It is now widely recognised that the Pahalgam incident was a false-flag operation.
The international media refused to buy into India’s narrative of Pakistani involvement. President Trump casually dismissed the matter, calling it a "thousand-year-old issue" that India and Pakistan would eventually resolve — business as usual. While the Indian media’s barrage of falsehoods has failed to gain traction globally, Pakistan has offered a neutral investigation, which India wouldn’t want to accept for obvious reasons.
While Prime Minister Modi was abroad, his Godi media went into overdrive, fanning the flames far beyond what was likely intended. By the time he returned, the situation had spiralled: public emotions were burning hotter than needed to ignite the election campaign in Bihar or to impress the likes of JD Vance with India’s fixation on Pakistan — and hence why India can't go after China. The script crafted by Modi’s strategists was poorly designed, and its execution by the media was even worse. What we are left with is a film that whips up mass hysteria but lacks a climax — the "punishment" of the villain, Pakistan, as the script demanded.
A story without a climax — and without a satisfying resolution — is a guaranteed flop. And if this particular drama flops, it could end the political career of its main protagonist — Narendra Modi. To salvage the situation, the "director" must deliver something — anything — to appease the Indian public, whose emotions have been pushed to a dangerous fever pitch. Otherwise, the public rage could turn inward.
This has now become a war for Modi’s political survival.
India could attempt to strike a presumed terrorist hideout inside Pakistan — the former headquarters of Lashkar-e-Taiba in Muridke, near Lahore, is one such target
But what options are left?
Another Balakot-style strike? Unlikely. Pakistan is better prepared this time. And there is a new complicating factor: China is watching, perhaps even looking for an opportunity to remotely test its cyberwarfare capabilities — capabilities that could, with little warning, cripple Indian air defences and radar systems, with disastrous consequences. Reports say China has provided the Pakistan Air Force with P15 missiles that can quickly shoot down Indian Rafales.
In short: No. Not this time.
Ground invasion?
Listen to the Indian defence analyst Pravin Sawhney. He unequivocally explains that Indian generals — and their army — are not mentally prepared for a war. The best they can do is exchange fire along the Line of Control (LoC), effectively dividing Kashmir between India and Pakistan. This tactic might keep the Godi media rhetoric alive, giving Modi ample opportunity to make fiery speeches aimed at winning state elections and saving his face.
Remember — Modi’s BJP significantly underperformed in the 2024 elections compared to his bold claim of securing 400 seats.
However, this rhetoric cannot last forever. Soon, the audience will grow bored — even offended — if the "action," the climax, is delayed. And that would mark the end of Modi’s political dominance in Indian politics. When this pressure mounts, it is plausible to speculate that Modi will be compelled to take some form of action to appease his restless audience and try to save his political future.
But how and where remain tantalising questions.
In my previous article, I outlined three plausible targets: Umerkot in Sindh, Sialkot in Punjab, and Skardu in Gilgit-Baltistan. Over the past three days, defence experts have floated a few more possibilities. India could attempt to strike a presumed terrorist hideout inside Pakistan — the former headquarters of Lashkar-e-Taiba in Muridke, near Lahore, is one such target.
However, this is extremely risky. Muridke is too close to the heavily populated city of Lahore, and any strike there could trigger a strong retaliation near — or even inside — New Delhi. India certainly does not want that.
Skardu?
As the starting point of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), hitting Skardu would please Washington. It would also allow India to more aggressively pursue the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty. But any move against CPEC would inevitably drag China directly into the conflict. And an Indian military action in that area, particularly to control the flow of the Indus, would mean a decisive response from Pakistan too. We leave it for the Indian generals to worry about how trained and prepared their soldiers are to fight a war in the Himalayas.
Not a good idea, either!
Meanwhile, some Indian media outlets are speculating about a possible naval attack on a Pakistan Navy target. I’m not sure what that could entail exactly, but any assault on Pakistan’s naval vessels would almost certainly provoke a missile response against Indian naval assets — a clear tit-for-tat escalation. So where could India strike where it maintains a clear advantage over Pakistan? Hitting any target near Gwadar would again be too risky — once more, it risks pulling China into the picture.
Is India ready to go that far?
Another possible option remains: launching a massive terrorist attack inside Pakistan, at a scale sufficient to satisfy Indian audiences. Remember, their sensibilities — conditioned by Bollywood blockbusters — demand exaggerated emotions, cheap thrills, and clumsy action sequences.
In an interview with News18, former RAW chief Vikram Sood dampened the journalistic enthusiasm of the anchor by bluntly stating that India does not have the capacity to launch a military operation in Balochistan to separate it from Pakistan.
That is not happening.
However, small to medium-scale terror attacks — like the Jaffer Express train bombing last month — remain a possibility. Similar operations could be launched in other parts of Pakistan as well. Speaking to Neelu Vyas in a podcast on YouTube, Indian defence expert Muqtedar Khan openly admitted that using TTP or BLA to launch terror attacks in Pakistan is a plausible option. Remember, India has incessantly denied any links with these terror organisations, which have been carrying out terror attacks in KP and Balochistan in recent months and before.
But what if the Indian audience doesn't buy into this bluff?
If Modi’s political standing weakens further, and his hold on the Prime Ministership is truly threatened, he might resort to reckless action, even options that defence and military experts have already dismissed as unviable. In such a scenario, India would be hit hard, and so would Modi. Either way, his end appears near, with or without action.
Modi has bitten off more than he can chew.