While social scientists generally complain about the paucity of good social science literature coming out of Pakistan in the last few years, some good books have been written. Dr Mohammad Waseem’s recent book, Political Conflict in Pakistan, is one of them. It is quite a distinguished contribution to the sociology of politics in Pakistan.
Dr Waseem’s book is a 570-page hefty tome. It is his magnum opus after having taught in the best universities of Pakistan during his professional career stretched over many decades. Though, the book covers a wide canvas, in this article, we are only going to concentrate on the idea of construction of a master narrative and differentiation between the middle and political classes, based on the book’s initial chapters.
What is important to analyse, and it has not been analysed and disseminated enough, is how through certain myth making, the national project of master narrative has been constructed in Pakistan post-partition. The first chapter on Seventy Years of Partition, is powerful. However, we won’t dwell much on it in this article except to highlight the fact that Waseem masterfully debunks the Two-Nation theory.
The Two-Nation theory purports that in the Indian society historically; two faith-based nations -- Muslims and Hindus -- were in conflict with each other. Whereas, according to the author, in the pre-partition united India for centuries, “Most typically, people fought for region, not religion, for the ruling dynasty, not an ideological agenda, and for territory, revenue and prestige rather than for a transcendental goal or racial superiority”.
Though, there was “internecine warfare” in the united India, before and during the Mughal empire, yet there were examples such as both “Hindu and Muslim generals and soldiers jointly fought for Akbar against Chand Bibi, for Aurangzeb against the descendants of the Bahmani Sultanate in the Deccan, for the Sikh Maharaja Ranjit Singh against the Durranis in what later became North West Frontier Province (NWFP), and against Nawab Muzaffar Ali Khan of Multan, and for Tipu, Sirajuddaula, Wajid Ali Shah and Bahadur Shah Zafar against the British”.
This first chapter on the partition goes on to discuss many other such examples -- of mutual coexistence, tolerance, ambivalent and overlapping religious identities, and communal harmony over the centuries in the united India -- that have been erased from the collective memories of the inhabitants of India and Pakistan today through myth making about the Two Nation theory and politics of communalism. Of course, the British sowed the seeds of discord by ordering a census to demarcate the communities along religious lines in the 19th century, it is something that morphed into the politics of hatred and communalism later in India.
In the second chapter on Master Narrative, the author states that history, territory, and language are discussed as the three sources of conflict to construct the master narrative of the national project of Pakistan.
The 20th century saw a shift in the narrative in the identity-construction of communities living in India from “region to religion”, and “individual to community”. It was particularly true for Muslims whose identity-construction was on a “position of weakness”. When the cheerleaders for Pakistan and its pioneers, who belonged to the Muslim minority provinces of India, such as the UP, lost their geography and history upon shifting to Pakistan, the “metaphor” of conflict was used to create a myth – that the “demon” Hindus and Muslims have been in perpetual conflict with each other over the centuries.
As far as the language, territory and culture are concerned, there is a lot of discussion on the politics of assertion of Bengali language post-partition as a statement of ethnic identity interwoven with “organic” Bengali culture. Post breakup of Pakistan in 1971 under Bhutto’s leadership, the four dominant provincial language-based ethnicities asserted themselves, and it became more common to talk in the idiom of four nations (Punjabi, Pashtun, Sindhi, and Baloch) instead of one nation. However, this process alienated the ethnic “minorities” at the intra-provincial level. Mohajirs were aggrieved due to Bhutto’s language policy in Sindh in 1972, which gave rise to the ethnic Mohajirs politics 1980s onwards.
On culture, Waseem further states, “culture is politics by other means” (by borrowing from Clausewitz). The debate on the politics of “modernists” versus “traditionalists” has been fascinating in Pakistan. The “modernists” have in past and in contemporary times tried to contain the street power of “traditionalists” by using religion as an instrument to take the sting out of the “traditionalists” arguments. But they have ended up legitimizing it as a genuine source of politics and identity, and, in fact, have ended up emboldening it further. The effort is now, as in history, to limit the street power of the “traditionalists”.
There is a lot to chew over here in this book. One point that Waseem does not discuss overtly is the “instrumentality” behind the construction of the national project. Who constructs such projects and who benefits from them?
Waseem makes an original contribution in the book by presenting a cogent analysis of the middle class versus the political class. The middle class consists of the army’s office cadre, civilian bureaucracy, professionals, businessmen, bankers, chartered accountants, lawyers among many others. The middle is meritocratic, educated, controls the media narrative, and is strongly influenced by the anti-corruption narrative of the establishment against the politicians for decades -- most recently in form of the PTI.
The salaried middle class is rent seeking. It has taken huge financial advantage of turning the terms of trade in its favour through the state machinery, by transacting in property files or land being officially given to it, and such other financial, legal and quasi legal advantages, perks and privileges (we don’t know the direct illegal gains of the middle class since it controls the media narrative). This middle class hates politicians, politics, elections, and democracy, and views the rival political class unfavourably. The middle class has its roots in the colonial structures.
The political class is local-based, draws legitimacy from votes, elections and patron-client relationships, following the formation of governments or joining governments in the case of smaller parties and independents. The masses find the colonial-inherited state structures as alien and inaccessible, and use the leadership of the political class to get their issues of access to the government departments and courts resolved.
The election system in Pakistan is candidate-centred rather than policy agenda-centred. The mainstream parties -- PML-N, PTI, PPP – have weak organizational structures, except perhaps in the case of the MQM. They mostly depend on “electables”. Other than Bhutto who won the 1970 elections in West Pakistan on the policy issue of class; most of the recent elections are non-ideological and leadership-oriented.
Like Waseem, economist Asad Sayeed has also delved into describing the limited role of the political class (mostly agrarian) versus the middle class. He cites political sociologist Barrington Moore, who theorized that the onset of capitalism was directly linked to worsening of terms of trade for the agrarian sector historically -- and it is also true for Pakistan.
Waseem’s book, despite being a bit unwieldy at places, as the author has tried to juggle thorough and cite the relevant established theoretical and empirical literature, along with his own analytical input, is a fascinating read. Though, the author has given some political economy analysis in this work largely centred around political sociology and political science, what is needed is for some political economist to take this monumental work forward.
Waseem’s conceptualization of the differentiation between the middle and political classes is mainly analysed from the politico-cultural lens. Some political economists should create the equivalence of these categories to the means of production and income/wealth levels. Though, there is a detailed discussion on this regarding the middle class; the same is needed for the political class.
The political class perhaps belongs to the lower middle class, the poor. The landed elite and now a section of the business elite in form of the PML-N have traditionally provided its leadership. Even Asif Zardari’s financial base is largely urban despite his original rural roots.
The book is worth reading for everyone interested in the political sociology of Pakistan both historically and in contemporary times.
Dr Waseem’s book is a 570-page hefty tome. It is his magnum opus after having taught in the best universities of Pakistan during his professional career stretched over many decades. Though, the book covers a wide canvas, in this article, we are only going to concentrate on the idea of construction of a master narrative and differentiation between the middle and political classes, based on the book’s initial chapters.
What is important to analyse, and it has not been analysed and disseminated enough, is how through certain myth making, the national project of master narrative has been constructed in Pakistan post-partition. The first chapter on Seventy Years of Partition, is powerful. However, we won’t dwell much on it in this article except to highlight the fact that Waseem masterfully debunks the Two-Nation theory.
The Two-Nation theory purports that in the Indian society historically; two faith-based nations -- Muslims and Hindus -- were in conflict with each other. Whereas, according to the author, in the pre-partition united India for centuries, “Most typically, people fought for region, not religion, for the ruling dynasty, not an ideological agenda, and for territory, revenue and prestige rather than for a transcendental goal or racial superiority”.
Though, there was “internecine warfare” in the united India, before and during the Mughal empire, yet there were examples such as both “Hindu and Muslim generals and soldiers jointly fought for Akbar against Chand Bibi, for Aurangzeb against the descendants of the Bahmani Sultanate in the Deccan, for the Sikh Maharaja Ranjit Singh against the Durranis in what later became North West Frontier Province (NWFP), and against Nawab Muzaffar Ali Khan of Multan, and for Tipu, Sirajuddaula, Wajid Ali Shah and Bahadur Shah Zafar against the British”.
This first chapter on the partition goes on to discuss many other such examples -- of mutual coexistence, tolerance, ambivalent and overlapping religious identities, and communal harmony over the centuries in the united India -- that have been erased from the collective memories of the inhabitants of India and Pakistan today through myth making about the Two Nation theory and politics of communalism. Of course, the British sowed the seeds of discord by ordering a census to demarcate the communities along religious lines in the 19th century, it is something that morphed into the politics of hatred and communalism later in India.
In the second chapter on Master Narrative, the author states that history, territory, and language are discussed as the three sources of conflict to construct the master narrative of the national project of Pakistan.
The 20th century saw a shift in the narrative in the identity-construction of communities living in India from “region to religion”, and “individual to community”. It was particularly true for Muslims whose identity-construction was on a “position of weakness”. When the cheerleaders for Pakistan and its pioneers, who belonged to the Muslim minority provinces of India, such as the UP, lost their geography and history upon shifting to Pakistan, the “metaphor” of conflict was used to create a myth – that the “demon” Hindus and Muslims have been in perpetual conflict with each other over the centuries.
The 20th century saw a shift in the narrative in the identity-construction of communities living in India from “region to religion”, and “individual to community”. It was particularly true for Muslims whose identity-construction was on a “position of weakness”.
As far as the language, territory and culture are concerned, there is a lot of discussion on the politics of assertion of Bengali language post-partition as a statement of ethnic identity interwoven with “organic” Bengali culture. Post breakup of Pakistan in 1971 under Bhutto’s leadership, the four dominant provincial language-based ethnicities asserted themselves, and it became more common to talk in the idiom of four nations (Punjabi, Pashtun, Sindhi, and Baloch) instead of one nation. However, this process alienated the ethnic “minorities” at the intra-provincial level. Mohajirs were aggrieved due to Bhutto’s language policy in Sindh in 1972, which gave rise to the ethnic Mohajirs politics 1980s onwards.
On culture, Waseem further states, “culture is politics by other means” (by borrowing from Clausewitz). The debate on the politics of “modernists” versus “traditionalists” has been fascinating in Pakistan. The “modernists” have in past and in contemporary times tried to contain the street power of “traditionalists” by using religion as an instrument to take the sting out of the “traditionalists” arguments. But they have ended up legitimizing it as a genuine source of politics and identity, and, in fact, have ended up emboldening it further. The effort is now, as in history, to limit the street power of the “traditionalists”.
There is a lot to chew over here in this book. One point that Waseem does not discuss overtly is the “instrumentality” behind the construction of the national project. Who constructs such projects and who benefits from them?
Waseem makes an original contribution in the book by presenting a cogent analysis of the middle class versus the political class. The middle class consists of the army’s office cadre, civilian bureaucracy, professionals, businessmen, bankers, chartered accountants, lawyers among many others. The middle is meritocratic, educated, controls the media narrative, and is strongly influenced by the anti-corruption narrative of the establishment against the politicians for decades -- most recently in form of the PTI.
The salaried middle class is rent seeking. It has taken huge financial advantage of turning the terms of trade in its favour through the state machinery, by transacting in property files or land being officially given to it, and such other financial, legal and quasi legal advantages, perks and privileges (we don’t know the direct illegal gains of the middle class since it controls the media narrative). This middle class hates politicians, politics, elections, and democracy, and views the rival political class unfavourably. The middle class has its roots in the colonial structures.
The political class is local-based, draws legitimacy from votes, elections and patron-client relationships, following the formation of governments or joining governments in the case of smaller parties and independents. The masses find the colonial-inherited state structures as alien and inaccessible, and use the leadership of the political class to get their issues of access to the government departments and courts resolved.
The election system in Pakistan is candidate-centred rather than policy agenda-centred. The mainstream parties -- PML-N, PTI, PPP – have weak organizational structures, except perhaps in the case of the MQM. They mostly depend on “electables”. Other than Bhutto who won the 1970 elections in West Pakistan on the policy issue of class; most of the recent elections are non-ideological and leadership-oriented.
Like Waseem, economist Asad Sayeed has also delved into describing the limited role of the political class (mostly agrarian) versus the middle class. He cites political sociologist Barrington Moore, who theorized that the onset of capitalism was directly linked to worsening of terms of trade for the agrarian sector historically -- and it is also true for Pakistan.
Waseem makes an original contribution in the book by presenting a cogent analysis of the middle class versus the political class. The middle class consists of the army’s office cadre, civilian bureaucracy, professionals, businessmen, bankers, chartered accountants, lawyers among many others.
Waseem’s book, despite being a bit unwieldy at places, as the author has tried to juggle thorough and cite the relevant established theoretical and empirical literature, along with his own analytical input, is a fascinating read. Though, the author has given some political economy analysis in this work largely centred around political sociology and political science, what is needed is for some political economist to take this monumental work forward.
Waseem’s conceptualization of the differentiation between the middle and political classes is mainly analysed from the politico-cultural lens. Some political economists should create the equivalence of these categories to the means of production and income/wealth levels. Though, there is a detailed discussion on this regarding the middle class; the same is needed for the political class.
The political class perhaps belongs to the lower middle class, the poor. The landed elite and now a section of the business elite in form of the PML-N have traditionally provided its leadership. Even Asif Zardari’s financial base is largely urban despite his original rural roots.
The book is worth reading for everyone interested in the political sociology of Pakistan both historically and in contemporary times.