The establishment – or more plainly, the Pakistan Army – must remain a part of critical national decision-making, at least for the foreseeable future. Any movement to remove them from this role would create a significant crisis in the country. This may be the most unpopular statement to make, given the current political situation, but it carries weight. A few historical events may serve as a compelling analogy and perhaps help explain why it is important.
Recall the withdrawal of the British Indian government following the onset of the Second World War in 1939. The following year, when Britain was attacked by the German Air Force, the Lahore Resolution was passed – perhaps the British sensed that it might no longer be feasible for them to continue their rule in India. With their involvement in a major armed conflict, running the distant government in India could become a liability, a burden that the fragile government in London might struggle to bear. They decided to wind it up as the war dragged on, preparing to exit by the time it ended in 1945.
History shows the various exit plans that London devised during this period:
The Cripps Mission (1942) offered post-war dominion status and a Constituent Assembly but was rejected by both Congress and the Muslim League. The Wavell Plan (1945), proposing equal Hindu-Muslim representation in the Executive Council, failed due to leadership disputes. The Cabinet Mission (1946) suggested a united federal India, which was initially accepted but later collapsed. Finally, the Mountbatten Plan (1947) proposed the partition of India into two dominions – India and Pakistan – which was accepted by all major parties, leading to independence in August 1947.
Pakistan came into being as a result of this hasty withdrawal, without a constitution of its own and with an unprepared political elite – leading to an unending political crisis.
Similarly, the sudden withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan raised immense concerns and challenges for Afghanistan and its immediate neighbours, including Pakistan. The Soviet Union's departure from Afghanistan was formalised in the 1988 Geneva Accords, signed by the USSR, United States, Pakistan, and the Afghan government. The agreement outlined a phased withdrawal of Soviet troops, completed by 15 February 1989, ending nearly ten years of intervention. Although the Soviet-backed regime of President Najibullah survived briefly, it collapsed in 1992 following the cessation of Soviet aid. This led to a violent civil war among Mujahideen factions, which paved the way for the Taliban's rise in 1996.
The withdrawal of the Pakistani establishment from the nation’s affairs would create a vast vacuum, severely impacting key decision-making and leaving the state structure fragile and vulnerable to collapse
The Soviet withdrawal left Afghanistan deeply destabilised, with repercussions that shaped regional geopolitics for decades.
Likewise, the United States' rapid withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, ending a 20-year presence, had profound consequences for both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The sudden exit allowed the Taliban to swiftly return to power, as the Afghan government and security forces collapsed with minimal resistance. This resulted in a humanitarian crisis, economic collapse, and a rollback of civil liberties, particularly for women and minorities.
For Pakistan, the fallout was dire.
While Islamabad welcomed a friendly Taliban regime, it also faced heightened security challenges. The resurgence of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) emboldened militancy within its borders, straining internal security and civil-military relations. Additionally, instability in Afghanistan led to a refugee influx, and cross-border tensions, and complicated Pakistan's regional diplomacy, especially with the West. The withdrawal also signalled to shift U.S. priorities, reducing American strategic reliance on Pakistan while increasing its tilt towards India and other regional partners.
My argument is that the withdrawal of the Pakistani establishment from the nation’s affairs would create a vast vacuum, severely impacting key decision-making and leaving the state structure fragile and vulnerable to collapse. I am drawing a clear analogy between the establishment's role in Pakistan's affairs and that of the British government in India, as well as the presence of the USSR and the USA in Afghanistan. The presence of an external force, or a force outside the political system, leaves local political leadership inept and unfamiliar with the process of critical decision-making – simply because they have been excluded from it. Therefore, if they find themselves with full authority one day, they will be burdened with responsibilities for which they are neither prepared nor equipped to handle effectively.
This thesis can be further illustrated by examining the major errors committed by political governments in key national and foreign policy areas since 1988.
After Zialul Haq’s eleven-year-long martial law, Benazir Bhutto's tenure as Prime Minister of Pakistan was marred by critical misjudgments in both national and foreign policy. Domestically, her administration was plagued by allegations of corruption. While she used PTV day and night to celebrate the return of democracy and the end of a black night, she overlooked the fact that Ziaul Haq’s period was marked by economic progress and stability. Hence, the economic policies of her two governments were erratic, marked by debt mismanagement and inflation.
She failed to enact meaningful institutional reforms, while simultaneously asserting civilian control over the military and intelligence agencies that only earned her political problems. In foreign affairs, her overtures towards India lacked strategic depth, while her alignment with the West generated domestic unease. Moreover, her inability to curb Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan, particularly through the ISI's support for militant factions, exacerbated regional instability. Her leadership was compromised by political expediency and ineffective governance.
The current position of the Pakistani establishment is akin to that of the British government in pre-partitioned India, and the Soviet and American presence in Afghanistan
Benazir Bhutto’s inability to maintain power on two occasions also stands as testimony to her lack of political acumen.
In a similar vein, Nawaz Sharif's political career, marked by three non-consecutive terms as Prime Minister, was characterised by a blend of economic ambition and political miscalculation. Domestically, while he pursued liberalisation and infrastructure development – including the motorway network and privatisation – his tenure was often marred by authoritarian tendencies and an inability to foster institutional consensus. His confrontational approach towards the judiciary and military – most notably in the attempted dismissal of Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf in 1999 – precipitated his ouster and the imposition of military rule. In foreign policy, although he was keen to make peace with India, his efforts were undermined by the Kargil conflict, which occurred under his watch, ostensibly without his full knowledge, exposing a lack of civil-military coordination. His later terms saw strained relations with both regional and Western allies, while his reliance on Saudi Arabia and China lacked strategic diversification.
Ultimately, Nawaz Sharif's governance suffered from a combination of personalisation of power, institutional fragility, and an inconsistent foreign policy vision.
Similarly, successive governments since 2008, after General Musharraf left power, have struggled to make plausible decisions in areas such as the economy, foreign policy, and energy policy. Their incessant indulgence in blame games, corruption, and petty politics has not only had disastrous effects on national security and progress but has also discredited their political parties in the public eye. The hybrid system of governance has emerged from this very weakness of the political parties – they have lost both their strength and credibility.
The current position of the Pakistani establishment is akin to that of the British government in pre-partitioned India, and the Soviet and American presence in Afghanistan. If they are compelled to withdraw abruptly from national affairs, it would create a massive decision-making vacuum. In other words, once you have ventured beyond your boundaries – be those geographical or institutional jurisdiction – you do not have the luxury of pulling out without allowing the wheel to go full circle. Or you leave a mess behind.
It is therefore imperative that a system be devised to ensure the establishment remains at the decision-making table, from which a gradual transition to full civilian rule can take place over time. For this to happen, anti-establishment narratives must be silenced, and a clear understanding between the establishment and the politicians must be fostered, with the ultimate objective of transferring full decision-making powers to the civilian government, while simultaneously strengthening both civil and military institutions.