When flash floods strike Pakistan, political leaders often cite two primary causes: water releases from India and Pakistan’s own failure to construct upstream dams. While India’s role remains a contentious topic, the demand for new dams is particularly controversial in Sindh. Both issues are of deep concern to Pakistanis, and understanding their complexities requires a closer look at history, infrastructure, and governance.
The Role of the Ravi River and the Indus Waters Treaty
The recent surge in the Ravi River caused widespread devastation, including loss of lives, drowning of livestock, and destruction of property. Unchecked encroachments in riverine areas and weak governance undoubtedly worsened the impact, but the Ravi’s troubled history also tells a deeper story.
In Lahore, crowds gathered on the river bridge to witness a spectacle many had never seen in their lifetime, ignoring repeated warnings from rescue teams. People rushed to its banks as if greeting a long-lost beloved. They knew it had swallowed lives, yet brought their children to witness the sight, fearing the river might vanish again. It was a scene of ruin and rapture: warnings from police went unheard as the Ravi roared past concrete walls built to cage it, declaring, “Look, I have returned.”
Its waters carried both fury and joy—sweeping away homes, livestock, and the illusions of mafias and officials who had thrived in its absence. Yet, in its restless surge, it sought reunion with all who once rowed, fished, and celebrated along its shores. When at last it spread miles wide and paused, it seemed to sigh: “Much has changed. But before I am imprisoned again, I will see it all.” For decades, the Ravi had been a “dying river,” its water reduced to a trickle.
This scarcity traces back to the Indus Waters Treaty (1960), which allocated the Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas (the Eastern Rivers) to India for consumptive use, while assigning the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab (the Western Rivers) to Pakistan.
This stark disparity in water storage capacity has direct implications for flood management and water security
Functions of Dams, Headworks, and Barrages
Before analysing the impact of these structures, it is important to distinguish their roles:
Dams are large, high-altitude structures built to store vast volumes of water for year-round release and hydroelectric generation. Despite being classified as “run-of-the-river” in some cases, their reservoirs ensure controlled supply throughout the year.
India: Over 5,700 large dams, with 447 more under construction — the third largest number worldwide after China and the United States.
Pakistan: About 150 dams, including 73 large dams (over 15 metres), with Tarbela and Mangla as the most significant.
This stark disparity in water storage capacity has direct implications for flood management and water security.
Headworks and Barrages, in contrast, are built on flatter terrain. Their purpose is not large-scale storage but regulation and diversion of flow. They raise water levels slightly, enabling diversion into canals. Barrages, with gated regulators, allow precise control of downstream releases.
India’s Water Diversion Infrastructure on the Ravi
On the Indian side, three major structures regulate and divert the Ravi’s waters:
Thein (Ranjit Sagar) Dam: Commissioned in 2001, with 2.34 MAF of usable storage and 600 MW capacity.
Madhopur Headworks: Built in 1902 to feed the Upper Bari Doab Canal, it diverts Ravi water for irrigation, leaving Pakistan’s stretch of the river largely dry under the treaty.
Shahpur Kandi Barrage: Completed in 2024, this dam-cum-barrage retains ~9.74 million cubic metres of pondage and generates 206 MW. It allows India to fully utilise its share of Ravi waters under the Indus Waters Treaty, with significant agricultural, energy, and geopolitical implications.
Lessons from Pakistan’s Own Headworks
Although headworks are often assumed to have little effect on natural river flow, history shows otherwise. The Khanki Headworks, built by the British in 1889 on the Chenab near Gujranwala, transformed semi-arid plains into fertile farmland, enabling the rise of Lyallpur (now Faisalabad). By raising river levels and diverting water into canals, it provided reliable irrigation even during dry seasons and laid the foundation for Faisalabad’s textile-based economy.
Evidence of Declining River Flows
In his column Water shortages: present and future, Naseer Memon, a senior journalist and civil society professional, highlighted in narrative form the long-term decline in river flows since 1976. His observations are presented below in tabulated form:
| River Group | Control | Water Flow (1976–1998) | Water Flow (1999–2022) | Reduction (MAF) | Reduction (%) |
| Western Rivers | Pakistan | 135.6 | 120.8 | 14.8 | 11% |
| Eastern Rivers | India | 9.35 | 2.96 | 6.39 | 68% |
The data clearly shows that flows in the Eastern Rivers under India’s control declined far more sharply (68%) compared to the Western Rivers under Pakistan’s control (11%) over the same period.
The purpose of presenting this evidence is not to echo the media-driven rhetoric that routinely blames India for Pakistan’s water shortages without a nuanced understanding of the Indus system. Rather, it is to examine how, alongside other factors, infrastructure—dams, headworks, and barrages—affects water availability at different points across the basin. The figures indicate that these structures, whether in India or Pakistan, influence downstream flows more significantly than their formal definitions might suggest. The specific impact of Pakistan’s own infrastructure on lower riparian areas will be explored in the next chapter.