Pakistan’s dependence on telecommunications is no longer confined to the communications sector; it now shapes how businesses operate, public services are delivered, and daily life is conducted. As next-generation networks expand, the challenge is not simply to build more infrastructure but to create a regulatory framework that allows it to be deployed efficiently, predictably, and without unnecessary friction. The proposed amendments to the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996, aim to address delays in Right of Way (ROW) approvals, with the objective of reducing costs and facilitating faster connectivity. This objective is both legitimate and necessary, but its pursuit must remain within the boundaries of lawful protection afforded to private property.
Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution protect the right to property and, read alongside the Constitution’s commitment to Islamic principles and conformity with the Qur’an and Sunnah, establish clear limits on arbitrary interference with private property. The Qur’an prohibits the unjust consumption of another’s property (2:188) and permits its acquisition or transfer through mutual consent (4:29), reinforcing the principle that interference with private property must have a lawful justification and satisfy the requirements of necessity and proportionality.
A similar restraint on state power can be found in John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty (1859), which, through the harm principle, recognised that coercive state interference is justified only to prevent harm to others and not merely to advance the state’s own interests. Applied to property, this principle cautions against treating private land as freely available for state or public purposes without compelling justification and appropriate legal safeguards.
Taken together, these constitutional, Islamic, and liberal principles provide a coherent framework for assessing the proposed amendments. Viewed against this framework, aspects of the proposed provisions raise legitimate concerns, particularly where expanded access powers could interfere with private property without adequate safeguards. The government’s subsequent assurances are therefore encouraging; however, until those assurances are incorporated into the final legislation, the proposed framework continues to warrant careful consideration.
First, under proposed Section 27A(3), although the Bill requires an owner’s approval, consent should remain the norm. While non-response concerning individual private property may be referred to the government, “deemed approval” continues to apply to organised private ownership and public properties. Public assets should not be affected by official silence, and compulsory access should remain a narrowly defined exception.
Legislative reform, however, should go beyond simply expanding access rights and should also address the institutional shortcomings that continue to delay telecommunications deployment.
Second, under Section 27B, disputes involving constitutionally protected property rights should be subject to independent adjudication rather than executive determination alone. Although the Bill refers such disputes to the appropriate government for settlement through a nominated officer, it provides little guidance on the legal standards or criteria that should govern the officer’s decision. Where the exercise of state power may directly affect a constitutional property right, the process should not depend solely on executive discretion. An independent Telecom Infrastructure Tribunal or an expansion of the existing Telecom Tribunal’s jurisdiction would provide a more appropriate forum for such disputes while strengthening both legal certainty for infrastructure providers and public confidence in the process.
Third, Sections 27A(1) and 27B grant the government significant powers without setting out equally clear procedural safeguards. Although the Bill allows these powers to override other laws and gives the government a role in resolving disputes, it does not clearly require reasoned decisions or set out the principles and criteria that should guide their exercise. This leaves considerable room for discretion without sufficient guidance on how that discretion should be exercised.
Finally, legislation alone cannot resolve Pakistan’s connectivity challenges. From my professional experience, the main challenges have rarely been a lack of legal powers; rather, they have been fragmented approvals and inconsistent implementation. I have encountered matters where, despite a valid lease and substantial investment, a landowner later obstructed operations, resisted statutory tax deductions, and used local influence to seek additional commercial concessions. While legal remedies were available, pursuing prolonged litigation carried the real risk of disrupting services, leaving the telecommunications infrastructure company with little practical choice but to continue negotiations despite having clear contractual and legal rights.
There have also been instances where, even after the prescribed fee was paid, the relevant authority issued only a demand note but failed to issue the formal NOC. This creates uncertainty for investors and operators alike, leaving projects, contractual arrangements, and network expansion exposed to later objections or administrative action. Notably, the Ministry’s own press release of 19 June 2026 acknowledged that fragmented approvals and inconsistent requirements are impeding telecommunications deployment. This reinforces the point that legislative reform alone may not be sufficient; meaningful administrative reform is equally important.
Legislative reform, however, should go beyond simply expanding access rights and should also address the institutional shortcomings that continue to delay telecommunications deployment. Single-window approvals, digitised ROW processes, clear mandatory timelines, and independent dispute resolution could significantly reduce these practical difficulties while continuing to protect property rights.
At the same time, Pakistan should not repeat the colonial legacy of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, under which sweeping statutory powers permitted extensive state interference with private property, often placing individual rights beneath broader administrative objectives. A modern telecommunications framework should instead remain consistent with the original objective of the 1996 Act: to facilitate an efficient and well-regulated telecommunications sector while ensuring meaningful consent, fair compensation, and procedural fairness. Property rights and digital connectivity should reinforce, not undermine, one another. The real test lies not only in better legislation but in better governance, so that national development advances alongside, rather than at the expense of, citizens’ rights.