On December 8, 2024, Syria reached a historic milestone with the fall of the Assad dynasty, which had ruled the country with an iron grip for over half a century. The impact of this event extended far beyond Syria and the region, influencing jihadist movements from Pakistan to the African Sahel.
Jihadist movements closely followed and responded to the liberation of Damascus through their statements and media discourse. As we will explore in detail, this event stirred strong emotions, uncertainty, and the emergence of new ideological positions among jihadists.
Between praise and worry
Very quickly, the Afghan Taliban were the first to congratulate the conquest of Damascus, congratulating the Syrian people and praising Hayat Tahrir al-Sham by name. In their statement, Taliban expressed hope for the establishment of an independent Islamic regime that would fulfill everyone's aspirations, urging the group to engage with the international community.
The movement has so far maintained its supportive stance, despite criticism from some of its media figures of Ahmed al-Sharaa's statements in which he said that Syria is not Afghanistan. These statements were interpreted as contemptuous of the Taliban in some form or another.
The Pakistani Taliban's statement was particularly notable. It not only celebrated the liberation of Damascus but also expressed a desire for a similar outcome in Pakistan. The movement’s spokesman, Muhammad Khorasani, highlighted that Damascus’ liberation serves as an example for all oppressed peoples, especially in Pakistan. He also voiced hope that Pakistanis would embody the same sacrifice and patience demonstrated by their brothers in Syria.
The Balochistan jihadist group ”Jaish al-Adl“ also issued a statement and video celebrating the fall of the Assad regime, They congratulated Syrian fighters on their victories, and expressed hope for the downfall of the Iranian regime.
In an unexpected move, Al-Qaeda's central leadership has remained silent on the liberation of Damascus, without issuing any official comment yet. Despite its heightened media activity in recent weeks, the organization has yet to address the latest developments in Syria.
Al-Qaeda in Yemen criticised Hayat Tahrir al-Sham for what it perceives as alignment with Western interests, viewing this as a betrayal of Sharia and a threat to the jihadist cause
So far, reactions have primarily come from Al-Qaeda affiliates, such as Al-Qaeda in India, which praised Tahrir al-Sham and congratulated Syrian jihadists. Meanwhile, Al-Qaeda in Yemen has addressed the ongoing developments in Syria with caution, and It has also avoided directly mentioning Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, despite making subtle criticisms of the group.
In a publication by al-Qaeda’s Al-Malahem Foundation in Yemen, the group’s leader, Ibrahim al-Qawsi (also known as Khabib al-Sudani), offered guidance to Syrian mujahideen. He described the fall of the Assad regime as merely the first step in a broader struggle against what he called Zionist-Crusader dominance. Al-Sudani urged fighters not to submit to American influence, to support Palestinians, and to reject the legitimacy of borders established by the Sykes-Picot Agreement.
In fact, Al-Qaeda in Yemen criticised Hayat Tahrir al-Sham for what it perceives as alignment with Western interests, viewing this as a betrayal of Sharia and a threat to the jihadist cause. In its publication “Syria and the Revealing of the Facts”, the group warned against political settlements, regional compromises, and the adoption of democracy and secularism.
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) issued a joint statement on December 9, 2024, titled "The Glory of the East Begins with Damascus." The two movements congratulated the jihadists in Syria on the divine victory and called for abandoning differences, uniting, and standing together to build a new entity based on Sharia law and spreading justice among all sects of Syrian society. It is worth noting that these two groups have issued statements of support since the launch of Operation Deterrence of Aggression.
The liberation of Damascus also received significant by al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda's most powerful branch in Somalia, praising the liberation and congratulating Syria's mujahideen. They celebrated the liberation of prisons, particularly Sednaya, and expressed admiration for Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham's technological prowess, particularly the Shaheen drones, but without mentioning Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham by name.
The Guardians of Religion Organisation, affiliated with al-Qaeda in Syria and suppressed by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, blessed the conquest of Damascus, despite not participating in the liberation battle, believing that fighting for the sake of God is only for the sake of implementing Sharia law. It announced its dissolution in compliance with the directives of the organisation's general command, affirming in its statement its commitment to the principles of Sharia law and its readiness to engage in any future battles in defense of Muslims in the Levant.
Narrative War: Renewed Tensions
Most jihadists celebrated the conquest of Damascus, though some adopted a cautious stance until the results were clearer. However, many quickly expressed concerns and criticisms regarding Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham's recent actions.
Opinions on Ahmad al-Sharaa's policies were sharply divided. Abu Qatada's more open-minded Palestinian faction supported them, while al-Maqdisi's faction opposed them. The debate among jihadist thinkers centered on several key issues:
Delaying the implementation of Sharia law, tolerance of dissidents and minorities, giving more space to women, expanding personal freedoms, and not imposing a particular model of governance on Syrians pending their subsequent decisions, retreating from the principles of jihad, and discussions of divisive Salafi concepts such as loyalty and disavowal.
Al-Maqdisi has condemned Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham for diluting its jihadist principles. In his speeches, he has continued to emphasise the corruption of the approach of the proponents of democracy, who have misled and led their followers astray. He has also emphasised loyalty and disavowal and the establishment of the foundations of monotheism above all else, considering the implementation of Islamic rule a priority over reconstruction.
Al-Maqdisi seeks to undermine al-Sharaa's actions as a legitimate form of government, and believes that the path he is taking cannot lead to the rule of Islamic law and the establishment of an Islamic state. Al-Maqdisi even goes so far as to argue that al-Sharaa's actions undermine the concept of jihad in general. For him, al-Sharaa has committed unforgivable sins by implicitly accepting "democracy as a process" and by his unwillingness to implement Islamic law.
Al-Maqdisi then followed up with other posts accusing Ahmed al-Sharaa of a series of opportunistic actions, even accusing it of exploiting the blood of mujahideen to gain access to the presidential palace rather than as a price for implementing Sharia. Many jihadists have echoed similar arguments, viewing the Damascus victory as devoid of loyalty and disavowal and a victory with a secular flavor.
Al-Sharaa faced criticism for expressing gratitude to Qatar and other countries, as well as for congratulating Christians on the New Year
Also, On December 14, 2024, media reports sparked outrage among many jihadists after it was revealed that bars in Damascus had reopened. These establishments had been closed for four days following the entry of opposition forces, not due to an official ban, but out of fear. Once bar owners received reassurances from the new authorities, they resumed their operations.
Similarly, in a BBC interview on December 19, 2024, Ahmad al-Sharaa was asked if he intended to prohibit the sale and consumption of alcohol. He responded that many issues were beyond his authority, as they fell under the jurisdiction of the legal committee responsible for drafting the new constitution.
Sharaa's statements sparked a jihadist civil war. Al-Maqdisi's response was harsh, arguing that Sharaa's tongue had become tied, even on the issue of alcohol. Similarly, Hani al-Sibai, who is considered ideologically close to al-Maqdisi, raised this point in his Friday sermon on December 20, 2024, saying, "Has the West become so terrified that we will form a committee of legal experts?"
Tareq Abdel Halim, an Egyptian jihadist researcher, posted on his X account about the reopening of bars in Damascus, asking, "What is happening in Syria?! Is it a secular, infidel state, or a legitimate Islamic state?"
Also, Al-Sharaa faced criticism for expressing gratitude to Qatar and other countries, as well as for congratulating Christians on the New Year.
In response to these views, Abdullah al-Muhaysini, a figure close to many Syrian jihadists, sought to defend al-Sharaa and highlight the challenges of the current phase. In multiple posts on the X platform, he pointed out that the new administration has more pressing issues to focus on.
Sheikh Mazhar al-Wais, a close associate of Ahmad al-Sharaa and the Minister of Justice, published several posts cautioning against igniting ideological disputes that could break the revolutionary ranks. He warned that such internal strife diverts the Syrian people’s energy toward unproductive side conflicts. Instead, he urged unity, a focus on present responsibilities, and placing the public interest above all else.
But things weren't that simple for these jihadists orbiting around al-Maqdisi. In response, the more obstinate al-Maqdisi wrote an article titled "Warning of a Corrupt Word That Dilutes Religion and Justifies Suspending the Rules of Sharia and Enforcing Laws." He criticised what he called the "fallen quibbles" repeated by the revolution's leaders and sheikhs in Syria. Al-Maqdisi's main argument, as the title of the article reveals, was that such words as "gradualism" and "the duties of the stage" undermine Sharia.
In contrast, Abu Qatada and his disciple Abu Mahmoud adopted a more political tone in their response. Abu Qatada expressed admiration for Ahmad al-Sharaa, commending several aspects of his approach. He suggested that the Syrian experience was a significant case worth examining, saying: “We are facing a new reality, and a great state is now in the hands of the youth of Islam. So why not engage with it using reason, foresight, and sincerity before God?”
It is clear that Sharaa is pursuing a more gradual approach to the Islamisation of the Syrian state and society, and is not proceeding according to the formula established by traditional jihadists. Moreover, his vision of how Syria should be governed after Assad, the form the new state should take, and its relations with the outside world are not readily accepted by the mainstream traditional jihadists. He may also be reinventing a new approach to political Islam.
A key point raised by many, including al-Sabai, is the issue of gradualism in the implementation of Sharia law. Al-Sabai questioned, "Did the Ba'ath, secularism, and communism offer gradualism, or did they rule by force?" His views have gained significant traction in jihadist circles. In early 2025, Michigan-based cleric Ahmed Jibril released a video calling on Syrian jihadists to implement Sharia law immediately, while condemning the concept of gradualism.
Meanwhile, Abu Qatada and his disciple Abu Mahmoud began to provide ideological support for Ahmad al-Sharaa's political project, which caused al-Maqdisi and other junior theorists to lose much of their influence, even though al-Maqdisi's views on loyalty and disavowal remain highly popular among jihadists. It is possible that Abu Qatada and others preferred Ahmad al-Sharaa's approach.
Movements such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Pakistani Taliban have stated that their focus is exclusively on local affairs and defending the rights of the oppressed
The idea represented by Abu Qatada and his followers is based on the premise that the jihadist model advocated by al-Maqdisi, which is based on an obsession with the pure purity of monotheism, has largely failed. Abu Qatada even expressed his regret that some jihadists who followed al-Maqdisi have isolated themselves from the broader Islamic community.
While al-Maqdisi has avoided directly contradicting Abu Qatada, he has criticised his new ideas on multiple occasions. At times, al-Maqdisi appears disillusioned, reflecting on his circumstances and asserting that time will ultimately prove his views to be correct. He states:
"The Merchant of Venice is not a fictional story—it is the lived reality of anyone who mortgages his rifle to a patron and seals it with ballot boxes and legal frameworks. The 'Merchants of Venice' in our era are many: Sayyaf, Rabbani, Hekmatyar, Sheikh Sharif, and others. Their sedition was once concealed, but they have since been exposed. So beware of falling for a similar deception dressed in a different form."
Simultaneous Alienation: A Conspiracy Theory
Similar to its previous criticisms, ISIS, along with its affiliates in Africa, the Sahel, and Afghanistan, took an extremely hostile stance toward the liberation of Damascus. ISIS is likely not happy about the liberation of Damascus, and thus showed no joy at all even over the release of detainees from the Assad regime's prisons.
ISIS's response to the events in Syria was early and intense, shedding light on a new angle each week. In the editorial of its weekly newspaper, Al-Naba, Issue 473, it presented a provocative vision for the liberation of Syria, accusing Syrian jihadists of domesticating and subservience to the interests of international powers, and considering the liberation of Damascus the result of an international agreement.
He attacked Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and Syrian jihadists, claiming that those in Ghweiran and al-Hawl prisons were the ones who brought down the Assad regime. In reality, ISIS did not hide its psychological shock. However, it was unable to grasp its own powerlessness, so it resorted to conspiracy theories, as evidenced by his next statement: “What happened was a deliberate replacement of the Nusayri regime with a new regime that fights Sharia with Ahmed al-Sharaa.”
ISIS claims that the liberation of Damascus is a strategy to marginalise true jihadists, accusing Syrian factions of using jihad to serve international interests. Its media frequently depicts these factions as nationalist and ideologically corrupt.
In an attempt to justify its failure to achieve this goal, ISIS has isolated itself from others and tried to emphasise that it is the last bastion of faith against international conspiracies and that it does not fight at the whims of other countries. For ISIS, the conflict in Syria is part of a broader war between Islam and the international order. The organization continues to assert that it will stand in the way of a "free Syria" until true Islamic rule is established throughout the country.
Rising Jihadists: Repositioning
The Syrian revolution has been a major source of division among jihadists since its inception, and today it dazzles jihadists around the world. As previously demonstrated, this Syrian victory has not diminished its luster and continues to profoundly influence jihadists, even movements based in Asia, such as the Pakistani Taliban, to the point that some are considering emulating the experience based on what was achieved in Syria.
The current raging debates indicate that the Syrian jihadist experience will be accompanied by changes and revisions among many jihadists regarding methodology, jurisprudence, and political theory. While some jihadists seek to learn from other experiences, review their strategies, adapt to the new reality, and seek to reposition themselves, as in the case of the Guardians of Religion Organization and some movements in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel region, others cling to the old approach and move further away from any strategic vision.
Some jihadist movements may believe that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has gone too far, but all jihadist movements are facing increasing internal pressures and are seeking alternative strategies to avoid internal crises, especially given the glamorous images of Syrian empowerment. This is evidenced by the diversity and competition in opinions that emerged after the liberation of Damascus.
It is worth noting that, in recent times, jihadist movements have begun to disavow external operations and seek to provide security, basic services, and improve infrastructure in the territories they control. Movements such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Pakistani Taliban have stated that their focus is exclusively on local affairs and defending the rights of the oppressed.
The Syrian experience will likely push many jihadist movements to prioritize the national dimension over the international dimension, and to adapt to the field and political transformations in their regions. It appears that the competition between pragmatic and ideological jihadists will be the decisive factor shaping the jihadist landscape in the coming years. Will strategic interests prevail over traditional jihadist ideology?