Right Of Self-Defence Against Cross-Border Terrorism: A South Asian Perspective

An examination of evolving international law on cross-border counter-terrorism, contested unable-or-unwilling doctrine, and legal justification for Pakistan’s use of force against terrorist sanctuaries in Afghanistan compared with India’s cross-border strikes

Right Of Self-Defence Against Cross-Border Terrorism: A South Asian Perspective

Post-9/11, the use of force against non-state actors (NSAs) operating across international borders has increased significantly worldwide. States have repeatedly invoked their inherent right to self-defence against cross-border terrorist sanctuaries (CBTS) without the consent of the territorial state. This insight examines emerging scholarly writings and state practice concerning the threshold for the use of force against CBTS under the principles of international law, drawing on recent global practices and case studies from South Asia.

In principle, states are prohibited from using force under Article 2(4) of the United Nations (UN) Charter, subject to two exceptions: the right of self-defence under Article 51 or authorisation by the UN Security Council (UNSC). Over time, the interpretation of Article 51 has been extended to include attacks by non-state actors, particularly following UNSC Resolutions 1368 and 1373, which provided the basis for the United States' (US) invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Other instances include Colombia's incursion into Ecuador in 2008, Türkiye's operations in Iraq and Syria, and Kenya's Operation Linda Nchi against Al-Shabaab.

This trend continued with Israel's invasion of Gaza, invoking the right to self-defence against Hamas following October 2023, and extending the same rationale to its invasion of Lebanon in 2024. Tested against the criteria of imminence, necessity and proportionality, Pakistan's strikes in Afghanistan qualify as lawful self-defence, while India's strikes against Pakistan in 2019 and 2025 fail to meet these requirements. States have expanded the conventional interpretation of Article 51 and have increasingly sought to justify attacks against NSAs under the unable-or-unwilling doctrine (UUD). This doctrine applies where the actions of NSAs cannot be attributed to the territorial or host state, but that state is either unable or unwilling to act against them.

The doctrine can be traced back to the 1970s, when the Nixon administration launched attacks against North Vietnamese forces in Cambodia. It gained prominence following the US-led campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Syria in 2014. However, the customary status of the UUD remains ambiguous. The jurisprudence concerning the application of Article 51 to attacks against NSAs operating in foreign territory has evolved through International Court of Justice (ICJ) judgments, which have held that the legality of such actions can only be justified if the activities of the NSAs are attributable to the territorial state. State practice, however, continues to expand, creating a need for clearly established parameters governing the application of the UUD.

Scholarly writings identify three requirements for the application of the UUD. These three-tiered criteria have been synthesised from leading scholarship, including the Bethlehem Principles (16 principles governing self-defence against NSAs), alongside established principles of international law. The first criterion requires that the threat be imminent. The second requires that the use of force be proportionate to the threat. The third requires that force be used only when necessary, as a last resort, after reasonable diplomatic remedies have been exhausted and clear and convincing evidence has established that the territorial state is unwilling or unable to act, despite having been given a genuine opportunity to do so.

In South Asia, the use of force under the UUD has gained prominence as a counter-terrorism measure. Two notable case studies are India's cross-border strikes in 2019 and 2025 and Pakistan's 2026 invocation of the right to self-defence against CBTS in Afghanistan. In India's case, the 2019 and 2025 strikes occurred shortly after alleged terrorist incidents, without supporting evidence linking the attacks to the militant groups in question or establishing Pakistan's alleged involvement. The occurrence of a completed attack did not, in itself, establish that a further armed attack was imminent. India therefore failed to provide an objective basis for demonstrating that another attack was sufficiently probable or to present evidence attributing the incidents to the militant groups allegedly operating from Pakistan. Consequently, the criteria of imminence and necessity were not fulfilled.

The use of force must meet three cumulative requirements: imminence, proportionality and necessity, with military action remaining a last resort after reasonable diplomatic remedies have been exhausted.

India's response was also disproportionate to the alleged threat. The 2025 attacks resulted in significant civilian casualties and expanded hostilities beyond what could be considered a proportionate response to the alleged threat. Both the 2019 and 2025 strikes were followed by days of continued military confrontation. More importantly, the threat was not established as an ongoing or imminent one beyond the isolated incidents, thereby raising further questions about the proportionality of India's response. Finally, the absence of prior communication with Pakistan, including any demand or opportunity for it to act against the alleged threats, means that India cannot establish Pakistan's unwillingness or inability to eliminate them. Thus, India failed to meet the UUD's last-resort requirement. An assessment of Pakistani strikes against Afghanistan using the same three-tiered test produces different results.

To satisfy the criterion of imminence, Pakistan has presented evidence beyond its own intelligence assessments. In February 2025, the UN's Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team reported that the Afghan Taliban were paying the TTP's emir approximately $43,000 per month and hosting new TTP training camps across five provinces. Pakistan raised these findings at the UNSC in 2025, with its Permanent Representative citing nearly 6,000 TTP fighters operating across more than 60 camps in Afghanistan. The UN's 2026 report also cites the training of BLA fighters alongside the TTP in Afghanistan.

Imminence is further supported by the continuing nature and scale of the cross-border threat. TTP- and BLA-backed attacks in Pakistan, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan, are averaging three per day. Terrorism originating from Afghanistan has been described at the UNSC as the "gravest threat" to Pakistan's national security, while Pakistan ranks first on the Global Terrorism Index. Regarding proportionality, Pakistan's operations in Afghanistan have taken place against the backdrop of persistent terrorist activity since the establishment of the Taliban government in 2021. BLA- and TTP-linked violence contributed to more than 4,000 fatalities in 2024–2025, including 1,479 deaths among security personnel. Pakistan's strikes were directed exclusively against terrorist targets rather than the Afghan state or civilians.

Before resorting to force, Pakistan repeatedly pursued diplomatic avenues. In December 2023, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Afghanistan's chargé d'affaires and demanded that Kabul "apprehend and hand over" the TTP leadership and take concrete action against the BLA leadership. The same concerns were also raised during talks in Doha and Istanbul in 2025. However, Afghanistan failed to take substantial action. Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid responded by describing the NSAs as "Pakistan's internal issue", while Kabul consistently declined Pakistani requests to expel the TTP and BLA leadership. Pakistan resorted to force only after these diplomatic efforts had failed.

In conclusion, although state practice in this area is still evolving, it is imperative to adhere to the cumulative requirements of imminence, proportionality and necessity. Subject to these requirements, Pakistan reserves its right to eliminate threats posed by CBTS, including the TTP, BLA and any other non-state actors operating from foreign territory. Failure to observe these safeguards risks enabling states such as India, Israel and the US to misuse the UUD for political gain and with impunity. These safeguards are therefore essential to prevent the erosion of territorial sovereignty under international law.