Pakistan–Afghanistan relations have long been a complicated story of excesses and mutual meddling, though much of the hostility has historically emanated from the Afghan side — beginning with Afghanistan’s distinction as the only country to vote against Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations in 1947. Such has been the rollercoaster relationship of over seven decades between the suspecting neighbours. Even after the Taliban came back into power, Pakistan was nowhere near its overambitious and archaic objective of making a vassal state out of Afghanistan.
Even when India hastily left after the Taliban returned to power in 2021, there wasn’t that feeling of jubilation or the bhangra that should have erupted all over Pakistan. There was something badly amiss in this victory, and it showed in the uncertainty and lack of grasp of the situation that evolved since the Taliban came into power. It was a silly decision to rush to Kabul. Nonetheless, we reached the pearly gates with delusional confidence, only to enjoy a hot cup of tea at the Kabul Serena aptly captured by the Urdu maxim “بیگانی شادی میں عبداللہ دیوانا”. Now, the feelings are those of hurt and melancholia.
A dispassionate but empathetic look at the landlocked and geographically disadvantaged Afghan history may provide a better appreciation of the circumstances on the ground, and perhaps aid in understanding the psyche surrounding the historical conflict, which is neither religious nor ideological. It can also help forensically introspect the most damaging miscalculation of strategic depth, a misadventure that has cost us dearly.
It is a misconception that Afghanistan was never truly conquered; historical empires like the Timurid Empire and the Mongol Empire successfully conquered parts of the region. Moreover, many invaders left their mark before they left for good. Among the conquerors were the Maurya Empire, the Ancient Macedonian Empire of Alexander the Great, the Rashidun Caliphate, the Mongol Empire, the Timurid Empire, the Mughal Empire, various Persian Empires, and the Sikh Empire.
More than a graveyard of empires, Afghanistan has been a graveyard for the forlorn Afghan masses and their ambitions
Between 1838 and 1979, the British Empire invaded it twice, the Soviet Union once, and most recently a coalition force of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) troops — with a majority from the United States in 2001 — who left it in August 2021, with Afghanistan becoming an economic liability for the invaders, leaving it in shambles and much chaos. More than a graveyard of empires, Afghanistan has been a graveyard for the forlorn Afghan masses and their ambitions.
The historical disruption by the retreating British on 14 August 1947, resulting in the bifurcation and independence of the Indian subcontinent into India and Pakistan, was largely a joyous occasion for the Muslims opting for Pakistan. However, it wasn’t all that enamouring for the much-disenchanted neighbouring state of Afghanistan, which was casually burdened with a historical decision taken by the British and stakeholders of the soon-to-be independent republics and new members of the British Commonwealth. Thus was laid the foundation for an acrimonious relationship between Afghanistan and the newly independent neighbouring state of Pakistan.
While it is accurate to describe Afghanistan's historical function as a buffer state between Great Britain and Tsarist Russia (and later the Soviet Union), it is inaccurate and simplistic to say it had no say in its own external affairs and matters of territory. Afghanistan's rulers frequently resisted and manipulated the great powers' rivalry to maintain some degree of autonomy, even while being constrained by larger geopolitical forces. The border between Afghanistan and British India was negotiated during Emir Abdur Rahman’s reign in 1893. The British drew the line to demarcate their and Afghanistan's spheres of influence. Though contentious and still disputed by Afghans, the Durand Line was a result of negotiation, not imposition.
It will only be noble to acknowledge the laudable neutrality that Afghanistan under Zahir Shah maintained when Pakistan was at war with India
The guileful cartography and establishment of regimes in the Middle East by the Allied Powers, and the hurriedly executed division of the South Asian subcontinent tailored to British specifications, left seeds for a tumultuous region — roots to future discord between nations, religions, and ethnicities — and brought new equations with harsh realities to the sociopolitical forefront, keeping it bogged down with complicated issues. So continued Pax Britannica shrewdly, though no longer as the brute policeman of colonies, but as the carefully crafted, respectable, nurturing quasi-political overseer to the dominions of India and Pakistan, besides the greater region in the Middle East.
Squeezed on both its flanks between Tsarist Russia and the British Empire, the partition of the subcontinent added to landlocked Afghanistan’s historical insecurities and carried on as an insidious paranoia that has constantly afflicted the root of Afghanistan’s existence in a volatile region.
Afghanistan’s main concern since Pakistan came into existence has been the Pashtuns on the other side of the Durand Line. The Afghan government sinisterly went out of its way to create trouble for Pakistan in the NWFP, FATA, and Balochistan through insurgents and infiltrations across the international border of the Durand Line, encouraging separatist movements. In Pakistan’s tumultuous relationship with Afghanistan, the only exception was King Zahir Shah.
It will only be noble to acknowledge the laudable neutrality that Afghanistan under Zahir Shah maintained when Pakistan was at war with India. According to J. N. Dixit, a powerful Indian diplomat who was National Security Adviser in 2005, “Zahir Shah ‘was ambiguous about Indo-Pakistan relations and was not supportive of India in its conflicts with Pakistan in 1947–49, 1965, and 1971’, and ‘equivocated’ on Kashmir” — a noteworthy fact that cannot be disregarded when looking at the broader picture and better understanding the contentious issues in regional context.
Regrettably, it is a fact that in 1857, Afghanistan sided with the British and didn’t avail itself of the golden opportunity to take over and free Pashtuns from the British. Also, during the First World War, it is notable that Afghan ruler Emir Habibullah Khan snubbed Pashtuns who were keen to join the Ottomans. Furthermore, with the signing by Emir Abdur Rahman of the much-controversial Durand Line Agreement, Afghanistan relinquished control of Swat, Bajaur, Chitral, Chageh, Buner, Dir, Kurram, part of Waziristan, Khyber Pass, Chagai, and Chaman, and gained control of Nuristan and Asmar districts. In exchange, the British annual subsidy was increased by six lakh rupees, with assurance to respect the calculating Emir’s sovereignty over the western side of the Durand Line.
Also not to be forgotten are a series of incidents from the 1850s onwards, where Afghan rulers successively gave up sovereignty for small subsidies and surrendered vast tracts of Pashtun-dominated lands to the British, leaving Pashtuns at their mercy. It was a wicked game that Afghan royals played with the Pashtuns and ensured that Afghanistan remained involved in their affairs one way or another. Upon realising that the British were on their way out, Afghanistan brought up the issue of self-determination for frontier Pashtuns in the 1940s.
Previously, however, to grab or retain power in Kabul, successive Afghan rulers from 1857 to 1947 had agreed to relinquish claims to Pashtun-majority areas and leave their Pashtun inhabitants at Britain’s mercy. It is a fact that Afghan rulers and royals realised that to remain in power, retaining Kabul, Kandahar, and Nangarhar was far more vital than having Peshawar, Mardan, and Kohat.
It is thought-provoking that Afghan rulers were at ease with the British ruling frontier Pashtuns, but after Pakistan’s birth in 1947, the same Afghan rulers could not stand their fellow ethnic Pakistani Pashtuns ruling frontier Pashtuns. Indeed, Afghanistan would have been different geographically had its rulers not traded sovereignty and national interest for personal favours and material gains from the British.