This week, the Pakistani parliament became a spectacle to watch. Opposition parties yelled chants and tore copies of the proposed 27th Amendment. Despite protests, the amendment was passed in both houses of parliament. The passage of the amendment occurred without any compelling debate in the name of creating “institutional balance” and “good governance” by the supporters of the alleged hybrid regime. Contrary to the official narrative, the amendment centralises power while feigning a commitment to democratic ideals.
According to the government’s narrative, the amendment was necessitated by the need to create a balance among the government's organs. It entails the creation of a Federal Constitutional Court, an overhaul of the Judicial Commission of Pakistan, and, crucially, adjustments to Article 243 to strengthen the status of the Field Marshal while granting legal immunity to the army chief. Senator Ishaq Dar of the PMLN called these changes “historic milestones”.
Conversely, behind the veil of the official narrative lies a political transformation that aims at self-preservation. Unlike in the past, this time, it is not just another ordinary episode in the power struggle between the military and democratic forces. Instead, it represents an alarming pattern in which political parties transform into what political scholars Richard Katz and Peter Mair describe as “cartel parties.” In such situations, political parties survive not by championing the public's interests but by collaborating with the state's powerful institutions to sustain their collective interests.
At the same time, these parties employ what Scheppele calls “autocratic legalism,” where the rhetoric of law is used to institutionalise power and limit accountability. In the case of Pakistan, it is clearly evident in the strategic choices that the PMLN and PPP have been making after they allegedly lost the 2024 election. Current Defence Minister Khawaja Asif of the PMLN openly discussed embracing a hybrid regime in his interview with Mehdi Hassan during his visit to the US.
There is no doubt that, in the past, all major political parties have alternated between a pattern of clash and cooperation with the military. Notwithstanding, the post-2024 period signifies a situation that is profoundly different from the recent past. Notably, following the extraordinary support for the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and its leader Imran Khan, the historical supremacy and political duopoly of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) almost ceased to exist. In response, instead of rekindling their connection with the electorate, they chose to join forces with the military to check the rise of PTI. This perfectly exemplifies the behaviour of cartel-like parties that resort to unconstitutional and undemocratic measures when they lose the public's trust and support.
The two parties might still be associated with particular social groups, but they are downright fearful of approaching the voters and electorate. These are signs of political weariness, defeat and collapse
What has transpired in the form of the 27th Amendment is a subtle but worrying shift from within. It is the very political parties that are weaponising the basic democratic institutions against their own core principles. This is a typical example of what autocratic legalism looks like. Unlike elsewhere, in Pakistan, it is a group of political parties, including the PMLN and PPP, that are desperate to hold on to power to avoid the impending political oblivion due to the rise of PTI.
Against this backdrop, the 27th Amendment is more akin to a cartel contract than a valid legal and constitutional document. It distributes institutional privileges between the military and its elected ruling elites. The government receives political insurance, whereas the military gains recognition for its power in the constitution. PTI, the most popular and the main opposition party, is being oppressively cut to size. It will have profound implications for democracy, federalism and the rights of smaller provinces.
Just think about the introduction of the new Federal Constitutional Court. It is supposed to hold sway over important powers, including the enforcement of fundamental rights, the interpretation of the constitution, and disputes between the centre and provinces, as well as among the provinces. However, its appointments are heavily influenced by the executive and the parliament, particularly the president and the prime minister. In the context of Pakistan's highly centralised, majoritarian federal structure, the proposed FCC does not adequately protect the rights of smaller provinces, such as Balochistan, which lacks significant political influence in both the parliament and the executive.
Similarly, the provision that gives the army chief immunity is equally questionable. By placing the most powerful man beyond the reach of civilian law, the parliament fundamentally renders him untouchable from the consequences of political failures. This serves as a classic illustration of autocratic legalism.
Many critics argue that this has transformed the military's informal role into a de jure one, which will further reinforce the civilians' dependency on it. Additionally, in an ethnically volatile state, it can deepen the fears among weaker federal units and groups that perceive the military as being monopolised by and aligned with the interests of a particular federal unit. For example, this immunity could reinforce the use of force against social movements in Balochistan, as the system incentivises cartel parties to allow the military to run Balochistan.
The most troubling thing is the overzealous way in which the two main parties have converged on this amendment. Unlike in the past, this moment signifies a profound societal, political and legal rupture, one that is highly detrimental to the very principles of representative democracy. The two parties might still be associated with particular social groups, but they are downright fearful of approaching the voters and electorate. These are signs of political weariness, defeat and collapse. Their legitimacy no longer stems from their engagement with the voters and public mobilisation. Instead, it flows from their utility to the military establishment and its selectorate.
Therefore, seen in this light, the 27th Amendment is more a product of the incentives created by the cartel-like politics of the two major parties, rather than a necessary evil. Pakistan's emerging cartel-like party culture and autocratic legalism will pose serious challenges for democracy, federalism, civilian supremacy and minority rights in the years to come.