There are three reasons Indian belligerence should not be discounted as empty threats. Indians have been amassing modern weaponry from at least three main sources, First, it bought $20 billion worth of weapons from the United States in the past five years. Its other sources of weapons are France and Israel. The weapon-buying spree is so massive that it might have fed the notion of decisive conventional military superiority over Pakistan into the heads of Indian military planners. This is what had happened with Pakistani military planners before the 1965 war: They were convinced of the notion that American military weapons that Pakistan started getting after entering the military alliance with Washington in the early 1950s gave them a slight edge over the Indian military. And they considered it a small window of opportunity that would close after Indians would also started getting weapons from multiple sources including Washington and Moscow. We can safely assume that Indians would be suffering from the same syndrome of military superiority after procuring American and Israeli weapons that we had suffered before 1965.
The second reason we should not discount Indian theatrics as empty threats is the fact that the international taboo against the use of force by militarily powerful states against relatively militarily weaker states has evaporated into thin air after the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Israeli invasion of Gaza. In these terms, Pakistan is not militarily a weak state. But when international military experts compare India in conventional military terms they always give India a decisive edge. In the post-Cold War era, this taboo was repeatedly broken by powerful countries like the United States, Russia, and Israel. It’s only that Pakistan assisted the United States in the invasion of one military non-entity, Afghanistan, and came close to sending its troops to Iraq—another militarily weak country that Washington invaded recently. Now that invading militarily weak countries has almost become a norm in international politics, Pakistan should not take the developing political and military situation lightly. It is not difficult for us to see that India has been in a deep embrace of Washington, Tele Viv, and Paris—its three main arms suppliers. These are not simply arms suppliers for India, they are providing political support to New Delhi when it sees itself as the bulwark against Islamic terrorism, which it sees emanating from across its western borders.
The third reason is the likelihood that the Western block active diplomacy to prevent the India-Pakistan military crises from converting into a full-fledged war, which we witnessed during the 2002 twin peak military crises, which might not be replicated this time. Washington has played a decisive role in averting a Pak-India war in every Pak-India military crisis that has happened since 1987—in 1990 Elder Bush Administration sent its Deputy CIA to mediate between New Delhi and Islamabad, in 1990 Kargil conflict, President Clinton played a decisive role in defusing the crisis and in 2002, US, French and British diplomats.
The present crisis-like situation is occurring when the United States has decisively tilted in support of India
Some international military experts describe the 15-year period, in India-Pakistan military relations, between 1987 and 2002, as a period of long military crisis which was punctuated by short periods of peace. Then there were military tensions in the wake of the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, followed by a period of military tensions following the Pulwama suicide attack. Americans remained engaged in preventing and averting a war between Pakistan and India during the period. The present crisis-like situation is occurring when the United States has decisively tilted in support of India. Washington’s strategic community is talking about joint military planning with India. They are floating ideas such as integrated deterrence, in which India will be playing a central role, in countering China’s rise as a military power. The concept of integrated deterrence clearly has implications for Pakistan at the military level.
This background is explained to make the third point why Indian theatrics should not be discounted out of hand: Pakistan-India military crises have been regular occurrences since the decade of 1980s. Between 1987 and 2002, Pakistan and Indian militaries confronted each other in eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation, and at least once in a war, some five times. This was the period when the two countries journeyed from hidden and not-so-hidden nuclear weapon programs to declared nuclear status in 1998. As I have already stated Washington remained engaged in South Asia to avert a war and a nuclear exchange between Pakistan and India during the period between 1987 and 2002, because of this reason it is very difficult to judge whether Indians were deterred from attacking Pakistan in 2002 Twin-Peak crises—after Indian parliament building was attacked by militant groups—by the existence of nuclear weapons in Pakistani inventory or whether by American, French and British diplomacy during the crucial period of Twin-Peak crises.
In Pakistan, it is generally believed that Pakistani nuclear weapons and their delivery systems deterred Indians from attacking Pakistan. But on the other hand, it is generally believed in New Delhi and Western capitals that India decided to avoid the war under the influence of Western diplomacy. This controversy could be settled decisively only after the Pakistani and Indian governments decided to declassify their secret official documents from this period. The question for Pakistan is whether in the absence of active Western diplomacy—it is likely that the West would not be as active as it was during the 2002 crisis as at that time, their militaries were fighting in Afghanistan against international terror networks and the Taliban. They had an interest that Pakistan and India should not come to blows as the former was their military ally in the war against terror.
What kind of state Jinnah wanted Pakistan to be could be judged by the fact he didn’t sell his properties in Bombay when he left India for the newly founded state of Pakistan. It seems he had the intention of enjoying his holiday in his beloved town of Bombay
I want to make three important points at this stage. Firstly, what direction the ongoing situation in Pak-India relations would take will depend on how the United States and other Western capitals would engage themselves with the situation. President Trump made a brief comment that indicates he is interested in seeking some role for the United States in managing these tense relations. Secondly, how New Delhi and Islamabad will perceive the role of Western diplomacy in the situation? There are American experts who think that in the wake of the 2002 crisis, the Western influence to decisively change the direction of the Indian policy-making process has dwindled substantially. There, we must take into account new realities of international politics and try to understand our own notion of deterrence in light of these new realities. There was this old concept that countries and states don’t attack other states with nuclear weapons. But Ukraine has been attacking deep into Russian territory—it's no secret that Russia possesses the largest stockpile of nuclear weapons in the world.
One clearly sees a war hysteria developing in India. On the other hand, in Pakistan, one could see Pakistanis are absolutely amused at the way Indian media and the public are playing up the whole situation. Pahalgam was bad, very bad but so was the Jaffar Express attack in which hundreds of innocent lives were lost. We don’t see any war hysteria developing in Pakistan. Pakistan and India have a history, which has a horrific aspect on both sides of the border—but this history is not even slightly comparable with what we see in the present and what we see in the future of this region. Pakistan’s founder, Jinnah’s conception of politics directly conflicted with the conception of politics that Gandhi and Nehru had. But all three would never have envisaged a future for the sub-continent that would go into self-destructive mode. All three would never have thought of building states in the subcontinent that would amass so much firepower and nuclear power that would pose a threat to human existence not only the Subcontinent but would be a threat to survival of humanity.
The scientists are now producing studies that indicate that even a limited nuclear war between Pakistan and India “might cause unprecedented global food shortages and starvation lasting more than a decade. The study appeared in the journal Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences in 2020. The paper was co-authored by 19 scientists from five countries, including three others from Goddard, which is affiliated with Columbia University’s Earth Institute, “In addition to direct death and destruction, the authors say that firestorms following the bombings would launch some 5 million tons of soot toward the stratosphere. There, they say, it would spread globally and remain, absorbing sunlight and lowering global mean temperatures by about 1.8 degrees C (3.25 F) for at least five years. They project that this would in turn cause production of the world’s four main cereal crops—maize, wheat, soybeans, and rice—to plummet an average of 11 percent over that period, with tapering effects lasting another five to 10 years”. When in 2008 after the Mumbai terror attacks that killed more than 200 innocent citizens there developed the possibility of Pak-India, US officials reportedly told the then-Indian Prime Minister that any military confrontation between the two countries would push the global economy into recession.
What kind of state Jinnah wanted Pakistan to be could be judged by the fact he didn’t sell his properties in Bombay when he left India for the newly founded state of Pakistan. It seems he had the intention of enjoying his holiday in his beloved town of Bombay. Gandhi went into a prolonged state of fasting to secure for Pakistan its share in the imperial assets and cash in the imperial exchequer that British colonial authorities left behind. Nehru remained committed to the social and economic uplift of the Muslim community left behind in India. Nehru had deep anti-militaristic political tendencies and he embraced the concept of a strong military only after facing humiliating defeat at the hands of the Chinese in 1962. Under him there arose no possibility that India would develop a strong military machine. The shape in which we see Pakistani and Indian militaries today is the creation of superpower rivalries. The superpowers including the USA, erstwhile USSR, and China provided weaponries to their respective clients during the Cold War. The western block saw the Subcontinent as a Bulwark against Soviet Communism. Pakistan readily became an American client and received massive military equipment from Washington before 1965. India turned towards the Soviet Union and received weapons from there. For part of this century, the Washington anti-China lobby was instrumental in bringing Washington and New Delhi close as military allies against China. This has direct implications for Pakistan.
Most of the Pak-India international border doesn’t feature any natural obstacle like river, mountain, or valley—which is easy on the plain, could be pulverized with tactical nukes
At present India seems to be in a post-911 hangover syndrome—a psychological situation where India thinks it can still compel Pakistan to do things, with the help of international pressure, if a case could be made against Pakistan's intelligence services and military that they are sponsors of Islamic terrorism in the region. India thinks that it could with the help of Western block manufacture an international consensus—such as the one which existed after 911—against Islamic terrorism and its sponsors like the Pakistani military and intelligence services. After India successfully compelled General Musharraf's regime into launching a military operation against militant groups in Punjab, relatively the most peaceful province of Pakistan in 2002 under pressure from the western block. Much water has flowed under the bridge. Things have changed. Pakistanis are rethinking the thoughts and perceptions that Americans left behind while withdrawing from Afghanistan. Besides the Gaza war has brought a fundamental change in the thinking of Pakistani society, ideologically they are now more than ever inclined towards religious right. Now people openly talk about the Musharraf government’s mistake of turning its guns against its own people at the behest of Americans. Pakistanis are no experts in international relations theories, but they do have a realization that powerful military states are destroying societies after societies in the Muslim World. And there is nobody to stop them. I think with public opinion taking this turn, India’s strategy to make Pakistan do things at its behest, will not work at all.
Will there be war? It is difficult to judge this. The photographs and videos of Prime Minister Modi’s meetings in New Delhi, after he cut short his visit to Saudi Arabia, show the presence of no military men in the photographs and videos of these meetings released to the media by the Indian government. Does this mean Prime Minister, or does it mean that Prime Minister Modi has not started contemplating military options? But one answer to this question could be in the negative supported by the argument that in India it is always the civilians who make decisions and the military only implements these decisions. But that doesn’t change the reality that the absence of military men from Modi’s security meetings must have been perceived in Pakistan in the way it is stated above—no military option considered.
War, if it comes, will be devastating for both countries. A good security and military planner is one who takes into account the vulnerabilities of the enemy—sometimes a vulnerable and weak enemy could prove to be devastating for your own survival. Take the example of Pakistan at the conclusion of the 2002 Twin-Peak military crises: Mobilization of land forces and other services proved too costly for Pakistan. In the wake of the 2002 military crises, Pakistan decided to make tactical nukes part of its war-fighting plans, according to a retired Pakistani military official. What else does an economically and financially weak country have done in such a situation? What does it mean practically? In the 2002 military crisis, the lack of strategic depth proved to be an advantage for Pakistan. With the snap of the fingers of the then COAS: Pakistani land forces changed deployment from border to barrack and then back to the border. On the other hand, Indian strike formations, which were located somewhere in Central India, took 27 days to mobilize. This was the period when British, French, and American diplomacy convinced New Delhi to back off. This was very frustrating for the Indians. They came up with a plan for the deployment of elements of land and air forces close to the border for rapid mobilization in case of any such crisis in the future. What is the meaning of making tactical nukes part of warfighting plans? This means if Indian armored columns penetrate Pakistani defenses—most of the Pak-India international border doesn’t feature any natural obstacle like river, mountain, or valley—which is easy on the plain, could be pulverized with tactical nukes. But this could mean Pakistan would be using tactical nukes on its own territory. We must realize what would become of the agricultural farmland of Punjab in such a situation.
Tanks, immediately after the Cold War became an obsolete weapon system because there was no ware theatre that required its deployment after the Warsaw Pact was dissolved. Tanks were again, back in business after Russia attacked Ukraine. But tanks might again lose utility in future warfare when Artificial Intelligence and Swarm drones have introduced dramatic changes in warfare. AI and drones play a decisive role in the Ukraine and Gaza war. This news weaponry-which both Pakistan and India are working to develop—would make any future Pak-India conflict more deadly. The best way is to resolve this problem of terrorism at the bilateral level and to develop some joint mechanism in this regard. War is a very serious business, and it should be a toy in the hands of those who are under the influence of war hysteria that they themselves have created.