Donald Trump’s return to the White House has reignited global debates about American leadership, but nowhere is the impact more layered than in the Indo-Pacific. From Washington’s stance on the Ukraine–Russia war to its backing of Israel’s strikes on Iran, the Trump administration has once again privileged unilateralism over consensus—forcing allies to recalibrate both strategic and economic bearings.
Redefining Alliances, Redrawing Expectations
Trump’s second term doubles down on “America First”, recasting alliances as transactional deals centred on trade and security. Unilateral tariff hikes—first announced on 2 April and then escalated against China—have rattled expectations of stability, even among staunch partners. Public opinion surveys, while not flawless, act as barometers of diplomatic success and reveal a narrowing trust gap between Washington and Beijing. In Japan, India, and South Korea, favourability for Trump stands at 38 percent, 52 percent, and 33 percent respectively—each barely ahead of Xi Jinping’s ratings and signalling a razor-thin edge in perceived reliability.
Figure 1: Trump vs. Xi Favourability Among Key Allies
| Country | Trump Favourability % | Xi Favourability % |
| Japan | 38 | 37 |
| India | 52 | 51 |
| South Korea | 33 | 32 |
Source: Pew Research Centre, April–May 2025
Trump’s unpredictability has triggered anxiety among allies, eroding American soft power and raising doubts about reliability
Strategic Trust vs. Economic Realities
Economic preferences in the region further expose the complexity: Japan, South Korea, and India overwhelmingly prefer the United States as an economic partner (78 percent, 81 percent, 60 percent), whereas Australia and Indonesia tilt towards China (69 percent, 53 percent).
Figure 2: Preferred Economic Partner, Indo-Pacific
| Country | Prefer US % | Prefer China % |
| Japan | 78 | 22 |
| South Korea | 81 | 19 |
| India | 60 | 40 |
| Australia | 31 | 69 |
| Indonesia | 47 | 53 |
Source: Pew Research Center, April–May 2025
In Oceania, trust in the United States has plunged—down 20 points in Australia and 5 points in New Zealand—underscoring dissatisfaction with erratic US policy.
Figure 3: Change in Trust in US (2024→2025)
| Country | 2024 Trust % | 2025 Trust % | Change (pp) |
| Australia | 58 | 38 | –20 |
| New Zealand | 38 | 33 | –5 |
Source: Lowy Institute Poll & Perceptions of Asia Survey, 2025
Two Camps in the US–China Rivalry
Allies now split into two distinct categories based on how they view the US–China competition:
- Category 1: Strategic allies with the United States on both security and economy, seeing China primarily as a threat (e.g., South Korea).
- Category 2: States that rely on the United States for security but depend on China for trade (e.g., India, Australia, Philippines).
| Country | Category | China: Threat vs. Partner | US: Strategic Role |
| India | Cat. 2 | 33% view China as threat | 35% call US “important” |
| South Korea | Cat. 1 | 33% see China as cooperative | 89% call US “most important” |
| Japan | Cat. 2 | 53% see China as top threat | 78% call US “most important” |
| Australia | Cat. 2 | 52% see China as threat | 35% call US “important” |
| Philippines | Cat. 2 | Least trusted economic partner | 88% view US as critical |
Source: Pew Research Center & National Survey of the Philippines, April–May 2025
Category 1 countries continue to entrust security to the United States while hedging economically. Category 2 states grapple with balancing deep trade ties to Beijing against strategic dependence on Washington.
The Soft Power Conundrum
Trump’s unpredictability has triggered anxiety among allies, eroding American soft power and raising doubts about reliability. Yet, institutional cooperation—joint exercises, information-sharing platforms, alliance forums—has so far mitigated extreme fallout.
Meanwhile, China’s economic overtures are gaining traction where US credibility has slipped.
The paradox: strategic trust in Washington remains strong, but economic pragmatism is pushing allies towards Beijing. This dual-track diplomacy enables states to safeguard interests in both capitals but risks splitting the alliance in moments of acute crisis.
In today’s multipolar Indo-Pacific, perception is policy. If the United States wishes to sustain its leadership, it must rebuild trust by aligning its actions with alliance expectations—balancing domestic priorities with the strategic realities of partners. Ignoring allies’ shifting perceptions will not dissolve alliances, but it will force them to deepen economic ties with China, potentially undermining collective security. The time for Washington to recalibrate is now.