Diplomatic language is never accidental. In the joint formulations, each word, each sequence and absence conveys a political message. The reason a paragraph in the joint communiqué from the European Union and Pakistan following Kaja Kallas’ visit to Islamabad should be treated seriously is clear. The communiqué issued post the 8th Pakistan–EU Strategic Dialogue on 1 June 2026, said: “The Pakistan side briefed on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir. The EU side briefed on Russia’s war against Ukraine. Both sides expressed support for the peaceful resolution of conflicts through dialogue and diplomacy, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.”
On a surface reading, the text reads like standard diplomatic language. Pakistan briefed the European Union on Kashmir, and the European Union briefed Pakistan on Ukraine – both supported dialogue and diplomacy. In diplomacy, however, it is the position that counts. The European Union’s official inclusion of Jammu and Kashmir in any formal communiqué between Pakistan and a third country allows it to suggest that Kashmir could be legitimately placed in a diplomatic document between Pakistan and any third country.
This is not to say the European Union has approved the position of Pakistan as a whole, only that it has endorsed Pakistan’s position. But it does temper the Indian government’s longstanding argument that it is only an “internal dispute” and not subject to any external reference. This sensitivity was reflected in India’s response, with New Delhi stating this time that the reference was rejected, and reiterating that Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and Ladakh are “integral and inalienable” parts of India.
The most significant aspect of the paragraph is the juxtaposition of Kashmir and Ukraine. The European Union briefed Pakistan on the war by Russia against Ukraine, and in the other direction, the Pakistani side briefed the European Union on Jammu and Kashmir. The paragraph then speaks about “conflicts” being resolved via “dialogue, diplomacy and the United Nations Charter”, which essentially means through a peaceful process. This creates a form of diplomatic equivalence, although not a legal one, in categorisation.
The European Union conceives Ukraine as a sovereign state with territorial boundaries and international law as the basis for its existence. The European Union sees Ukraine as being based on sovereignty, territorial integrity and international law. The European Union has provided Kashmir an opportunity to be placed in the same paragraph, thereby making Jammu and Kashmir a ‘conflict’ between two nuclear-armed neighbours and not a ‘closed’ domestic dispute.
It is in this sense that Pakistan’s diplomacy has hit a bullseye. India, for decades, tried to reduce the Kashmir problem to a bilateral issue within the framework of Simla. However, following the removal of Articles 370 and 35A in August 2019, India went a step further when it made Kashmir an issue of internal constitutional dispute between rulers and the ruled.
Islamabad should view Kashmir not simply as a territorial dispute, but as one that continues to pose a nuclear stability and human rights threat to peace
So is the international record, however. Though the origin of the dispute lies in the partition, Kashmir is divided today into Indian-administered and Pakistan-administered territories, and despite United Nations resolutions, their implementation has remained disputed, as Kashmir also has an early history of ceasefire and self-determination.
The European Union’s language does not embrace India’s “post-2019” formulation. It does not term Kashmir an “internal matter”. It does not restrict itself to the United Nations Charter alone. Instead, it records that Pakistan briefed the European Union on Jammu and Kashmir and then links both sides to the peaceful resolution of conflicts. That is significant. Diplomacy moves forward, and not always by major statements, but by small uses of language which become landmarks in the process ahead. Now, Pakistan is gaining leverage to present this communiqué in the capitals of Europe, in parliaments and multilateral forums, and to argue that Kashmir is an international diplomatic issue.
It is also particularly significant in terms of the language used, as it explicitly goes against the traditional Indian tendency towards exclusive bilateralism. China’s own statements on Kashmir also make references not only to the United Nations Charter and relevant resolutions, but also to bilateral pacts between India and Pakistan. India wants the Kashmir issue to be settled bilaterally, while Pakistan wants it to be settled through third-party diplomacy, the United Nations Charter, and international law. In this text, Pakistan’s framing is more visible than India’s.
The timing further enhances the importance of the communiqué. The potential for a renewed crisis between India and Pakistan in 2025 has brought South Asia once again to the world stage. The crisis in question involved the “decades-long potential for conflict” between the two nuclear-armed countries on 10 May 2025, according to the Congressional Research Service. The crisis consisted of strikes, drones, missiles, and an uneasy ceasefire on 10 May 2025 and was the worst fighting between the two nuclear-armed states in decades. The confrontation had also worsened since the Pahalgam attack on 22 April 2025, as the fundamental issues – issues of Kashmir’s sovereignty and future – were not resolved after this ceasefire, the United Kingdom House of Commons Library noted.
This context is important. Kashmir is not a dormant territorial matter. It is tied to nuclear issues, regional conflict, human rights concerns, water disputes, accusations of terrorism, and conflict management between two heavily armed states. The 2025 war showed that policies of repression or denial lead to no stability. On the other hand, without dialogue, the risk of escalation grows. For the European Union, which has prized a “rules-based order” and “peaceful dispute resolution”, it becomes difficult to regard Ukraine as an international legal matter while simultaneously accepting India’s demand that Kashmir be “beyond international discussion”.
For Pakistan, the communiqué reflects a broader recovery of diplomatic relevance. For years, India attempted to isolate Pakistan internationally and portray it as a state with declining strategic value. The European Union–Pakistan Strategic Dialogue demonstrates a different trend, however. The communiqué includes issues such as trade, Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus, migration, counterterrorism, Afghanistan, Gaza, Lebanon, Iran mediation, and the Strait of Hormuz. In its own profile of European Union–Pakistan relations, the European Union does label Pakistan as one of its important partners in South Asia and calls itself Pakistan’s “main trading partner” and Pakistan as the European Union’s largest export market.
Thus, Pakistan’s challenge is to turn this opportunity into more enabling diplomacy. Islamabad should view Kashmir not simply as a territorial dispute, but as one that continues to pose a nuclear stability and human rights threat to peace. The strongest argument to present the challenge internationally is that unilateral moves cannot resolve a disputed issue, and sustainable peace in South Asia will depend on the inclusion of Kashmiri concerns and aspirations in the dialogue process.
So, the immediate effect of paragraph 11 is small, though the implications are huge. It reveals that India has failed to resolve the Kashmir issue, while also showing Pakistan’s return to a place in international diplomacy after the 2025 crisis. Most importantly, it is clear that Jammu and Kashmir remains an unresolved issue in the international system. The communiqué cannot put to rest the conflict, but it does something politically significant: it keeps Kashmir on the international agenda.