The current military and political tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan is not merely a result of recent events, but a continuation of the political, military, and diplomatic policies pursued by both sides over the past eight decades.
Pakistan's first Governor-General, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, addressing the Constituent Assembly in August 1947, expressed a desire for friendly and peaceful relations with neighbouring countries, particularly Afghanistan, Iran, and India. However, ground realities proved otherwise.
To understand the current deadlock, we must confront history. Tensions between the two countries became prominent immediately after the Partition of India. In September 1947, Afghanistan was the only country to vote against Pakistan's membership in the United Nations, a clear indication of future disagreements. The fundamental conflict has persisted over the Durand Line, which Kabul refused to recognise, instead supporting "Pashtunistan" movements within Pakistan. The declaration of the Durand Line as illegal by the Afghan Loya Jirga in 1949, and the attack by the Afghan army on Bajaur in 1960 under Prime Minister Daoud Khan, were continuations of this policy.
During General Zia-ul-Haq's era, amid the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989), Pakistan, with American and Saudi support, organised the Afghan Mujahideen. This policy was, on one hand, a proxy war against the Soviet Union, and on the other, a source of internal justification for the Zia regime on religious grounds. As a result, arms, militancy, narcotics, and religious extremism took strong root in Pakistan, the effects of which are still felt today.
This strategy was repeated during the Afghan civil war in the 1990s. The ISI played a key role in the formation and patronage of the Taliban around 1994, aiming to achieve "strategic depth" and establish a friendly government in Kabul. The result was that Pakistan became one of only three countries to recognise the first government of the Taliban Emirate (1992–2001).
After September 11, 2001, General Pervez Musharraf's government joined the American "War on Terror", but simultaneously maintained secret links with some Taliban groups. This dual policy was beneficial for short-term political survival, but proved detrimental to Pakistan in the long run.
The Pakistani public paid a heavy price for these policies. According to the Ministry of Finance, Pakistan suffered an economic loss of approximately $67 billion between 2001 and 2009. Between 2001 and 2021, 8,000 to 10,000 military personnel and 22,000 to 25,000 civilians lost their lives, while millions were displaced. It was also during this period that the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was formed in 2007, which became the basis of today's tension.
Upon the Taliban's return to power following the American withdrawal in 2021, Pakistan's political and military leadership initially expressed satisfaction. However, this warmth soon faded when the Afghan Taliban refused to act against the TTP. Relations deteriorated to the extent that in October 2025, direct military clashes occurred between the two countries, resulting in dozens of military casualties.
Parliament can serve as a forum where sustainable and long-term policy can be formulated
According to the Pakistan Board of Investment, border closures are causing Pakistani exporters losses of approximately $77.1 million per month. Meanwhile, the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies reports that deploying over one hundred thousand troops at the border costs billions of rupees annually.
The history of relations between the two countries shows that covert operations, proxy wars, and opportunistic policies based on temporary interests can never bring sustainable peace. This crisis is particularly a product of those military eras where the "Afghan card" was used for internal political justification. From Zia-ul-Haq's "Jihad policy" to Pervez Musharraf's "frontline" partnership, authoritarian regimes repeatedly used Afghan policy as a tool, imposing a short-term perspective that continues to haunt Pakistan today.
The solution to this fundamental deadlock lies not in further military escalation, but in meaningful political dialogue. In Pakistan, the authority and democratic legal mandate belong solely to one institution: Parliament. Instead of confining foreign and security policies to personal or institutional domains, bringing them under parliamentary oversight can form the basis of sustainable decisions.
In mature democracies worldwide, Parliament's role in national security and foreign policy is considered decisive. For example, the United States Congress pressured for military withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2011, and later, congressional committees influenced policy through formal hearings throughout the withdrawal process. In the United Kingdom, the House of Commons Defence Committee conducted detailed reviews of military deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, leading to significant strategic changes. Similarly, Canada's Parliament held an open debate in 2002 on the military mission in Afghanistan, conditioning its extension on clear terms.
These examples demonstrate that strong parliamentary oversight not only provides constitutional and legal justification for national security but also ensures transparency, accountability, and public support in policymaking. This is the foundation of any lasting and acceptable solution.
The Constitution of Pakistan establishes Parliament as the centre of sovereign authority. Under Article 70, the authority to legislate on all matters, including national security, rests with Parliament. Furthermore, under Article 73, approval for defence expenditures and military operations from the national treasury also falls within its jurisdiction. Thus, parliamentary oversight of foreign and security policy is not merely a moral imperative, but a constitutional responsibility.
Pakistan's parliamentary history contains important examples of the practical exercise of this authority. In October 2008, a joint in-camera session of Parliament was held on the proposal of President Asif Ali Zardari, where all political parties were taken into confidence regarding the national security situation and military strategy against terrorism. This process led to the formation of the Parliamentary Committee on National Security, which, from November 2008 to March 2012, formulated sixteen guiding principles for foreign policy, including military cooperation with the United States and NATO, which were presented in a joint session of Parliament on 20 March 2012.
The fundamental point of the Parliamentary Committee's recommendations was that foreign and security policy should be formulated under parliamentary sovereignty. Constitutional balance between institutions should be maintained, and while the armed forces and civil service are consulted as advisory parties, final decision-making should rest with elected representatives. Regarding Afghanistan, it was also clarified that this conflict has no military solution and that political reconciliation is the only way forward. This political consensus and institutional harmony later enabled effective military operations against terrorism, such as Operation Rah-e-Raast (2009), Operation Rah-e-Nijat (2009), Operation Zarb-e-Azb (2014), and Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad (2017).
This tradition was further strengthened in December 2017 when another in-camera session of Parliament was held under the chairmanship of Senate Chairman Mian Raza Rabbani, where Chief of Army Staff General Qamar Javed Bajwa directly provided a comprehensive briefing on the security situation to elected representatives. These steps demonstrate that Parliament can serve as a forum where sustainable and long-term policy can be formulated.
At the domestic level, Parliament provides an effective platform for political consensus, inter-institutional dialogue, and transparent decision-making, where all stakeholders, the government, the opposition, and the military can come together within constitutional bounds. At the international level, through parliamentary diplomacy, direct links can be established with regional parliamentary institutions to formulate an alternative narrative based on historical facts and shared interests. Such "Track II" diplomacy can help build confidence and open doors for dialogue that remain immune to temporary political fluctuations. This is the only path to lasting stability and a solution to the conflict.