The 27th Constitutional Amendment in Pakistan, signed into law on November 13, 2025, has generated significant controversy due to its wide-ranging implications, particularly for the judiciary, civil-military relations, and provincial autonomy. Proponents argue it improves governance and national security, while critics contend it undermines judicial independence and the constitutional balance of power.
The cat is out of the bag: the 27th Amendment is now a part of the Constitution amid the raging controversies and doubts it has generated in the national media and in the minds of the people of Pakistan. This latest amendment to the Constitution of 1973 has created a new Federal Constitutional Court that will handle pure constitutional disputes or cases related to fundamental rights.
The power to transfer senior judges has been transferred from the Chief Justices to the office of the elected Prime Minister. District-level courts will now have magistrates to handle petty crimes and maintain public order, to reduce the burden on the courts. This amendment was the subject of discussion in the political circles of Pakistan for the last many months.
Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) Chairman Bilawal Bhutto Zardari brought it into the open on November 3. In a post on X, he wrote that a delegation of the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N), led by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, had visited him and President Asif Ali Zardari to seek their support for the approval of the 27th Constitutional Amendment. The PPP and PML-N are partners in the federal coalition government.
The amendment had easy sailing through both houses of Parliament, and the coalition government of Shehbaz Sharif was able to get it approved by an absolute majority, but there is concern that the amendment is a threat to democracy, as critics fear that the federal government is trying to weaken the judiciary and take policy control from the provinces.
This amendment has brought sweeping and revolutionary changes to Article 243 of the Constitution and has established a framework in which the COAS now becomes the Chief of the Defence Forces, who may be elevated to the rank of Field Marshal along with lifelong privileges and perks and also lifelong immunity. The amendments to Article 243 have a direct impact on accountability and the rule of law.
The newly enacted 27th Amendment to the 1973 Constitution is a classic example of how constitutional design can justify military dominance within a democratic framework
Specifically, the changes establish the Army Chief’s dominance, constitutionalise the Field Marshal position, politicise the Field Marshal rank, and grant unprecedented immunity that could shield the Field Marshal from any legal accountability. By amending Article 243 of the Constitution, it eliminates the post of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and transfers its coordinating authority to the Army Chief, who will also hold the new title of Chief of the Defence Forces (CODF).
Henceforth, every Army Chief will command not only the land forces but also the Navy, Air Force, and intelligence branches under a unified structure. This arrangement, on the surface, appears to be workable and efficient, providing a single chain of command, but it has centralised military power not seen even during the martial law regimes in the country.
The COAS has always been the most influential in the defence establishment, but the Air and Naval Chiefs were always independent of his direct command. By this amendment, the Army Chief has been elevated above all the officers in the armed forces, and his position is now constitutionally supreme.
Two senior judges of the Supreme Court, Mansoor Ali Shah and Athar Minallah, both former Chief Justices of the provincial High Courts, have tendered their resignations on the grounds of complete judicial capture and constitutional distortion because of the 27th Amendment, and more resignations from the superior judiciary will not be surprising.
This amendment has made sweeping and radical changes to the judicial system of the country and the military chain of command. A Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) has been established as the highest court of the land, and the Supreme Court now stands as a final appellate court for civil and criminal matters.
All matters of a constitutional nature, including those involving disputes between provincial and federal governments, public interest, and the enforcement of fundamental rights of the people, will be heard by the FCC. The Chief Justice and the judges of the FCC will be appointed by the Prime Minister, and the President will not retire before the age of 68. The Supreme Court and all other courts will be bound by the decisions of the FCC.
The Judicial Commission of Pakistan, which is responsible for selecting judges to the Supreme Court, the FCC and High Courts, will now be dominated by the executive branch members. Only 5 out of the 13 members of the JCP will be judicial appointments (two executive-appointed FCC judges, two senior-most judges of the Supreme Court, and one more judge of either court).
Formerly, the judges of the superior courts were selected by the JCP, which had a majority of judicial members. This meant that the judiciary was selecting judges from within itself without being outvoted by the executive’s representatives on the JCP. Now the executive-dominated JCP will be able to transfer judges from one court to another through the President.
If a judge does not accept a transfer, he will be subject to disciplinary proceedings through the Supreme Judicial Council, consisting of executive-appointed judges. The amendments have also granted lifetime immunity from arrest and from all criminal and civil proceedings to the President and anyone holding the rank of Field Marshal, Marshal of the Air Force, or Admiral of the Fleet.
According to the government, these amendments are necessary to control a superior judiciary that had become all-powerful and was stepping outside its constitutional role. According to the proponents of this amendment, some judges in the past were too independent and guilty of judicial overreach; the names of Saqib Nisar, Khosa, and Bandial are mentioned in this regard.
When courts have interfered with politics, endorsed martial laws, or removed prime ministers, it was not because they were “independently” exercising their own preferences. It was because they were too susceptible to pressure from certain quarters that used them as tools for political engineering. Decisions in Maulvi Tamizuddin, Dosso, Nusrat Bhutto, and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto are a testament to the courts being used to achieve state objectives and not judicial preferences.
The newly enacted 27th Amendment to the 1973 Constitution is a classic example of how constitutional design can justify military dominance within a democratic framework.