Strong democracy and good governance remain elusive in states where local government elections are not held within legally prescribed timeframes. Local governments form the backbone of democratic consolidation by bringing governance closer to citizens, strengthening accountability, and nurturing future political leadership grounded in constitutionalism and the rule of law.
Where local governments remain absent or ineffective, states tend to spiral into political instability, social unrest, and fiscal stress. Pakistan offers a telling illustration.
Despite constitutional and statutory guarantees provided under Article 140-A of the Constitution and Section 219(4) of the Elections Act, 2017, local government elections have rarely been conducted within the mandated timeframe. This persistent failure is neither accidental nor administrative; it reflects deliberate resistance by entrenched political and bureaucratic elites.
A functional local government system threatens centralised authority by redistributing power, limiting discretion, and creating alternative centres of accountability. Unsurprisingly, this has generated sustained opposition from those who benefit from centralised control of political and financial resources.
These political realities are compounded by constitutional weaknesses. Article 140-A neither prescribes a definite timeline for local government elections nor guarantees a fixed share of provincial resources for local governments. It also does not mandate the establishment of Provincial Finance Commissions.
These omissions allow provincial governments to evade their statutory obligation to hold elections within 120 days of a local government’s term expiry—an obligation that has been routinely ignored despite its clarity in the Elections Act.
If local governments are to function as meaningful institutions rather than ceremonial bodies, constitutional reform is unavoidable.
First, local governments must enjoy a constitutionally protected tenure. Through the proposed insertion of Article 140-B, the tenure of local governments should be fixed at four years, with elections constitutionally required within 120 days of term expiry. This would prevent provinces from delaying elections through repeated amendments to local government laws. Comparative experience supports this approach. In India, local governments have a constitutionally guaranteed five-year term, and elections must be held within six months of dissolution, ensuring institutional continuity.
A constitutionally protected, financially empowered, and institutionally autonomous local government system is essential to prevent democracy from remaining centralised, exclusionary, and fragile
Second, financial decentralisation must be institutionalised. The proposed Article 140-C would mandate the establishment of a Provincial Finance Commission (PFC) in each province, comprising elected representatives of both provincial and local governments. Headed by the provincial finance minister as Chairman and with district Mayors serving as members of the Commission, the Commission would be responsible for administering and implementing the distribution of financial resources between the province and local governments in accordance with constitutional requirements. A similar model exists in the Philippines, where a Local Government Finance Commission ensures fair and transparent allocation of funds to local governments.
Third, local governments must be guaranteed a fixed share of provincial revenues. Under the proposed Article 140-D, 25% of provincial resources would be constitutionally allocated to local governments through the Provincial Finance Commission, following a model similar to the NFC. To ensure oversight, the PFC shall submit an annual report to the Parliament and the respective provincial assemblies. Predictable revenue-sharing arrangements of this kind are common in federal systems, including Canada.
Financial guarantees, however, are ineffective without enforcement. The proposed Article 140-E would introduce a compliance mechanism by linking provincial adherence to the NFC award. If a province fails to transfer the prescribed share to local governments, the National Finance Commission shall proportionately reduce that province’s share in the subsequent NFC distribution.
This would create a direct constitutional obligation, enforceable through fiscal consequences. Brazil offers a comparable example, where states are legally required to transfer fixed revenues to municipalities, with penalties for non-compliance.
Finally, meaningful devolution requires local revenue-raising powers. Under the proposed Article 140-F, local governments should be empowered to levy and collect local taxes and fees, including property taxes and business licensing fees. Such authority would enhance fiscal autonomy and enable local governments to respond more effectively to local needs. In the United States, for instance, property taxes constitute a major source of local government revenue, underscoring the importance of local fiscal control.
If Pakistan’s ruling elite are genuinely committed to improving governance and addressing citizens’ grievances, symbolic commitments will not suffice. A constitutionally protected, financially empowered, and institutionally autonomous local government system is essential to prevent democracy from remaining centralised, exclusionary, and fragile.