World War II resulted in an estimated 70 to 85 million deaths, making it history’s deadliest conflict. Of the casualties, roughly two-thirds were civilians, with the Soviet Union and China suffering the highest losses. Realising that, after the arrival of the atomic bomb era, a Third World War could end the planet, representatives from the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China held a conference on 21 August 1944 at the Dumbarton Oaks estate in Georgetown, Washington, D.C. They discussed the structure of a new international body, culminating in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals.
These formed the basis for the 1945 San Francisco Conference, where the United Nations Charter was drafted, and the organisation officially began on 24 October 1945, with its first substantive meetings (General Assembly and Security Council) convening in London in January 1946.
Without going into the successes and failures of the United Nations, the cornerstone of international relations revolved around the United States-led military and economic bloc versus the Soviet Union and its allies until the 1990s. The order was never perfect, never neutral, and never totally inclusive. The mere fact that five countries were given the right of veto made the Security Council an exclusionary body and was, in effect, a continuation of the historical reality of power-based international relations.
The post–Second World War system rested on several assumptions. The first assumption was that the United States would act as a stabilising hegemon. Secondly, economic growth would reduce political conflict. Lastly, a rules-based structure could restrain raw power. However, what must be noted is that this was a Western structure that delivered relative stability and prosperity. For much of the Global South, however, the order was exclusionary and deeply unequal.
Despite the United Nations, while a precise total is elusive due to varying definitions of “war” (as opposed to insurgency or skirmish), hundreds of significant armed conflicts and dozens of major wars occurred globally during these 45 years, a significant portion of the Cold War era.
As the architect of this structure and after becoming the hyperpower following 1990, the United States sought United Nations cover for the wars it launched in Iraq and Afghanistan. The need for international consensus was felt in order to ensure a semblance of international law and to ensure the continuation of an order required to prevent a major war between the great powers.
Raw power has replaced the requirement for international consensus. The philosophy of “spheres of influence” is back
However, post-2010, in all likelihood due to the imbroglio in Afghanistan and the dire situation in the Middle East, American strategic thinking began to change. By the time President Donald Trump assumed office in 2016, “Manifest Destiny”, a concept coined by John O’Sullivan in 1845 that the United States was divinely ordained to expand across the North American continent from the Atlantic to the Pacific, spreading democracy and American ideals, once again became a foundational element of American identity and expansionism.
However, to gain a complete picture, it is also necessary to dwell on the evolution of the Soviet Union, and later Russia and China, during this era.
The Soviet Union created its own sphere of influence, resorting to military intervention where necessary. It also backed allied regimes and insurgencies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. It would be fair to assert that it viewed international law as subordinate to strategic necessity. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia, having been significantly weakened, reasserted its regional dominance in places such as Chechnya and Georgia through military intervention. In 2022, Russia attacked Ukraine, signalling that its ideology had shifted towards hard realism and nationalism to counter persistent security anxieties.
China avoided global military overstretch and ideological export. It focused on borders and sovereignty. As a matter of policy, it relied on diplomacy, trade, integration into the global economy, and infrastructure influence to conduct its foreign relations.
Following Russia’s attack on Ukraine and China beginning to flex its muscles, challenging the United States in the Western Hemisphere, Africa, and the South China Sea, the second Trump presidency initiated a process whereby power was to be used to ensure American hegemony. First came the tariff war. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and later the World Trade Organisation, which had defined the economic world order post-2000, became casualties.
Except for China, Russia, India, and North Korea, other countries found it difficult to withstand tariff pressure. Europe, which had once been a force to reckon with, saw its status plummet. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation came under severe strain. The threat of an expansionist Russia and a non-committal United States further compounded European security concerns.
The “Donroe Doctrine”, being touted as a Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, describes a desire by the second Trump administration to assert American predominance in the Western Hemisphere. Trump’s efforts to rename the Gulf of Mexico, acquire Canada, the Panama Canal, and Greenland, as well as pursue military action against Venezuela, have all been cited as part of this corollary. Additionally, Trump’s “Make America Great Again” agenda and withdrawal from international agencies indicate that the United States is focusing on its own hemisphere at the expense of traditional alliances such as NATO.
The resultant weakening of the world order has been remarkable. Besides Europe, the United Nations has been pushed to the sidelines. Raw power has replaced the requirement for international consensus. The philosophy of “spheres of influence” is back.
This reflects the exhaustion of a system built for a different era, struggling to govern a world marked by the diffusion of power, deep inequality, and the looming threat of another world war. History tells us that transitions between world orders are periods of heightened hostility. Whether the world succeeds in resetting the balance will depend on how the situation develops in 2026.
For Pakistan, this will be an exceptionally sensitive period. The transition presents profound strategic and tactical risks, with very little room for error. Positioned at the crossroads, Pakistan will have to balance its relations with the United States and China, manage instability in Iran, and navigate its acrimonious relations with Afghanistan and India. In this era, diplomatic foresight, strategic restraint, economic progress, and internal political inclusiveness are the need of the hour.
Any misstep or miscalculation could cost us dearly.