Youm-e-Takbeer is commemorated each year on May 28, marking Pakistan’s response to India’s nuclear weapon tests in both 1974 and 1998. It was absolutely significant to acquire and test such a capability to deter India from waging both a limited war, which India has long aspired to, and a large-scale war in South Asia. Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence remains India-specific. Pakistan adopted Credible Minimum Deterrence, while Full-Spectrum Deterrence falls within the ambit of Credible Minimum Deterrence, with the essence of deterring India at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.
In other words, it is intended to deter India across the spectrum, providing India with no opportunity to wage any type of limited or large-scale war. Pakistan’s Full-Spectrum Deterrence has left India’s growing conventional force capability in a state of strategic frustration. The deterrent imperative of Full-Spectrum Deterrence is to offset both India’s growing conventional and nuclear capabilities. Under such policy guidelines, Pakistan continues to produce effective countermeasures to retain a strategic balance in South Asia. Unlike India, Pakistan does not have ambitions for power projection, parity, or escalation dominance.
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons deter India each day. When it comes to the psychology of deterrence, the essence and value of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence have been working in the background of every crisis in South Asia. Many, including the recent Carnegie papers on South Asian strategic affairs, wrongly assume that nuclear weapons have played little or no role in India-Pakistan crises on multiple occasions. These papers attempt to undermine the role of nuclear deterrence in South Asia by encouraging the South Asian security leadership to rely on conventional deterrence.
Historically, conventional deterrence has failed many times, both globally and regionally. The seminal work Conventional Deterrence by Offensive Realist John Mearsheimer provides strong empirical evidence that conventional deterrence failed between the major powers. Nuclear deterrence, compared with conventional deterrence, has largely prevented both limited and large-scale war between nuclear rivals. Crisis episodes between the US and the Soviet Union, the US and Russia, China and Russia, the US and China, the US and North Korea, and India and Pakistan have indicated that none of these nuclear rivals has crossed the nuclear threshold because of the fear of nuclear weapon use.
The US-Israel-led preventive strikes against Iran reflect that a nuclear-weapon state can strike a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT
One may observe how and why countries such as Iraq, Syria, Libya, Ukraine, Iran, and others across the globe are targeted when they do not possess nuclear weapons. Proponents of nuclear deterrence would argue that if these countries possessed nuclear weapons, their potential rivals would think many times before invading them. North Korea can be considered a classic example, where the US remains cautious about striking North Korea and decapitating its regime because of the fear of North Korea using nuclear weapons against the US and its Asian allies and partners. Similarly, the US and its NATO allies remain cautious not to cross Russian nuclear red lines amid the Russia-Ukraine war, despite Russia’s debilitated economy and weakened conventional force capability.
Nuclear rivals think many times before striking each other, considering the deterrent imperative of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). MAD played a role during the Cold War and has persisted in the new nuclear age, despite the emergence of disruptive technologies. India’s increasing conventional force modernisation and nuclear weapons capability, supported by disruptive technologies, have put India in a position of hubris, escalation dominance, and power projection, encouraging aspirations for preventive strikes against a nuclear-armed Pakistan.
India demonstrated such dangerous aspirations during the 2019 and May 2025 episodes, risking dangerous escalation that may not benefit India. It may not be wrong to argue that India is a target-rich country; therefore, India would suffer far more, both economically and militarily, than Pakistan in the event of a serious military conflict.
All that being noted, Pakistan's Full-Spectrum Deterrence continues to hold value not only in deterring India but also in ensuring broader strategic stability in South Asia. The value and essence of nuclear deterrence can be assessed by observing how all major powers are modernising their nuclear forces and sophisticated delivery systems. None of them is considering nuclear disarmament, as pledged long ago in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
There is no evidence of nuclear disarmament. Even the prospect of an arms control regime is effectively dead, at least in the near future. Many states aspire to acquire nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes and their survival within the international system. The negative security assurances discussed as part of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) are being undermined. The US-Israel-led preventive strikes against Iran reflect that a nuclear-weapon state can strike a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT.
Pakistan should continue to maintain nuclear deterrence against all forms of Indian aggression and offensive capabilities. At the same time, Pakistan, with the support of leading powers and as part of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), should continue to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes in various fields of research, such as medicine, agriculture, health, and energy, to meet the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
What is needed is an institutionalised and sustainable dialogue process to resolve issues between the South Asian nuclear rivals. War of any kind is not an option due to the risk of rapid escalation to dangerous levels.