The 2026 Iran War, which finally ended after 40 days with a ceasefire on 8 April 2026, had already demonstrated the failure of conventional military and proxy tactics to ensure the survival of the regime against a determined and modern air attack. Tehran had to review its nuclear options after the successful attacks on highly fortified nuclear sites such as Natanz and Fordow by U.S. and Israeli forces, which had previously been considered “red lines”.
It is too early to say that nuclear acquisition is Iran’s only option, but the war has certainly hastened the need for ultimate deterrence. The present Iranian calculation covers three important, interwoven paths: full weaponisation, negotiated settlement, and improved asymmetric deterrence, and a comprehensive, up-to-date analysis of the risks and rewards is required to determine which is best.
The idea of the North Korean model, one that would make the bomb “irreversible”, is enormously attractive to the Iranian leadership. Despite being isolated and sanctioned by the international community, North Korea has managed to survive long-term by refusing to allow disarmament to be used as a means of securing economic gains or security guarantees.
The war’s biggest blow came when a decapitation strike killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and dozens of top officials, turning the nuclear programme into a matter of “national pride” and a way of “paying homage to our martyrs”. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi emphasised that Iran cannot give up enrichment, describing it as an “achievement of our own scientists”.
But even after the military attacks, analysts broadly agree that Iran still possesses all the essential components required to build a bomb: the material, the dispersed facilities, and the technical know-how. Moreover, Supreme Leader Khamenei has pledged to safeguard Iran’s nuclear and missile programme as a national treasure.
The message for Tehran is a simple one: those who possess the bomb are taken seriously; those who seek the bomb are bombed.
However, there are serious dangers associated with complete weaponisation. The world is on the verge of an “out-of-control” nuclear arms race, according to International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Rafael Grossi. Iran’s rivals, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey, have all openly vowed to compete with Iran in developing nuclear weapons.
A short diplomatic truce allows Iran to recover and slow a regional arms race while still maintaining the ability to accelerate the weaponisation process rapidly if future commitments are not honoured
The prospect of outright weaponisation raises the possibility of further military escalation and the imposition of even harsher international sanctions. Exacerbating this is Iran’s refusal to cooperate with the United Nations atomic agency since last summer, preventing international inspectors from knowing where, or in what quantity, highly enriched uranium is being stockpiled.
A diplomatic detour is being pursued while internal pressure to weaponise continues to mount. Indirect talks between the United States and Iran, brokered by Pakistan, are laying the groundwork for a temporary memorandum aimed at preventing a return to conflict rather than achieving a comprehensive peace agreement.
Iran is currently considering a U.S. offer as of May 2026, which President Trump claims is “FAR BETTER than the JCPOA”.
The United States offered a 20-year “suspension” of all nuclear activity. Trump’s counter-proposal, which Iran rejected as “totally unacceptable”, proposed a shorter moratorium, the export of only a portion of its stockpile of highly enriched uranium, the dilution of the remainder, and the refusal to dismantle facilities.
Iran did not agree to the permanent discontinuation of uranium enrichment. This diplomatic process would allow Tehran to remove the U.S. naval blockade and secure sanctions relief. Significant differences remain regarding how enriched uranium stockpiles will be disposed of and the duration of any nuclear shutdown.
If Iran is unable to establish a mechanism to verify its nuclear progress, International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Grossi has warned that any agreement would be an “illusion”. Russia’s proposal to remove Iran’s surplus enriched uranium for use in peaceful energy projects remains a technical component of a possible deal that could help defuse tensions and reduce the highly enriched uranium stockpile.
Iran also possesses a significant non-nuclear arsenal. Its conventional capabilities, demonstrated during the war, can inflict considerable damage on regional energy markets. Satellite imagery analysis shows that Iranian airstrikes struck and/or destroyed at least 228 U.S. military facilities in the Middle East, far more than has been publicly acknowledged.
Moreover, Iran’s ability to influence the Strait of Hormuz, currently the choke point for the U.S. blockade, gives it a continuous and potent instrument of economic coercion. The military still maintains a large stockpile of thousands of missiles and drones that are secured and ready for deployment, and officials have warned of a strike on the Israeli nuclear site at Dimona if regime change is pursued.
It was not enough, however, because the coordinated air campaign demonstrated that conventional means alone were insufficient to repel a full-scale attack.
The painful historical lessons of disarmament provide a strong counterargument against abandoning a nuclear programme. Libya’s 2003 decision to dismantle its entire weapons programme, referenced by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu as the preferred model for Tehran, ultimately resulted in the overthrow and death of its leader.
Similarly, Ukraine’s surrender of its nuclear arsenal after the collapse of the Soviet Union failed to provide the security assurances needed to prevent a later invasion by a nuclear-armed neighbour. These examples suggest that abandoning the nuclear path is perceived as a sign of weakness that invites aggression, reinforcing the Iranian belief that only a nuclear capability can provide ultimate security.
Iran is caught between the demands of diplomacy and the threat of existential military danger after the war. Given these realities, the best option for Tehran is a combination of strategic ambiguity that would allow it to retain the capacity to develop nuclear weapons while buying time through a short-term interim deal.
The essence of its achievement, enrichment, remains intact; its long-term deterrent is reinforced; and its immediate military risk is reduced as it seeks relief from the naval blockade and sanctions. Moreover, Tehran delays the onset of a regional arms race by denying neighbours such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey a clear justification to go “full nuclear” and openly nuclearise.
A short diplomatic truce allows Iran to recover and slow a regional arms race while still maintaining the ability to accelerate the weaponisation process rapidly if future commitments are not honoured, as happened when a previous administration abandoned the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Threshold status is the last refuge in a largely hostile strategic environment, where the balance strongly favours those aligned against Tehran.