President Donald Trump’s renewed call for countries such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Qatar to join the Abraham Accords has once again sparked speculation about whether Islamabad might be preparing to shift one of its longest-held foreign policy positions: its refusal to recognise Israel.
It is a familiar cycle. A high-profile diplomatic statement is made, rumours swirl, political commentators begin parsing possible signals, and Pakistan is suddenly portrayed as being on the verge of a major strategic recalibration.
But in this case, as in many before it, the reality is much simpler.
Pakistan will not join the Abraham Accords under the present conditions.
The reason is neither hidden nor ambiguous. Pakistan’s position on recognising Israel has been stated repeatedly, consistently, and publicly by successive governments: any normalisation of ties is contingent on the implementation of United Nations resolutions on Palestine, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, and a return to the pre-1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital.
Those conditions remain unmet.
Indeed, they appear more distant today than at any point in recent memory.
That alone explains why Trump’s invitation—however diplomatically significant—will not result in Pakistan becoming part of the Abraham Accords.
When Trump first launched the accords during his previous presidency, they were hailed as a breakthrough in Middle Eastern diplomacy. Countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan normalised ties with Israel, reshaping regional alliances and giving Washington an important geopolitical victory.
The underlying premise was clear: Arab and Muslim-majority states could separate their own national interests from the unresolved Palestinian question.
For some governments, that calculation made strategic sense.
Trump’s invitation may generate headlines. It will not, however, change Pakistan’s answer
For Pakistan, it does not.
Unlike many of the countries that joined the accords, Pakistan has explicitly linked recognition of Israel to Palestinian statehood. This has not been a symbolic diplomatic posture designed for public consumption. It is a foundational policy position rooted in both principle and politics.
Pakistan’s support for Palestine has long been framed not merely as foreign policy, but as a moral and historical commitment. It is tied to the country’s own identity and to a broad domestic political consensus that cuts across ideological lines.
No government in Islamabad—civilian or military—has shown any willingness to abandon that framework. Nor is there any reason to believe that will change now.
Trump himself may have acknowledged as much. In discussing the expansion of the Abraham Accords, he suggested that while many countries could eventually join, “one or two” might have reasons not to—and that this would be understandable. Though he did not specify which countries he meant, Pakistan almost certainly fits that category.
Its position is fundamentally different from that of Saudi Arabia or Qatar, both of which have more diplomatic flexibility and broader strategic room for manoeuvre. Pakistan, by contrast, has tied itself publicly and repeatedly to a very specific condition: justice for Palestine first, normalisation later.
That condition matters.
And right now, it is nowhere close to being fulfilled.
Far from moving towards a two-state solution, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has entered a period of deeper uncertainty. Settlement expansion continues in the occupied West Bank. Diplomatic efforts towards meaningful peace negotiations have largely collapsed. International consensus on a viable political settlement remains elusive.
In that environment, for Pakistan to suddenly normalise ties with Israel would not be seen as pragmatic diplomacy. It would be viewed, both domestically and internationally, as a retreat from principle.
That is politically untenable.
Public opinion in Pakistan remains overwhelmingly sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. Any government seen as moving towards recognition without a Palestinian state in place would face fierce political opposition and likely significant public backlash.
At a time when Pakistan is already navigating political instability and economic challenges, opening another deeply contentious front would make little strategic sense.
None of this means Pakistan will disengage from the broader regional diplomatic shifts taking place around it. Islamabad will continue to maintain close relationships with countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, regardless of their own calculations regarding Israel. It will also continue balancing its ties with the United States and the wider Middle East.
But diplomatic alignment does not require policy imitation. Pakistan can support regional stability while maintaining its own red lines. And in Israel, that red line remains unchanged.
Could that change someday? Possibly. Foreign policy is not immutable. If there were genuine movement towards implementing United Nations resolutions, if a credible Palestinian state were established, and if the pre-1967 framework became politically attainable, Pakistan would have grounds to reconsider its position.
But that is not today’s reality.
Today, Trump may be inviting Pakistan to join the Abraham Accords. He may hope that broader momentum towards normalisation will eventually draw Islamabad in. Yet Pakistan’s own policy leaves little room for ambiguity.
Until there is a just settlement for the Palestinians—one grounded in international law and statehood—Pakistan will remain outside the Abraham Accords.
Trump’s invitation may generate headlines. It will not, however, change Pakistan’s answer.