Modern warfare has transformed because of technological advancements, new spaces of war, and changing actors, or rather blurred actors (state and non-state actors) in war, which demand transformed strategic thinking, operational planning, and force development and posture. Pakistan faced a wide spectrum of conflict ranging from limited war, network warfare, cyber warfare, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism; therefore, it needs greater integration and consolidation of plans and operations at a fast pace. The new Article 243 has raised a critical question: is knowledge of, and about, war (or more precisely modern war) still inherently political for Pakistan?
To answer this question, let us see what has happened in the rewriting of Article 243. The post of Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCSC) was rotational among the army, air force, and navy, but since 1997, the Pakistan Army has held the post. Gradually, its role and importance have been reduced to ceremonial.
Now, the new Article rationalises the abolition of CJCSC and creation of the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) as a single and centralised military authority under which all three service chiefs will fall to address the needs of modern warfare. Constitutionally, now the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) will be the CDF and will be immunised from any form of prosecution.
It is good to argue that the new amendment has normalised the extraordinary promotions (like Munir Akram’s promotion to the rank of field marshal), as it was the second promotion in the history of Pakistan, but that is extraneous. The core of this change is to modernise the command structure and operations and the role of the Defence Coordination Council, which will help the CDF to control appointments, assignments, and postings (in sensitive areas and bureaucratic institutions). In this way, the CDF will challenge the judiciary’s traditional influence in those appointments, assignments, and postings.
The COAS-CDF will establish firm executive and operational control over the armed forces, including strategic and non-strategic forces, and will completely exclude parliamentary/civilian oversight and/or influence over the appointments and assignments of officers and military strategy and operations. This will be the characteristic feature of civil-military relations in the country and will impact the character of war without civilian oversight, accountability, and purse strings.
As things stand and are understood, the CDF will maintain control over strategic force command. The Commander of the National Strategic Command (CNSC) will be created, who will oversee the country’s nuclear and strategic assets and will functionally be subordinated to the CDF. The Commander must be from the army, and the prime minister will appoint the CNSC on the recommendation of the COAS-CDF.
The National Command Authority (NCA) has been, at least on the face, a civilian-led, essentially military-led body overseeing the country’s strategic forces, but now it will peter out under the COAS-CDF’s operational control. As argued by different scholars, the constitutional alignment between the new Amendment and the existing NCA Act and clarity about the role and position of the CDF within the NCA are now required.
However, it is refutable to argue the civil-military imbalance enshrined in the new amendment as a general reference. To emphasise the practices and institutional memory of the military-led centralised NCA and that things have worked well so far is burying one’s head in the sand. The management of nuclear operations is essentially a matter of civil-military relations, and Pakistan is no exception.
The centralisation, or rather concentration, of power in one office clearly implies that service chiefs other than the army are seemingly less enthusiastic and confident about a major swing in the country’s maritime strategy and the new role that the air force has earned in the country’s defence
The mobilisation of professional knowledge as a source of power in one office under the new Article is notable. The army has successfully developed and promulgated the changing character of conflict, crisis, and war in South Asia to (not only justify) legislate its concept of (current and future) war and strategy and to solidify its role in a monologic national security discourse.
The military, especially the army, in Pakistan has represented and mobilised knowledge of war, professional expertise, and authority through its involvement in political activities, its influence over politics through direct attempts like coups, shaping public narratives of threat and conflicts, and/or its capitalisation upon heroism or popularity of serving officials.
In the modern warfare debate, the recent statements of COAS Asim Munir are notable in signifying not only the authority over knowledge but also the knowledge about war that is going to shape military strategy, operations, and procurement. Building on the strand of literature on civil-military relations that argues that, to an extent, civil-military tension heightens military effectiveness, the customary question is: Should we expect this with Pakistan?
A high level of societal and military support for the use and projection of (all) force backed by unchecked/unbridled and prioritised defence spending characterises the civil-military contestation in Pakistan. But the new amendment has transformed the question; the new question is: under the new amendment, is there any friction between the two left to be argued about? The answer is that there is no contestation left between the two. Well, then, this calls into question the heightened military effectiveness envisaged under the new Article.
It is clear from the arrangement that the CDF will have significant powers and freedom to take any initiative relating to strategic thought, but will he keep a balanced representation of all services in such initiative, and will he ensure civilian oversight over his thoughts, processes, and operations, as well as provide objective advice and analysis to parliament or illusory civilian masters? These are the areas that need transparency.
Instead, the question is whether the reorganisation of higher defence is striking the right balance between centralised policy and command and devolved management of operations to services. However, under the current set of circumstances, it is not clear how the three services will approach tight resources against their expanding commitments.
The influence and power of the COAS have increased, and since there have not been clarifications about the working mechanism of the CDF, perhaps it has left a void by reducing the influence of other services’ chiefs in decision-making. The rationale of speedy decision-making as a requirement of modern warfare could veil the disagreements within services over national security policies, military plans, and operations.
The centralisation, or rather concentration, of power in one office clearly implies that service chiefs other than the army are seemingly less enthusiastic and confident about a major swing in the country’s maritime strategy and the new role that the air force has earned in the country’s defence.
Undoubtedly, we are living in times where technology and tactics have transformed the way we think and operate about defence. The overhaul of Article 243 is argued to modernise command according to modern, swift network-centric warfare and is a manifestation of how new warfare concepts such as jointness, integration, and multi-domain have driven (or been used as the drivers of) organisational change, including structure, policy, strategy, operations, and procurement.
However, the new amendment has established that war (or future war) in the region has to be devoid of any political and financial imperatives. An autocratic defence is in the making. This amalgamation of power under one post, as well as the concentration of the target for the enemy in one office, has shifted the balance of power towards the military, more specifically the army, at the expense of civilian institutions.
However, under new circumstances, the man in the office of COAS-CDF should not ride roughshod over other services and civilian oversight (again, if there is any left).