The recent decision by India to ease the inflow of Chinese capital into the country should raise eyebrows in Islamabad. Both India and China have been warming up their bilateral relationship since the Indian Prime Minister visited China last year. Both countries resumed direct flights and business visas, and most recently lifted restrictions on capital flows. China also continued to dominate the balance of trade during the interim years of friction with New Delhi since the Galwan crisis. These developments have always been termed part of Beijing's pragmatic foreign policy, especially at a time when US protectionism puts all major economies at risk.
Like China, Pakistan’s recalibration of ties with the United States, especially after the May 2025 conflict with India, must also be seen as a forthright act of pragmatism. After the May 2025 conflict with India, Islamabad played its cards carefully. Pakistan’s successes in the conflict not only garnered accolades for Chinese military equipment, but they also brought the country closer to the US administration led by the strongman President Donald Trump. The subsequent cooperation with the US on minerals and cryptocurrencies indicated a return to friendly US-Pakistan relations after a period of relative coldness in the preceding years.
The discourse around Pakistan’s foreign policy choices in recent years, however, has revolved in binaries of for-or-against both China and the United States, particularly since the country joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The sentiment that any action towards one great power is essentially set to act against the other was reflected in October 2025, when China expanded its critical minerals export controls, leading to speculation that the move was a signal against Pakistan’s September joint minerals cooperation deal with the United States.
Even though the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs dispelled the rumours, it reiterated Islamabad’s assurances to Beijing at the time, stating that “Pakistan stressed that its interactions with the US will never harm China’s interests or its cooperation with China.” A month later, however, Beijing lifted critical mineral export bans following the Xi-Trump meeting. This time around, however, no assurances were communicated publicly to Pakistan.
Foreign policy is not a game of chess to be played turn by turn. It is rather a card table where each move must be played carefully in light of the circumstances and options available. This is also why, considering China’s normalisation with India in August and the announcement of export controls in October as a response to Pakistan’s improving relations with the US, would be as misguided as considering Islamabad’s $500 million deal with US Strategic Metals as an act detrimental to China.
Recent Iranian attacks in Riyadh also once again put the Pak-Saudi defence agreement in the spotlight, especially after the Saudi Foreign Minister signalled the right to retaliate against Iran
Even though observers argue to the contrary, Pakistan has nevertheless balanced its relationship with both the United States and China as its two largest trading partners and strategic allies. The country cannot afford to be caught in a war between two elephants. For this reason, Islamabad did not give up on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) despite US officials calling the project a “debt trap” a few years earlier.
It also engaged in extensive counter-terrorism cooperation and refused to publicly denounce China’s counter-terrorism policies in Xinjiang. Likewise, Pakistan did not hinder prospects for cooperation in the minerals sector with the United States under the broader Special Investment Facilitation Council framework, despite China’s adoption of a “carrot and sticks” minerals control policy elsewhere.
Other than the minerals race and the India-Pakistan equation, Islamabad’s recent overtures in the Middle East have also brought the country closer to the United States. The Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement with Saudi Arabia in September 2025, and its entry into the Gaza Board of Peace in January 2026, cemented its position alongside Western allies. Despite this, however, it has adopted a balanced position after the US-Israeli strikes on Iran.
In addition to unequivocally condemning aggression against Iran as well as its Gulf allies, Pakistan also immediately mediated Iran’s position vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia by sensitising Iran about the mutual defence pact. Furthermore, it was among the only four countries in the United Nations Security Council, along with China, Russia and Somalia, to vote in favour of Russia’s resolution condemning the conflict in the Middle East. The Iranian Foreign Minister also acknowledged Pakistan’s efforts during the crisis.
Now that the world is more uncertain than it has been in the past few decades due to the ongoing crisis in the Middle East, Pakistan’s choices are set to be tested again. Iran’s increasing belligerence against energy security in the region is set to inflate fuel prices globally. Recent Iranian attacks in Riyadh also once again put the Pak-Saudi defence agreement in the spotlight, especially after the Saudi Foreign Minister signalled the right to retaliate against Iran.
Ultimately, as the saying goes, there are no free lunches in international relations. Pakistan has been walking a tightrope in the past several months. It has attempted to balance all odds: the US-China equation, the Saudi-Iran equation, and now it might have to juggle the China-India equation as well. Going forward, any expectation of either/or foreign policy decisions would remain unrealistic.