Earlier this year, in a telephonic conversation with his Iranian counterpart, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, General (now Field Marshal and Chief of Defence Forces) Asim Munir, stated that Pakistan would eliminate the menace of terrorism while transforming the Pakistan-Iran border into a zone of friendship, brotherhood, and economic development. Similar remarks were made in October 2023 in response to suicide bombings in the restive Pakistani provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Pakistan has been grappling with the scourge of terrorism for the past 22 years.
Outfits such as the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) have wreaked havoc in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, respectively. The TTP was flushed out of Pakistan through a massive military operation, only to stage a resounding comeback in 2020. As for the BLA, it remains the most cohesive and brutal terrorist group in Balochistan. Pakistan’s successful counterterrorism military operations notwithstanding, these groups continue to pose a potent threat. Consequently, the question Pakistani authorities must answer is: how can these organisations be compelled to end their activities or reduce the level of violence?
Although it is reasonable to argue that terrorist groups tend to become dormant rather than cease entirely, it is worth analysing factors that could precipitate their decline. According to Audrey Kurth Cronin, the decapitation of leadership significantly contributes to the decline of a terrorist organisation. Leaders can be considered the centre of gravity of such outfits, not least because they provide both the ideological justification and strategic direction to their rank and file, as well as to followers. The impact of a leader’s removal, however, depends on the degree of control they exerted over the group. Where their grip is absolute, their demise can prove fatal for the organisation.
In cases where strong leaders are killed, the organisation often collapses quickly. A pertinent example is Velupillai Prabhakaran, the founder and sole leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Founded in 1976 by Prabhakaran, the LTTE was dismantled when he was killed by Sri Lankan forces on 18 May 2009. This outcome can be attributed to Prabhakaran’s unwillingness and inability to establish a succession plan. By contrast, the killing of Baitullah Mehsud in 2009 did not weaken the TTP, as Hakimullah Mehsud promptly succeeded him.
Terrorist organisations do not enjoy widespread public support, offering the state a significant advantage in devising a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy
Another factor that may account for the decline of a terrorist organisation is the achievement of its objectives. When an organisation achieves the political goals for which it employed violence, it is likely to cease its activities. A relevant example is the African National Congress, which became a political entity in 1990 following Nelson Mandela’s release and the gradual repeal of apartheid laws. Clearly, when the casus belli no longer exists, terrorist organisations are more likely to fizzle out, unless they choose to form alliances with other groups. For instance, despite retaking control of Kabul in 2021, the Afghan Taliban have not ceased their terrorist activities, though they have not allied with other terrorist organisations.
A key factor that could catalyse the decline of terrorist groups is the loss of public support. These groups draw strength from both active and passive backing from the surrounding population, which allows them to sustain operations, plan attacks, and operate with relative impunity. Such support is critical for providing safe havens and reliable supply lines. Consequently, when popular support wanes, their operational capability diminishes sharply. Terrorist groups may lose support for various reasons, one of which is their disruption of local life. A recent example is the population of Swat turning against the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi due to its brutalities in the Malakand region. While the loss of public support did not directly end the group, it deprived them of local sanctuaries, ultimately contributing to their crushing defeat in 2009.
Although difficult, terrorist organisations can be dismantled if a combination of factors favours the state. It must be emphasised that no single factor alone is sufficient to bring about the decline of a terrorist outfit.
With respect to Pakistan, these analyses are instructive for several reasons. First, it is notable that terrorist organisations do not enjoy widespread public support, offering the state a significant advantage in devising a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy. This advantage must not be squandered, necessitating efforts to reduce political instability in the country. Second, militant groups have consistently failed to achieve their subversive objectives, underscoring the fact that their violent activities will not cease voluntarily. Lastly, leadership decapitation alone is unlikely to resolve Pakistan’s terrorism challenge, as evidenced by the TTP’s ability to manage leadership transitions effectively.
Taken together, Pakistan’s counterterrorism strategy should combine kinetic and non-kinetic measures to weaken terrorist organisations both operationally and ideologically. The use of force, in isolation, merely creates space for political and governance measures to make violence more prohibitive. Therefore, it must be complemented by the empowerment of local and affected communities. Alongside long-term reforms and interventions across key domains, this approach will help maintain terror-related violence at a manageable level.