The relationship between Pakistan and Bangladesh has been historically complex and emotionally charged. Bangladesh, which was once East Pakistan, accounted for the majority, 54 percent of Pakistan’s population before 1971. The eastern wing was also politically more active, serving as the birthplace of the All India Muslim League. Yet, despite its demographic and political weight, East Pakistan remained marginalised by the West Pakistani ruling elite, hence leading to deep political, economic and cultural alienation. The tragic events of 1971 continue to dominate the collective memory of Bangladeshis. The civil war, marked by atrocities committed by the then West Pakistan, ended with Bangladesh’s independence in December 1971. Pakistan formally recognised Bangladesh as a sovereign state in 1974, but the shadow of the past has lingered, often resurfacing in diplomatic relations.
Bangladesh’s nation-building project, rooted in linguistic and cultural homogeneity, consistently invokes memories of the liberation struggle. National symbols, public memorials, museums, and even consumer products frequently reflect the history of independence and the role of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The nationalist politics of the ousted Awami League had further reinforced these memories. By pursuing trials of individuals accused of collaborating with Pakistan in 1971, Sheikh Hasina’s government kept the past at the centre of domestic politics. Opposition groups, such as the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami, criticised this approach, arguing it politicises the tragic history to silence dissent. However, across the political spectrum, there remains a consensus on the sensitivity of the 1971 trauma.
The political use of the past has also influenced Bangladesh’s foreign policy stance towards Pakistan. Diplomatic strains have surfaced periodically, including the expulsion of Pakistani diplomats over allegations of interference in domestic affairs and vice versa. Despite these tensions, Bangladesh hosts many Pakistani businesses, students and workers. Everyday interactions at the people-to-people level often remain cordial. Yet unresolved humanitarian and political issues persist. Urdu-speaking Biharis—commonly called “stranded Pakistanis”—continue to live in slums and camps in Bangladesh, many of them still identifying as Pakistanis while awaiting repatriation. Successive Pakistani governments, both civilian and military, have largely ignored this humanitarian concern. Similarly, disputes over the division of assets and foreign aid following the 1971 cyclone remain unsettled. These long-standing issues complicate the bilateral relationship, thus preventing meaningful normalisation.
Regardless of whether Bangladesh is governed by the Awami League, the BNP or any other political force, the collective sensitivity to 1971 is shared across the society
Given this fraught background, Pakistan ought to formally apologise to the state and people of Bangladesh for the tragic events of 1971. Such an apology would not only address a moral responsibility but also serve Pakistan’s long-term strategic interests. Regardless of whether Bangladesh is governed by the Awami League, the BNP or any other political force, the collective sensitivity to 1971 is shared across the society. Recognising this, Pakistan can build goodwill, reduce historical baggage and open avenues for closer co-operation in trade, education and investment. Four core issues continue to irritate bilateral relations: the atrocities committed in 1971, the unresolved division of assets, the transfer of foreign aid meant for the 1970 cyclone victims in East Pakistan, and the repatriation of stranded Pakistanis, particularly Urdu-speaking Biharis.
Addressing these requires a combination of symbolic and practical measures. First, the Government of Pakistan should issue a formal written and documented apology to the state and people of Bangladesh. This letter must be officially delivered to the relevant department in Dhaka and its receipt publicly acknowledged. Such a move would mark a significant confidence-building measure. Second, Islamabad should establish a federal cabinet committee tasked with engaging Dhaka on the division of assets and foreign aid-related matters. Pakistan can highlight the fragility of its current economy and request Bangladesh to pardon these disputes in the spirit of reconciliation, while also demonstrating sincerity by offering technical and/or humanitarian co-operation.
Third, on the matter of stranded Pakistanis, the same committee should work with Bangladeshi authorities to collect verified data on the actual number of individuals still awaiting repatriation. Many in the first generation have already acquired Bangladeshi citizenship (and voting rights), and a younger generation has grown up as Bangladeshi nationals. At the same time, Pakistan should document the number of Bengalis living in Pakistan, many of whom may already hold Pakistani nationality. This data-driven approach would allow both states to address the humanitarian issue pragmatically rather than emotionally.
Based on my own visit to Bangladesh in 2013 and the academic and official conversations I encountered, it is evident that all sections of Bangladeshi society remain acutely sensitive about 1971. Whether one supports the Awami League or the BNP, the tragic memories of that period unite public sentiment. It is, therefore, in Pakistan’s larger national interest to extend an immediate formal apology and ensure it is accepted by the state and people of Bangladesh. Dhaka, in turn, should disseminate Pakistan’s apology positively through official channels, media and curricula. Such reciprocal gestures would not erase history but would allow both nations to move forward with dignity, mutual respect and a renewed spirit of co-operation.