Yes, there is public unease. Yes, the mission is imperfect. Yes, the risks are real. Yes, the optics are uncomfortable. Yes, the region is volatile. But the real question is whether Pakistan’s absence improves outcomes for Gaza, for Palestinians, or for Pakistan itself.
First, by joining the Gaza International Stabilisation Force, Pakistan gains a seat at the table shaping the mandate, rules of engagement, and operational red lines. Outside the room, Pakistan has no veto. Inside it, Pakistan has leverage. Its presence reduces—not increases—the risk of the force being used against Palestinians.
Second, Pakistan has already drawn a clear line: disarmament is not its role. Its position carries weight only if it is part of the mission design. Refusing to participate does not prevent a coercive mandate; it merely removes Pakistan’s influence over it. Mandates evolve through negotiation, not by abstention.
For Pakistan, the choice is not between principle and pragmatism; it is between shaping outcomes and merely commenting on failures
Third, Pakistan’s long-held stance on international peacekeeping rests on three pillars: protecting civilians, separating combatants, and stabilising transitions, while never acting as proxies for occupation. Over time, Pakistani troops have earned credibility for being professional, restrained, and politically neutral. Gaza needs that credibility now more than ever.
Fourth, Israel is an unreliable partner, and its actions are unpredictable. This makes Pakistan’s professional participation crucial it raises the political cost of violations. A force composed solely of Western contingents lacks legitimacy in the eyes of Palestinians; inclusion of Pakistan, alongside other Muslim-majority states, alters that equation.
Fifth, Pakistan’s strategic posture must shift from reactive to consequential. Being invited to contribute to a major peace initiative reflects renewed diplomatic and military credibility. Walking away signals hesitation. This is a moment when influence should be earned through presence.
Finally, if Pakistan’s goal is the creation of a viable Palestinian state, statehood remains impossible without prior stabilisation. Stabilisation must precede statehood. For Pakistan, the choice is not between principle and pragmatism; it is between shaping outcomes and merely commenting on failures.