The Constitution, The Majority, And The Game of Maps

The Constitution remains unchanged. What remains is whether the corridors of power still view the provinces as equal partners or as tenants awaiting an eviction notice under a newly drawn map

The Constitution, The Majority, And The Game of Maps

Every few years, Pakistan’s ruling corridors rediscover the map. This summer that drumbeat was amplified. Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi declared the system collapsed. Planning Minister Ahsan Iqbal floated twelve to fifteen provinces, or one hundred and sixty district administrations. Night after night, studios in Lahore and Islamabad treated historical homelands as technical inefficiencies delaying modernisation.

Then, on 3 September, the only assembly whose consent the Constitution requires before anyone can tamper with Sindh’s territory answered. After four days of debate and more than a hundred speeches, the Sindh Assembly adopted a resolution moved by Nisar Ahmed Khuhro. The text was concise because the truth was old: Sindh is one, and one it shall remain. The house rejected every design that would divide the province, alter its boundaries, carve units from its territory, detach a district, or place any part of Sindh under federal tutelage.

Chief Minister Syed Murad Ali Shah said One Unit was a blunder when conceived and remains a blunder now. Sindh’s destiny would be decided in that chamber not by lobbies in Lahore, nor by prime-time sermons. Among those who stayed, the vote was unanimous. The Muttahida Qaumi Movement-Pakistan and Jamaat-i-Islami walked out, arguing that urban devolution had been excluded from the text.

The walkout exposed the crossroads posturing works to blur. One path is a new federating unit carved from Sindh. Article 239 treats this as an alteration of boundaries and demands two-thirds in the affected assembly and in Parliament. The other path is already in Article 140-A: empowered city and district governments, with money and local policing, inside an undivided province. A distortion occurs when an opposition demanding local empowerment is answered as though it were demanding partition. Conversely, the Sindh Assembly cannot treat local democracy as a threat; it can lead by anchoring local government in provincial progress. After 3 September, speaking of dismembering Sindh as routine reorganisation is not statecraft. It is an ambition the 1973 Constitution was written to obstruct.

The resolution did not silence those determined to redraw the map. Iqbal asked the prime minister for a committee, saying social indicators had not improved even after the National Finance Commission expanded provincial resources. In Lahore on 5 September, Naqvi doubled down. New units were an inevitability no party could prevent; a Sindhi would remain a Sindhi; Islamabad might become a province; the people should decide, glossing over the fact that no referendum can replace the provincial two-thirds. He called it a “reset.” Sindh lodged a formal protest. Other cabinet members called the talk premature. Ambiguity at the centre still keeps the map on the air after the relevant legislature said no.

Divide and rule’ did not leave with the Raj. One Unit was how a post-colonial centre disenfranchised a democratic majority. Today’s campaign is not a replica, but it belongs to the same lineage: a centre that fails to deliver public goods.

The geography of the clamour is not an accident. Islamabad summits, Lahore auditoriums, capital discussion  shows: a media ecosystem in two cities finds it easier to frame Sindh as a governance failure than to confront its own centralisation of power. Conspiracy is unnecessary. When pressure to dismember a smaller province emanates from the heartland of the largest, the playbook is obvious: fragment the unit that bargains; market the cut as reform; repeat until the Eighteenth Amendment looks negotiable. “Divide and rule” did not leave with the Raj. One Unit was how a post-colonial centre disenfranchised a democratic majority. Today’s campaign is not a replica, but it belongs to the same lineage: a centre that fails to deliver public goods reaches for a pencil.

Honesty requires the mirror turned inward. Governance is not an indictment that flows only from Islamabad to Karachi. Provinces that take 57.5 per cent of the divisible pool and starve their cities and hinterlands are architects of the alienation they lament. Sindh’s shuttered schools, crumbling dispensaries, unsafe water, and a bureaucracy that treats municipal bodies as dependents are not fabrications of a Lahore studio. Southern Punjab’s deprivation and Balochistan’s hollowed institutions are provincial failures too. Iqbal is not wrong that NFC money did not automatically become development. He is wrong to use that shortfall as an excuse to alter the map, rather than demand an accounting of how both tiers spent what they already had.

The federal ledger is not clean. Debt and defence swallow much of the centre’s remaining share. For fifteen years Islamabad has scapegoated the NFC while siphoning revenue into levies—the petroleum development levy foremost—that bypass the provinces. It has failed to enforce Article 140-A, and failed to honour water under the 1991 Accord. A minister who laments collapse is describing an insolvency in which his own tier is a shareholder. The citizen outside a hospital in Jacobabad, Multan, Quetta or Islamabad waits on two governments at once. Politics that names only one of them is a politics of the map.

If the problem is distance from the citizen, the remedy is the local tier already in the Constitution. If the issue is provincial monopoly, compel every province including Punjab to devolve, rather than manufacture new monopolies for the same elites. A new province is not a larger district; it is a governor, a cabinet, a high court and another claimant on a contested pool. Closeness is an institutional achievement. On this soil, fragmentation has almost always been someone else’s weapon.

The people within these borders are entitled to a state that comes closer. They need not accept that the only vehicle is a dissection whose first post-colonial culmination was 1971. After 3 September the matter is no longer academic. Will the federation honour a provincial two-thirds as a covenant, or treat the Constitution as an obstacle to be worn down by ministers and campaigns? The Sindh Assembly has delivered its verdict. The Constitution remains unchanged. What remains is whether the corridors of power still view the provinces as equal partners or as tenants awaiting an eviction notice under a newly drawn map. Sindh is no tenant. For millennia, Sindh has been the sovereign master of its own house.