Picking up from my previous column on this very subject, I argued that Afghanistan was being manipulated by the United States through India’s Deobandi connection with the Afghan Taliban. Following the ceasefire announced on 19 October in Doha, facilitated by Qatar and Turkey, the conspicuous absence of two guarantors, China and Iran, from most media discussions was striking.
The stepping forward of China and Iran as guarantors confirms my earlier assessment that the recent armed clashes between Pakistan and Afghanistan were deliberately instigated to sabotage China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). President Trump’s desire to reclaim the Bagram airbase was similarly intended to unsettle China, not least by creating the impression that its closest ally, Pakistan, was assisting the United States in regaining control of the facility.
China, however, thwarted this plan quietly and effectively.
I had also maintained that Iran would never welcome an extensive Indian presence in Afghanistan, as that would essentially bring Israel closer to its borders. Iran’s signature on the peace agreement, alongside China’s, further validates this assessment.
However, developments over the past twenty-four hours suggest that the Taliban’s Foreign Minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, may not have been fully aware of India’s designs. In other words, he appears to have been oblivious to the fact that his engagement with Indian-linked, Saudi-backed Deobandi circles during his visit formed part of a broader strategy, one extending far beyond mere economic or regional cooperation. Why, after all, would he wish to antagonise China, or even Pakistan, to the extent of provoking a strong military response, as indeed occurred?
The presence of Qatar and Turkey as facilitators of the Pak–Afghan peace agreement, and of Iran and China as guarantors, further reinforces this point. All these Muslim countries are, to varying degrees, regional and ideological rivals of Saudi Arabia. Had the Taliban regime truly been part of an Indo–US–Deobandi conspiracy, the peace talks would have taken place in Riyadh, not Doha, and certainly without Iran’s participation. In this context, it is not difficult to discern who made this outcome possible, and why Saudi Arabia, Pakistan’s strategic defence ally, is conspicuously absent from the picture.
The unfolding events closely follow the script I had outlined in my earlier calculations of the situation.
Muttaqi’s visit has provoked domestic uproar, potentially damaging the BJP’s prospects in the forthcoming Bihar elections
In light of this, one can reasonably argue that China will not allow Pakistan to once again fall under American influence. By the same token, the true nature of the Pakistan–Saudi strategic partnership now stands exposed and appears to have a highly predictable future. If Pakistan holds as much importance for China as it undoubtedly does, then its strategic security should be anchored in a defence pact with China, rather than with a long-standing defence ally of the United States, one that also maintains substantial investments in India. Allowing Pakistan to drift away would mean losing control over the entire Central and South Asian region, key to the future trajectory of the BRI.
Meanwhile, Muttaqi’s visit to India, the first by a senior Taliban leader since 2021, has sent political shockwaves across India.
Critics view it as a moral and strategic misstep. Opposition leaders such as Mahua Moitra accused the Modi government of “legitimising the Taliban”, while Rahul Gandhi condemned the exclusion of women journalists from Muttaqi’s press conference, saying it exposed the government’s hypocrisy on women’s rights. Poet and lyricist Javed Akhtar expressed public outrage, declaring he “hung his head in shame” at the warm reception given to “the representative of the world’s worst terrorist group”. Commentators argued that by courting a regime infamous for its repression of women and minorities, India undermines its own proclaimed democratic and humanitarian values. Even though the Ministry of External Affairs insisted that the press event was organised by the Afghan side, the optics were damaging.
Analysts suggest India’s engagement is driven by geopolitical pragmatism, countering Pakistan’s influence, monitoring China’s growing foothold, and maintaining regional connectivity, yet the symbolism of embracing the Taliban while touting “Nari Shakti” and human rights has unsettled many. For a government that prides itself on global moral leadership, Modi’s Taliban outreach appears less a diplomatic triumph than a troubling compromise of India’s ethical standing.
This visit, if undertaken at Washington’s signal, and perhaps with Saudi undertones given the involvement of Darul Uloom Deoband, appears to bear the dual imprint of President Trump’s strategic calculus. First, it may have been designed to draw Pakistan into a confrontation with Afghanistan, thereby setting Islamabad against its closest ally, China, which holds deep strategic and economic stakes in both countries. Second, it could have been intended to undermine Prime Minister Modi’s political standing at home, using Muttaqi’s visit as a catalyst, and thus pave the way for his eventual exit from power.
President Trump’s treatment of Modi since Operation Sindoor, compounded by the Russian oil factor, suggests a growing unease with Modi’s continued presence in office. On 17 October, Trump remarked, “Modi is a great man. He loves Trump… Now, I don’t know if the word ‘love’—I don’t want you to take that the wrong way… I don’t want to destroy his political career.” Clearly, the thought is already on Trump’s mind.
The failure of President Trump’s Afghan manoeuvre now seems to have intensified the second half of his plan: the political weakening of Modi, who has stumbled on two fronts. Muttaqi’s visit has provoked domestic uproar, potentially damaging the BJP’s prospects in the forthcoming Bihar elections, while simultaneously failing to draw Pakistan into conflict with Afghanistan or against China’s geo-economic interests. This represents not merely a setback in Modi’s regional gambit, but a thwarted attempt at retribution, a revenge play for the strategic losses inflicted by Pakistan during Operation Sindoor.
It also leaves the builders of India’s anti-Pakistan narrative, portraying it as a so-called jihadi nation, in disarray. How does the Indian government now appear while associating with the Taliban? As a final note, the fate of those who promised Trump the Bagram base hangs in the balance.