I base my argument on the proposition that the current turmoil in Iran worries Saudi Arabia more than any other regional power, because the political fate of both regimes is deeply intertwined.
Why?
By applying the theory of binary opposition, one can see that the theocratic rivalry that emerged after the 1979 Iranian Revolution has, paradoxically, sustained both regimes in political and existential terms. If one were to collapse, the other would lose its principal justification for survival. They must therefore either stand together, fall together, or transform together by abandoning ideological theocracy and adopting modern political and social state structures.
This dynamic is rooted in the events of 1979.
Iran’s revolution overthrew a US-backed Shah, while Saudi Arabia, in the same year, confronted a violent Islamist seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. Both regimes responded by entrenching religious legitimacy and projecting their fears outward. Iran cast itself as the defender of Shiʿa Islam against corrupt, Western-aligned monarchies, while Saudi Arabia claimed the role of guardian of Sunni orthodoxy against revolutionary Shiʿism.
This produced a self-reinforcing cycle: every Iranian advance justified Saudi religious mobilisation, and every Saudi expansion of Wahhabi influence validated Iran’s narrative of sectarian siege. Geopolitical rivalry was transformed into theological warfare, exported across the Middle East and beyond, including to Pakistan.
Domestically, this rivalry enabled repression, as reformers, dissidents, and minorities could be branded agents of the enemy. Fear of the other side suppressed demands for democracy, pluralism, and accountability. In this way, both regimes thrived not despite their rivalry, but because of it.
One might ask: if Saudi Arabia is so invested in Iran’s survival, why has it supported US withdrawal from the nuclear deal, backed Israeli strikes on Iran, financed anti-Iranian militias, and encouraged economic strangulation? The answer lies in the profound regional realignment driven by the UAE–Israel axis. The UAE’s normalisation of relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords in 2020 entrenched this strategic shift.
If Iran were to move towards a democratic system based on transparency and accountability, Saudi youth in particular might demand the same
More recently, the United Arab Emirates, once a close Saudi partner in Yemen, has pursued an increasingly independent regional course. Disagreements over southern Yemen and the Southern Transitional Council have exposed fractures within the Saudi-led coalition. At the same time, reports, though not independently verified, of a possible Israeli military presence in the UAE near the Saudi border, close to predominantly Shiʿa areas, have heightened Saudi anxiety.
Before this transformation, opposing Iran and its proxies served Saudi interests well. It justified vast arms purchases from the United States, preserved Riyadh’s strategic partnership with Washington, and allowed domestic repression to be framed as necessary for national security. As long as an external threat could be invoked, internal control remained legitimate. However, shifting Emirati priorities in Yemen have complicated this calculus: should Riyadh fight Iran-backed Houthis or UAE-backed forces in the south?
Meanwhile, Iran has sought to offset sanctions through a long-term partnership with China and through Indian investment in the Chabahar port, which gives it access to Afghanistan and Central Asia. Relations between Iran and Pakistan improved after the Indian strike on Pakistan and the Israeli strike on Iran in May to June 2025, when both supported one another. After further clashes in September, Afghanistan increasingly diverted its trade away from Pakistan towards Iran and Central Asia.
The temporary relaxation of US sanctions on Chabahar restored Indian access to Iran. At the same time, India used air routes via the UAE for trade with Afghanistan. The combined Indian and Emirati presence leaves little doubt about an expanding Israeli footprint in the region. These developments coincided with mass protests across Iranian cities against the Ayatollah-led regime. From Riyadh’s perspective, the images of burning streets and chanting crowds in more than a hundred towns are deeply unsettling: what is happening in Iran today could, in time, happen in Saudi Arabia.
There are, however, important differences between the two states.
Saudi Arabia remains closely aligned with the United States and the West. It has been able to sell oil freely and accumulate immense wealth, producing a degree of general prosperity. Yet this wealth is overwhelmingly concentrated within the royal family. Estimates often place the collective net worth of the House of Saud at around 1.4 trillion dollars, largely through control of oil revenues and assets such as Aramco. This closely resembles pre-revolutionary Iran, where the Shah and a narrow elite accumulated vast fortunes, fuelling resentment and social alienation.
If Iran were to move towards a democratic system based on transparency and accountability, Saudi youth in particular might demand the same. In a kingdom where dissent against the royal family is effectively forbidden, and critics fear the fate of Jamal Khashoggi, this prospect is profoundly threatening.
Against this backdrop, Turkey’s move to associate itself with the Pakistan–Saudi strategic defence arrangement announced in 2025 takes on added significance. The pact was greeted with scepticism in Pakistan due to its sudden announcement and lack of public debate. Iran had previously sought to join, but was met with silence from both Riyadh and Islamabad. Turkey’s inclusion may therefore be intended to lend the pact broader legitimacy. Pakistan’s reported agreement to supply JF-17 fighter jets, partially offset against a Saudi loan of three billion dollars, should be understood in this context. It is as much a political gesture as a military one, aimed at reinforcing a new regional security architecture and binding Pakistan more closely to Saudi strategic priorities.
Finally, an emerging factor that could decisively alter Saudi calculations is the expansion of US control over Venezuela’s vast oil reserves. Once American firms modernise Venezuelan infrastructure and bring large volumes of high-cost oil to market, prices will need to remain elevated to remain profitable. That would require removing at least one major producer from the market, placing both Iran and Saudi Arabia in the same strategic category. In that scenario, the long-standing rivalry between the two regimes may be replaced by an uncomfortable convergence of interests and, potentially, a shared destiny.
It would be naïve to imagine that Riyadh cannot see this coming.