capacity.
On the ground, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) has pressured multinational companies to relocate headquarters from Dubai to Riyadh, launched competing airlines, tech hubs, and tourism projects, and even relaxed alcohol laws to attract expatriates. This zero-sum approach reflects MBS's frustration with what he sees as the UAE's "backstabbing" in regional affairs, including independent diplomacy that sidelines Saudi interests. Broader soft power clashes, such as rival football investments, further illustrate the fraying partnership.
Geopolitical Alignments: Diverging Alliances and Ideologies
The split also stems from contrasting foreign policies. The UAE's normalisation with Israel via the 2020 Abraham Accords and its alignment with Russia on energy issues contrast with Saudi Arabia's insistence on Palestinian statehood for any Israel deal and its 2023 reconciliation with Iran. Riyadh views Abu Dhabi's Israel ties as abandoning Gulf consensus, especially amid the Gaza conflict, and as part of a strategy to encircle Saudi influence. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia's pivot toward Turkey, Pakistan, and China signals a more independent stance, sidelining the UAE's opportunistic networks.
Ideologically, Saudi Arabia accuses the UAE of backing "separatist armed actors" that threaten regional security, a charge once levelled against Iran—ironic given Tehran's weakened position. Analysts note the UAE's "break-to-build" model prioritises disruption for leverage, while Saudi Arabia favours preserving regimes for stability.
Implications and Outlook
This rupture could destabilise the Red Sea corridor, disrupt energy markets, and complicate reconstruction in war-torn states like Yemen and Sudan, turning them into influence auctions. For the US and Europe, it hampers unified fronts against Iran and Houthi threats, while creating opportunities for actors like Turkey to fill voids. Projects like the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor face delays due to competing routes. While direct conflict is unlikely, experts predict a "very public divorce" with ongoing proxy rivalries, potentially recalibrating in Saudi Arabia's favour as reputational costs mount. Ultimately, this new phase in Arab geopolitics highlights how reduced external threats have allowed internal ambitions to fracture Gulf unity.
The Saudi-UAE fracture offers Pakistan a pathway to greater relevance in multipolar geopolitics, but at the cost of increased entanglement in Middle Eastern volatilities
Implications for Pakistan’s Foreign Policy
The escalating rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE places Pakistan in a precarious yet opportunistic position, compelling it to recalibrate its foreign policy toward deeper alignment with Riyadh while navigating potential strains with Abu Dhabi. Historically, Pakistan has maintained strong ties with both Gulf powers, benefiting from economic aid, remittances, and military cooperation. Saudi Arabia has long been a key financier, providing billions in loans and oil on deferred payments, while the UAE hosts millions of Pakistani expatriates and serves as a trade hub.
However, the rift, intensified by events like the December 2025 Yemen airstrikes where Saudi forces targeted UAE-backed separatists, has forced Islamabad to hedge its bets, culminating in the September 2025 Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) with Saudi Arabia. This pact, which treats aggression against one as against both, formalises decades of informal defence ties and introduces nuclear ambiguity, positioning Pakistan as a potential extended deterrent for Saudi interests without explicit commitments.
For Pakistan, this shift implies enhanced strategic leverage in the Middle East, allowing it to project itself as a security provider beyond its India-centric focus. The agreement opens doors to joint military planning, intelligence sharing, and exercises, bolstering Islamabad's role in regional hotspots like Yemen and Sudan, where Pakistan has reportedly coordinated with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt to counter UAE influence, such as restricting overflights for arms supplies to the Rapid Support Forces.
Economically, it promises intensified Saudi investments and aid, crucial amid Pakistan's fiscal challenges, potentially revitalising ties in a "new era" of security and economic cooperation. This alignment also diversifies Pakistan's alliances, intersecting with its close relations with China and Turkey, and could mainstream it in Islamic forums, enhancing its diplomatic stature.
Yet, the implications carry significant risks, demanding a delicate balancing act. Leaning toward Saudi Arabia may strain relations with the UAE, which has been a vital economic partner; reports suggest Pakistan is "trapped" between the two, with potential repercussions like reduced remittances or investment if Abu Dhabi perceives favouritism. More critically, it complicates ties with Iran, a neighbour sharing a porous border, as the pact could be viewed as anti-Iranian amid Riyadh's rivalries, testing Pakistan's professed neutrality and risking escalation in proxy conflicts.
Nuclear elements, while downplayed officially, invite scrutiny from the US and non-proliferation regimes, potentially limiting Pakistan's manoeuvrability. From an Indian viewpoint, the deal heightens concerns, as it could embolden Pakistan's regional posture, indirectly affecting South Asian dynamics and India's Gulf outreach.
Overall, the Saudi-UAE fracture offers Pakistan a pathway to greater relevance in multipolar geopolitics, but at the cost of increased entanglement in Middle Eastern volatilities. Islamabad's foreign policy may evolve toward pragmatic opportunism—prioritising Saudi ties for immediate gains while mitigating fallout with the UAE and Iran—though overextension could exacerbate domestic instabilities or alienate key allies. As the rift deepens into 2026, Pakistan's success will hinge on agile diplomacy to convert these tensions into strategic advantages without becoming a pawn in Gulf power plays.