Pakistan–Afghanistan relations have never been good, having varied between very bad and not so bad, marked by a consistent mistrust. There are mainly two issues that determine their bilateral relations: one is historical, namely the Durand Line, and the other is contemporary, which is terrorism. The contemporary issue has its roots in the historical one. Pakistan has pursued different policies to tackle both, without much success. This write-up attempts to understand how Pakistan has been managing its relations with Afghanistan, its policies, and to develop a different approach.
Relations between states are not relations between religions or ethnicities. A certain mindset, an approach, consciously or unconsciously develops, based on a combination of special interests, historical evolution and belief systems, which gives shape to views, perceptions and interpretations of facts, resulting in policies. In the case of Pakistan, a self-view and world view has developed based on the history of the division of India based on religion, military dominance of decision-making, and uneven development.
This mindset sees and interprets relations with India as a constant conflict between Hindus and Muslims, due to the Indian National Congress’s opposition to the creation of Pakistan. Differences arising out of disputes over division have led to the perception of a constant existential threat from India. Failure to develop a democratic polity, leading to military dominance, has translated the Indian threat into a military threat, making physical survival the most important challenge at the expense of economic and social challenges. This has created an overlapping of interests between the religious right, the military establishment, and a broad spectrum of co-opted civilian sections, classes and individuals.
This India-centric security threat, couched in religious terms, has bred a foreign policy which sees Pakistan’s relations with other states, big or small, with reference to India. It has learnt that religion is a good tool of policy, a strong rallying cry against India and, since the Soviet intervention—or rather since Sardar Daud’s takeover—in Afghanistan too.
Afghanistan’s claim over territory now part of Pakistan has put these two neighbours at odds since 1947. Afghanistan drew closer to India due to their common negative relations with Pakistan. Pakistan, since the 1970s, has been pursuing a policy of supporting religious extremism to counter Pashtun ethnic nationalism and, through that, the issue of the Durand Line. In the 1980s, with Western and Arab support, Pakistan gained enough influence in Afghan internal affairs through religious extremists.
Pakistan, with tactical adjustments, has continuously followed a policy of controlling Afghanistan through religious extremists. Pashtun religious extremists were preferred due to the idea that the religiousisation of Pashtun politics would weaken Pashtun ethno-nationalism and the challenge to the Durand Line. Pakistani policy-makers even talked of gaining ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan vis-à-vis India. Pakistan’s policy couched this in oft-declared claims of wanting a friendly government in Afghanistan, rather than a friendly Afghanistan. After failing to achieve these objectives through the Mujahideen, Pakistan bet on the Taliban. The Taliban victory was celebrated by all sides of the mainstream political divide and state authorities. But we see a very quick breakdown of relations between Taliban-controlled Afghanistan and Pakistan, including occurrences of armed conflict. Why?
Halting trade will not create enough pressure to force the Taliban to change behaviour; rather, it fuels existing mistrust and decreases interdependence
Having failed to control Afghanistan, the disputes with Afghanistan are not seen or presented as between two states, but, like those with India which are perceived as between Hindus and Muslims, they are presented as between Afghans and Pakistanis. Pakistani decision-makers have been talking a lot about geo-economics, but without really understanding it. Geo-economics simply refers to the centrality and dominant role of economics in determining the direction of politics. Pakistan understands it as the use of economics as a tool to achieve strategic or political objectives, which is a very traditional view and totally different from a geo-economic perspective. Political methods are popularly presented as an alternative to military methods. Diplomatic methods are much more than sitting across the table, negotiating and, if possible, signing a deal which ends a dispute.
Pakistan’s approach to foreign policy, and more specifically towards Afghanistan, has been influenced by a combination of a military and colonial mindset with a pinch of religion. The negative influence Pakistan has gained in Afghanistan’s affairs over the last few decades has led to this mindset towards policies aimed at controlling Afghanistan. The policy of wanting a friendly government and assuming the Taliban would be that friendly, controllable government has alienated all other power contenders. A fallout with the Taliban government thus means no friends in Afghanistan. Having no friends in Afghanistan has resulted in a narrative painting Afghans as a whole as bad people and untrustworthy. Such an approach has negative implications for both foreign and domestic policy. A large number of Pakistani citizens are also ethnic Afghans. This is promoting racism inside Pakistan, which cannot be good for Pakistan’s stability.
Influencing the policies of other states to varying degrees is possible, but controlling independent states is not—a lesson Pakistan should have learned from its relations with the United States. Despite heavy dependence on the US, Pakistan has been able to defy it and pursue policies totally contradictory to US interests. There are many examples, but the most obvious and recent one is supporting and protecting the Taliban at the same time as receiving large amounts of US aid during the US presence in Afghanistan.
Pakistan has to undergo an internal, fundamental review of its approach to foreign policy and its Afghanistan policy within that. Relations with other states are not based on whether the people of those states are good or bad, but on what is in one’s interest. States manage these relations in accordance with their interests and capabilities. Pakistan must accept that it cannot control another state, even if it is relatively weaker. The Durand Line is a political issue, not a legal one. Its fate will be decided more by Pakistan’s domestic political stability than by its recognition or non-recognition by Afghanistan. Therefore, there is no need to be overly concerned about what Afghanistan officially says about it. Terrorism is not just a military or police matter. It is mainly political, having both external and internal aspects. The foreign aspect depends on the domestic one. Priority has to be given to domestic sources, not the other way around, as Pakistan seems to be doing.
Both Pakistan and Afghanistan need each other. The narrative being built in Pakistan that Afghanistan is dependent on it is a miscalculation. Pakistan provides the cheapest and quickest outlet to Afghanistan and a good market for its produce, but it is not the only one. Afghanistan provides the easiest, fastest and cheapest connection for Pakistan’s trade with Central Asia, as well as a good market for its products. The security of both states is also interdependent.
Pakistan’s policy should aim at minimising areas of conflict and maximising areas of mutual benefit, thus increasing interdependence. No immediate resolution of issues is possible. Pakistan needs to plan and act for better relations over a period of time. Halting trade will not create enough pressure to force the Taliban to change behaviour; rather, it fuels existing mistrust and decreases interdependence. Decreased interdependence will mean not just less incentive to resolve issues, but will also sustain and increase mistrust and create new security threats, both domestic and foreign.