On April 23, 2025, the tranquil town of Pahalgam in Kashmir was rocked by a devastating terrorist attack that claimed 26 civilian lives, marking it as one of the deadliest incidents in the region in nearly two decades. India promptly pointed the finger at Pakistan, alleging state-sponsored terrorism, and unleashed a barrage of retaliatory measures, including the unprecedented suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT)—a 1960 agreement critical to water sharing between the two nations. Pakistan, denying any involvement, demanded evidence and countered with its measures, plunging the nuclear-armed neighbours into a perilous standoff.
This article delves into the Pahalgam attack, its aftermath, and the broader India-Pakistan conflict, providing historical context through incidents like the Kargil War and the 2008 Mumbai attacks. It examines the evolution of India’s responses, particularly the shift under Prime Minister Narendra Modi compared to previous Congress-led governments, highlighting how India’s rising global stature has emboldened Modi’s aggressive stance. Crucially, it underscores that India’s weaponisation of water is a historic first in recent times and critiques the lack of evidence and hasty nature of India’s actions.
The Pahalgam attack unfolded with chilling precision: coordinated explosions and gunfire tore through public spaces, killing 26 civilians, including women and children, and injuring dozens more. Prime Minister Modi, in a fiery televised address, accused Pakistan of orchestrating the assault via militant proxies and promised a “decisive response.” Within hours, India implemented sweeping measures: suspending the IWT, closing the Attari-Wagah border, expelling Pakistani nationals, blocking Pakistan’s official X account in India, and downgrading diplomatic ties by expelling military advisers.
Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar rejected India’s allegations, demanding “concrete evidence” of Pakistan’s involvement in the Pahalgam attack and challenging New Delhi to “share it with us and the world.” In a swift reciprocation, Islamabad closed its airspace to Indian carriers, suspended all bilateral trade, including third-country transit, and halted special South Asian visa schemes, signalling a comprehensive freeze in bilateral ties. Though several outlets initially reported that Pakistan had outright suspended the Simla Agreement, official statements clarify that Islamabad has “exercised the right to hold all bilateral accords, including the 1972 Simla Agreement, in abeyance” rather than formally abrogating the pact. This rapid tit-for-tat escalation set the stage for a crisis unparalleled in its scope and implications.
In May 1999, Pakistan infiltrated the Kargil district of Kashmir, occupying strategic heights and triggering a two-month conflict under Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s BJP-led government. India responded with a military operation to reclaim the territory, losing over 500 soldiers but successfully restoring the status quo by July. Vajpayee resisted calls for broader escalation, instead leveraging diplomacy to isolate Pakistan internationally. The United States pressured Pakistan to withdraw, and the Lahore Declaration—signed earlier that year to foster peace—was effectively abandoned. The aftermath saw heightened tensions but no immediate retaliatory measures beyond the battlefield, reflecting a restrained approach focused on containment rather than confrontation.
Modi’s approach draws strength from widespread domestic support for assertive leadership, while projecting India as a nation unwilling to compromise on matters of national security
On November 26, 2008, ten terrorists from Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistan-based militant group, launched a 60-hour siege on Mumbai, killing 166 people. Under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s Congress-led government, India’s response was markedly cautious. Singh condemned Pakistan’s alleged complicity but prioritised diplomatic pressure over military action. India suspended peace talks, shared evidence with Pakistan and the international community, and secured UN sanctions against Lashkar-e-Taiba. The aftermath saw a freeze in bilateral relations—composite dialogue stalled until 2011—and increased counterterrorism cooperation with the U.S., but no punitive economic or military measures were enacted. This restraint underscored the Congress government’s preference for diplomacy over aggression.
Between Kargil and Modi’s tenure, other incidents tested India-Pakistan relations. The 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament, linked to Pakistan-based groups, killed 14 and led to a massive military buildup along the border under Vajpayee. Yet, after a tense standoff, both sides de-escalated without war, opting for diplomatic channels. Similarly, the 2006 Mumbai train bombings, which killed 209, saw Singh’s government pursue investigations and international support rather than direct retaliation. These responses, while firm, avoided unilateral escalation, contrasting sharply with Modi’s approach.
Since taking office in 2014, Narendra Modi has redefined India’s stance toward Pakistan, favouring swift, assertive action over the restraint of past administrations. This shift was evident in two key incidents:
2016 Uri Attack: After militants killed 19 Indian soldiers in Kashmir, Modi authorised “surgical strikes” across the Line of Control (LoC), targeting alleged terrorist camps. India hailed the operation as a success, though Pakistan denied its impact. This marked a departure from diplomatic reliance to direct military engagement.
2019 Pulwama Attack: A suicide bombing killed 40 Indian paramilitary personnel, prompting India to conduct airstrikes on a supposed Jaish-e-Mohammed camp in Balakot, Pakistan. The ensuing aerial skirmish saw an Indian pilot captured and later released, but Modi’s willingness to cross borders underscored his aggressive posture.
In the Pahalgam aftermath, this pattern intensified. The suspension of the IWT, border closure, and expulsion of nationals reflect a broader, more punitive strategy than the Congress era’s focus on dialogue and evidence-sharing. Modi’s approach draws strength from widespread domestic support for assertive leadership, while projecting India as a nation unwilling to compromise on matters of national security.
Modi’s rapid escalation, from treaty suspension to border closure, lacks a clear de-escalation strategy, prioritising political optics over prudence
India’s ascent as a global power has significantly bolstered Modi’s confidence. With the world’s fifth-largest economy, strategic partnerships via the Quad (with the U.S., Japan, and Australia), and a growing voice in forums like the G20, India wields unprecedented influence. Its nuclear status and military modernization further enhance its leverage. During the Pahalgam crisis, this stature was evident: the U.S. urged “restraint” without condemning India’s IWT suspension, while allies like France and Japan remained silent, signalling tacit acceptance of India’s actions. This geopolitical clout, absent during earlier crises, allows Modi to pursue aggressive policies with less fear of international backlash, a luxury unavailable to Vajpayee or Singh.
India’s suspension of the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) stands out as perhaps the most alarming escalation. Signed in 1960 under World Bank mediation, the treaty has endured wars and crises, ensuring Pakistan’s access to the Indus River system—vital for 80% of its irrigation and much of its drinking water. However, the Indus River’s significant downstream flow within Pakistan’s territory poses a formidable technical challenge for India in any attempt to control or restrict the water supply. The river’s vast catchment area, fed by rainfall and glacial melt, combined with its high discharge rates, particularly during the monsoon season, means that India cannot simply “turn off” the Indus as one might a tap. Although India has constructed dams and reservoirs on the tributaries allocated under the IWT, the main stem of the Indus flows predominantly through Pakistan, limiting India’s capacity to drastically alter its natural course or volume. These technical constraints arise from the river’s complex hydrological dynamics, including seasonal fluctuations and the physical limitations of India’s infrastructure, which struggles to fully regulate such a massive waterway.
Nevertheless, India’s potential to manipulate water resources through existing projects could still result in significant reductions in water availability for Pakistan, especially during critical agricultural periods. This threat to Pakistan’s water security marks an unprecedented use of water as a weapon in recent history. By halting cooperation, India endangers Pakistan’s agricultural backbone, jeopardising millions of livelihoods and risking a humanitarian crisis. Legal experts argue this move violates the IWT’s dispute resolution framework, which mandates negotiation or arbitration rather than unilateral abrogation. The unprecedented nature of this escalation amplifies its danger, potentially encouraging other nations to exploit shared resources in conflicts, thereby destabilising global norms.
India’s response hinges on unproven allegations of Pakistan’s involvement in Pahalgam. Despite Modi’s claims, no intelligence, forensic data, or intercepted communications have been publicly disclosed—a stark contrast to the 2008 Mumbai case, where evidence was widely shared. Pakistan’s Ishaq Dar capitalised on this, challenging India to “present proof to the world.” The absence of evidence raises doubts about the accusations’ validity and suggests a pretext for pre-planned retaliation.
Moreover, India’s measures—implemented within hours—reflect a troubling haste. Past governments deliberated, as seen in the year-long 2001-2002 standoff or Singh’s measured Mumbai response. Modi’s rapid escalation, from treaty suspension to border closure, lacks a clear de-escalation strategy, prioritising political optics over prudence. This impulsiveness risks miscalculation, especially with nuclear stakes.
The international community has reacted with concern but little consensus. The UN Security Council’s emergency session on April 24, 2025, ended without a resolution, paralysed by U.S.-China divisions. The U.S., balancing its India partnership, avoided criticism, while China backed Pakistan, condemning the IWT move. Regional diplomacy faltered—U.S. Senator JD Vance’s planned India visit was postponed amid the crisis. Some analysts warn of “the most dangerous moment” in decades, urging mediation by the UN, U.S., or China to restore dialogue and treaty adherence.
The Pahalgam attack has propelled India and Pakistan toward a precipice, with India’s unprecedented actions, most notably weaponising water, marking a historic escalation. Modi’s aggressive response, fuelled by India’s global rise, diverges sharply from the restraint of Congress-led governments, yet the lack of evidence and hasty measures cast doubt on its legitimacy and wisdom. As tensions soar, the world must intervene to avert disaster. India and Pakistan, bound by geography and history, share a stake in peace. Without de-escalation and evidence-based dialogue, the spectre of conflict, potentially catastrophic, looms large. The stakes demand nothing less than a concerted global effort to pull both nations back from the brink.