The lifeline of millions lies beneath our feet, yet it remains invisible in policy. Groundwater sustains Pakistan and India, but unlike rivers, it has no treaty, no framework, and no shared protection. In the Indus Basin, this silence is becoming dangerous.
South Asia is facing a groundwater emergency. Aquifers are being pumped faster than they can recharge, water tables are falling, and contamination is spreading. The Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 governs rivers but excludes aquifers, leaving a critical gap in transboundary governance. This omission is decades old, but climate change and population growth have made it urgent.
Pakistan’s National Water Policy of 2018 acknowledges transboundary water issues but focuses almost entirely on surface flows. Groundwater is treated as a domestic resource, not a shared one. Yet every province faces distinct challenges. Punjab struggles with over-extraction and falling water tables.
Sindh suffers from salinity and seawater intrusion. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, with its mountainous terrain, experiences uneven recharge. Balochistan endures chronic scarcity in arid zones. Together, these pressures highlight the basin’s vulnerability. Internationally, Canada’s Mackenzie River Basin demonstrates that groundwater can be integrated into basin-wide agreements, even when scientific knowledge is limited.
Farmers across Punjab complain that wells must be drilled deeper each year, raising costs and reducing yields. In Sindh, growers lament saline water destroying crops. In Balochistan, communities fear aquifers may dry up entirely.
Experts warn that unchecked pumping is unsustainable, but policymakers hesitate to raise the issue bilaterally, fearing it could reopen old disputes under the Indus Waters Treaty. International organisations, including the World Bank, have urged both countries to begin joint aquifer mapping and monitoring. Yet hesitation persists, with stakeholders wary of political sensitivities.
The future of the Indus Basin depends on whether groundwater is finally brought into transboundary governance
The crisis stems from structural neglect. The Indus Waters Treaty was designed for rivers, not aquifers. Groundwater governance remains fragmented at national and provincial levels. Over-extraction is driven by subsidised electricity for tube wells, inefficient irrigation, and weak regulation. Climate change alters recharge patterns, while pollution from agriculture and industry degrades quality. This is not a one-time crisis but a recurring failure to integrate groundwater into transboundary management.
Consider farmers near Thatta, Sujawal and Badin districts, where seawater intrusion has left groundwater brackish. Once able to irrigate rice paddies and achieve healthy yields, they now struggle to grow even salt-tolerant crops. Their incomes have dropped sharply, and many fear migration may be the only option. Their story reflects the lived reality of millions across Pakistan; dependent on groundwater yet excluded from decisions that shape its governance.
Groundwater accounts for 60 to 70 per cent of irrigation in Pakistan’s Indus Basin. Studies estimate aquifers are being depleted at rates exceeding recharge by 20 to 30 per cent. In Punjab, water tables fall by up to one metre annually. In Sindh, salinity affects nearly 70 per cent of irrigated land. Balochistan faces chronic shortages, with minimal recharge. The financial impact is severe: rising pumping costs, declining productivity, and risks to food exports. Without intervention, losses could reach billions in agricultural output.
Uncertainty about groundwater availability undermines agricultural planning. Farmers hesitate to adopt high-yield crops, agribusinesses face rising costs, and investors remain cautious about long-term projects in water-stressed regions. This erodes Pakistan’s broader economic stability, as agriculture remains central to gross domestic product and employment.
Pakistan’s National Water Policy calls for improved monitoring and conjunctive use of surface and groundwater, but implementation is slow. India has similar domestic policies, yet neither country has advanced towards a joint framework. International agencies urge cooperative aquifer management, but official statements remain vague. Pilot projects in joint monitoring are expected, but political will remains uncertain.
The future of the Indus Basin depends on whether groundwater is finally brought into transboundary governance. Without cooperation, aquifer depletion will continue to erode food security and economic stability across Pakistan. The lesson from Canada’s Mackenzie Basin is clear: even with limited data, proactive agreements can safeguard ecological integrity. For Pakistan and India, the path forward lies in recognising groundwater as a shared lifeline and building frameworks that anticipate, rather than react to, crisis.