The Architecture Changes Immediately; The People Transition Progressively

Pakistan's future competitiveness will depend increasingly on whether its most talented public servants are organized to administer yesterday's state or to build tomorrow's

The Architecture Changes Immediately; The People Transition Progressively

Final part of a three-part series on redesigning Pakistan’s civil service.

Redesigning Pakistan’s civil service around professional specialization, while devolving administration and ordinary policing closer to the citizen, represents fundamental institutional change. But fundamental reform does not require institutional chaos. The architecture can change decisively while the careers, experience and legitimate rights of those already serving within it are protected through a managed transition.

Officers already serving in specialist occupational groups would continue within their respective vertical services. Future recruitment to PAS would cease. Serving PAS officers would not be displaced; they would be given the opportunity to select the professional group in which they wish to spend the remainder of their careers. That group would thereafter become their home service, ending the practice of moving generalist officers across unrelated areas of government. The transition should invest heavily in PAS officers already in the system. Senior officers at Grade 20 and above should be given opportunities to undertake doctoral studies at leading foreign universities. The objective is not to discard accumulated experience but to combine it with the professional knowledge required by the redesigned system.

Professional independence also requires legal protection. Civil servants are required to implement the policies of elected government, but that obligation remains subject to the Constitution and law. An officer who declines to carry out an unlawful direction must be protected rather than punished through transfer or other administrative pressure. Such legal protection must be accompanied by greater security of tenure. Arbitrary and premature transfers weaken institutions, discourage officers from taking ownership of assignments and make accountability difficult. Officers should therefore have protected tenures. Where government considers a premature transfer necessary, the reasons should be recorded in writing and the officer should have a right of appeal.

The architecture can change decisively while the careers, experience and legitimate rights of those already serving within it are protected through a managed transition.

Compensation must change as well. If government expects to recruit and retain highly qualified professionals, salaries must increasingly become commensurate with the market. At the same time, the present system of non-cash privileges should progressively disappear. Houses, cars, household servants and similar benefits should be monetized and incorporated transparently into market-based compensation.

The government office itself also needs redesign. Most routine work should be digitized and equipped with management information systems (MIS), allowing support staff to be reduced to the minimum genuinely required. Existing employees made surplus by digitization and MIS should not simply be dismissed. They should enter a central pool for retraining and redeployment into areas of government and private sector where their skills are needed. Government housing should not simply be withdrawn without an alternative. The housing needs of public servants should become part of a broader affordable-housing program available to citizens generally. The solution and design of such a program are available, but are beyond the scope of this article.

Career progression must also cease to be principally a function of time served. Promotions and salary increments should be linked to performance, measured against clearly defined KPIs and outcomes. Assessments should be discussed openly with officers during annual appraisal rather than disappearing into a confidential reporting system that provides little meaningful professional feedback. Any reform of this magnitude will cause some disruption. That cannot be avoided. But Pakistan's experience also demonstrates the danger of excessive gradualism. Incremental reform gives an established system time to absorb change, adapt around it and eventually neutralize much of what was intended. Reform after reform can alter procedures while leaving the underlying structure intact.

The alternative is not reckless overnight dismantling. It is a decisive change in direction accompanied by a managed transition. Existing specialists continue in their professions. Future PAS recruitment ends, while serving PAS officers choose permanent professional homes. Employees are retrained rather than dismissed. Tenures are protected. Compensation is modernized. Performance becomes measurable. New recruitment progressively feeds professionally qualified officers into the redesigned services. The architecture changes immediately; the people transition progressively. That is about as smooth a transition as fundamental institutional reform can reasonably achieve. More importantly, it should allow the first meaningful results to become visible within a single electoral cycle. 

Breaking the status quo ultimately requires more than another civil service reform. It requires a different conception of public service itself. Pakistan's future competitiveness will depend increasingly on whether its most talented public servants are organized to administer yesterday's state or to build tomorrow's. The sooner our politicians and civil servants realize this, the better it will be for the country's future.

The author is governance and economics expert, and former advisor to the Prime Minister and to the Chief Minister of Punjab.