Jamal Nasir (JN): What is the sociology of nationalism?
Sinisa Malešević (SM): One could say that nationalism studies began to develop in the 1980s as a coherent framework for understanding these long-term changes, although there were scholars who had studied nationalism before, albeit in a less systematic and piecemeal manner. It’s really from Gellner, Anderson, and Hobsbawm’s classical books that nationalism studies emerge as a distinct field of study. However, their books were more focused on the historical and political aspects of nationalism, rather than the broader sociological context. Even today, you can say that there are historians of nationalism who mostly focus on specific countries and particular periods of time.
There are also political scientists of nationalism who study party politics and various political movements, such as populist, nativist, and anti-immigrant groups. Social psychologists also study nationalism in terms of personality types, individual motivations, cognitions, and emotions. I think sociologists provide a much broader picture, in a sense, trying to understand how nationalism penetrates everyday life, how it is institutionalised, both historically and in a contemporary context. They explore how nationalism is linked with gender, religion, class, and many other forms of social division. So, I think there is a distinct way in which sociologists, particularly historical sociologists, analyse nationalism. They look at history, but they also examine these different social divisions and the wider social order. They explore how nationalism influences social change and various types of institutions.
JN: You have distinguished yourself from both ethno-symbolist and modernist perspectives on nationalism. How does your thesis of grounded nationalism align with, differ from, or form a bridge between these two theoretical frameworks?
SM: I started from a very classical modernist understanding of nationalism, and in some respects, I’m still in agreement with what modernists have to say about the origins of nationalism. But the problem with classical modernism is that it wasn’t really interested in the past. Gellner openly stated that everything begins with the French Revolution, the American Revolution, and industrialisation. Ethno-symbolists argue that we must examine the cultural roots that preceded the development of nationalism and how these roots were the springboard of nation-formation.
However, I disagree with both. I argue that we need to look at the past, but not at the cultural roots. We need to examine the transformation of organisational capacities over long periods of time and the reasons why certain aspects of culture become important, while others are forgotten. For example, Urdu became a standardised language in Pakistan because there was a well-organised social movement that worked on making this possible, the All-India Muslim League.
Cultural resources do matter, but organisational capacity is crucial. There must be well-organised people and movements that advocate the development of specific national projects. In the European context, the importance of religious institutions is evident, for example, the Serbian Orthodox Church, which has its origins in medieval times. But at that time, it wasn’t national. It was very aristocratic. It was used and was useful in the nineteenth century for Serbian nationalist groups to build a nationalist movement around it.
It is not cultural roots that matter for the development of nationalism, it is organisational capacity itself
In Pakistan, Islamic institutions played an important part in mobilising different groups. It’s not necessarily the beliefs themselves; it’s the institutions that are important, because they bring people together, and ideologies are developed to justify certain courses of action. In the European context, small organisations like the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century secret societies, which often congregated among middle-class people, gradually developed into social movements, and ultimately, nationalism became a state ideology. So, it is not cultural roots that matter for the development of nationalism, it is organisational capacity itself.
JN: You have argued that globalisation would not have weakening impacts on nationalism, which is indeed true. However, with the rise of artificial intelligence, intelligence in our everyday life, how do you view the relationship between AI and nationalism?
SM: AI programmes can interfere directly with what the nation-states provide. Let’s say, in the educational system, the nation-states have certain national programmes with visions of how the nation is depicted, and AI might generate a completely different interpretation. So, people can go and use a particular AI-generated national narrative that might affect how they think and see themselves as members of a nation, particularly in some contested historical interpretations, some wars or revolutions from the past.
Then you have states like China, which have their own AI programmes, such as DeepSee,k trying to police all information about China. I’m not sure if you’ve checked with DeepSeek, but if you try to ask something politically sensitive about China, it doesn’t provide an answer. It says that I cannot provide that information. So, in a sense, nation-states can police that. To some extent, I’m unsure whether this will last, because I’m certain people in China will find a way, as they did with Facebook, Twitter, and everything else. So, they will find a way to bypass that as well. I think several factors could affect the collection of information, including the collection of data on large populations and who can use that data, which might pose a problem.
JN: You have argued that ‘state creates nation’, which is true in a European context, but what do you think of post-colonial societies where the spirit of nationalism was a driving force in creating a separate state, as in the case of Pakistan and India?
SM: That’s a good question. In a sense, I would say that classical nationalism studies from the 1980s and 1990s were very Eurocentric. Europe was seen as a model of how a nation develops, and we now know much more about the global processes. We recognise that there is enormous diversity in the way nation-states have been formed throughout the world. Latin America was a notable example of these movements for independence from the Spanish and Portuguese empires, which began in the early nineteenth century. In Asia, colonialism lasted longer, and the movements developed internally, becoming fully-fledged before independence, as you rightly noted, particularly with Pakistan and India.
But what’s also important is how the character of nationalism changes. So, nationalism is very different when it is not in power and when it is the dominant ideology of the state. So, you can say, in the Indian and Pakistani context, these kinds of movements, such as the All-India Muslim League and the Indian National Congress, were quite strong and unified because they had a common goal. There wasn’t that much tension between the left and the right, or between more secular and more religious individuals within these movements, because the goal was to reach independence and then build a state together, particularly with democratic states like Pakistan and India. However, once they are in power, everything changes. Then nationalism becomes the dominant ideology, and everybody is trying to delegitimise the other political movements. So, the opposition will say, ‘You’re not enough of a national figure; you’re promoting somebody else’s interests.’
Nationalism can lead towards conflict, but it doesn’t have to
Thus, nationalism becomes the primary focus of political discourse. This is a trend that is evident in all modern nation-states. Once nationalism becomes the dominant ideology, replacing other sources of legitimacy such as the divine origins of kings, a civilising mission, or an imperial project, then everything changes. So, in that sense, regardless of when the states gain independence, once they’re independent, nationalism is the dominant ideology. So, I would say Pakistan and India are not very different in that respect, compared to Japan and Britain or Germany. Nationalism is now present everywhere.
JN: In the light of Subaltern Studies, where we have Partha Chatterjee, for whom nationalism in post-colonial societies differs from European experiences in terms of inner domain (religion, culture, and tradition), how do you view nationalism in post-colonial societies, particularly in the context of Pakistan and India?
SM: Yeah, there are some important differences in the way nationalism has developed in a kind of post-colonial context, compared to within the empire. So, empires already had a rudimentary state structure. The main point was to abolish this kind of monarchical order, which was based on the notion that kings have the right to rule due to a divine origin. In some respects, one can say that in monarchies such as Morocco or Denmark, the direct link was between the royal family and the religious authority.
Obviously, in a modern context, there are very few kingdoms today that invoke that directly. It’s more symbolic if it exists, but in a pre-modern world, that was the dominant way of life, with British, French rulers, Ottoman rulers, Habsburg rulers, and so on. And then they extended that obviously outside of Europe, once they were colonising it, as with imperial India. And India, here being the British Raj, meaning Pakistan as well, was seen as a jewel in the British crown.
As a result, we ended up with very strong nationalist movements, as well as anti-colonial movements. I think Chatterjee is right in the sense that nationalism was articulated differently here. It was a very anti-imperialist nationalism. It’s in relation to this overseas empire, which is quite different from the way the Ottoman Empire, or the Hungarian Empire, worked because they incorporated neighbouring territories into their own imperial structure. Here you have an overseas empire. It functions very differently.
So, nationalism then becomes much more inclusive politically, also more leftist, I would say, not necessarily in all its values, but in terms of the idea of equality in the world. In India and Pakistan, these movements started earlier than elsewhere, and they very much aligned around the idea of nationalism as a tool of social change, to get rid of the imperial power, to control one’s own natural resources, and establish a much more egalitarian social order. That’s always an ideal type.
Obviously, once you end up in an independent state where it’s very difficult to organise social order, and you have many different competing interests, nationalism changes. I would agree that there are important differences in the way post-colonial nationalisms developed, but once in power, nationalisms can change. As we see today in India, nationalism has become more radicalised, more exclusive, and more ethnic.
I think you know how this kind of rhetoric of decolonisation has been appropriated by a very far-right Hindu nationalist government. And some of these movements, such as the RSS, are explicitly racist. So, even though they use this rhetoric of anti-imperialism, they use it internally to establish rigid hierarchies between social groups and are very discriminatory against Muslim and other populations, as well as different social castes.
JN: With the growth of populism in India, Pakistan, and many other countries, how do you view the future of nationalism?
SM: I have been arguing for many years now that nationalism is constantly on the rise. Now, many academics recognise this, but 15–20 years ago, people were saying, No, we are all cosmopolitans, who live in a highly individualised and globalised world. But I said, No, if you look at the way nation-states operate, their nationalism constantly grows and expands. So, I expect there will be even more nationalism in the near future. The key question is, what kind of nationalism is it? Is it a moderate, inclusive nationalism, or is it a more radical, extremist, exclusionary, ethnic, racial nationalism that we see, as you say, with the BJP in India? India is a big, complex state with many internal tensions, but it is still a democracy. So that makes a big difference.
But now that far-right populist nationalism has spread all over the globe, it is likely to affect the relationships between India and Pakistan too. Even China has become more nationalist under the current leadership. It is a communist state that derives a lot of its legitimacy from Han nationalism. In the Indian and Pakistani context, obviously, these are two nuclear powers and big, important states that can shape the direction of nationalism. Nationalism can lead towards conflict, but it doesn’t have to.
So, the key issue is really balance, the geopolitical balance. It’s less likely that nationalism will generate violent escalation when you have the balance of power backed up by the nuclear threat. When only one state has nuclear power, as we see with Israel, it is very different. Then nationalism generates a very asymmetrical and destructive conflict. Israeli nationalism has produced a genocidal conflict in Gaza while also attacking many of its neighbours in the Middle East. This is in part because you have a state which is technologically much more advanced, and obviously, it also benefits enormously from American military, political, and economic support.