An independent judiciary remains one of the most vital institutional safeguards against executive overreach and lawlessness. In Pakistan, however, this constitutional ideal appears increasingly imperilled. The 26th and 27th Constitutional Amendments stand as stark illustrations of this trajectory, these amendments risk transforming judicial independence into a matter of executive discretion. Against this broader constitutional backdrop, the removal of Justice Tariq Mehmood Jahangiri from the Islamabad High Court (IHC) is especially disquieting. The episode cannot be viewed in isolation; rather, it reflects a troubling pattern in which institutional mechanisms are deployed to discipline or marginalise judges perceived as obstacles to executive preferences.
Justice Jahangiri’s legal career spans over three decades and is marked by consistent professional engagement and leadership within the legal community. He joined the Islamabad Bar Council in 1992, was enrolled as an Advocate of the High Court in 1994, and attained the status of Advocate Supreme Court in 2008. Beyond courtroom practice, he played a prominent role in bar politics, serving as President of the Islamabad High Court Bar Association during 2016–17, and earlier holding the offices of President and General Secretary of the Islamabad Bar Council in 2002–03 and 2005–06 respectively. Finally, he was elevated as a Judge of the Islamabad High Court on 28 December 2020.
Coming from a sitting judge, allegations that judges were subjected to coercive pressure through the abduction and torture of family members were profoundly unsettling
During his relatively brief tenure of approximately five years on the bench, Justice Jahangiri first came into prominent public focus in 2023, when he issued a blanket protective order in favour of ex-Prime Minister Imran Khan. The order effectively restrained law-enforcement authorities from arresting Khan in prospective criminal proceedings, unless due legal process was followed.
This intervention was widely perceived as an assertive exercise of judicial authority and the decision was met with strong disapproval from the government, which, since assuming office, had adopted a markedly adversarial posture towards Khan and initiated multiple criminal proceedings against him. Justice Jahangiri’s order was viewed by the executive as an impediment to its broader enforcement strategy. Consequently, his judicial conduct began to be framed by government actors and allied narratives as evidence of partiality, with allegations that he was unduly sympathetic towards the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI).
A further controversy emerged when Justice Jahangiri addressed a letter to the Supreme Judicial Council alleging interference by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in judicial affairs. In his communication, he reportedly claimed that judges were subjected to coercive pressure through the abduction and torture of family members, as well as through covert surveillance. Coming from a sitting judge of a High Court, these allegations were profoundly unsettling, as they suggested the existence of systemic interference in judicial decision-making. If taken at face value, such claims point to a judiciary operating under duress, where judges are compelled to issue dictated judgments in politically sensitive cases involving the government.
For an executive determined to ensure unchallenged compliance with its policies, Justice Jahangiri consequently came to be perceived as a liability. In this context, proceedings were initiated against him on the allegation that he had obtained a fake degree from the University of Karachi. The matter was taken up by the Islamabad High Court, where a divisional bench comprising Chief Justice Sardar Muhammad Sarfaraz Dogar and Justice Muhammad Azam Khan adjudicated the case. The bench concluded that Justice Jahangiri’s degree was invalid and that he had never obtained a law degree, thereby rendering his elevation to the High Court unlawful, as possession of a valid LL.B. degree is a constitutional requirement under Article 175-A.
Let’s not forget that Justice Jahangiri during his professional career, progressed steadily through the legal hierarchy—from Advocate Supreme Court to Judge of the High Court. Prior to his elevation, he held several significant public offices, including Advocate General Islamabad, Deputy Prosecutor General at the National Accountability Bureau, and Deputy Attorney General of Pakistan. At each stage, particularly prior to his elevation to the bench, he was subjected to multiple layers of institutional scrutiny, including formal interviews and extensive vetting processes. Judicial appointments are accompanied by rigorous background checks, involving Military Intelligence, the ISI, and other relevant state institutions.
Against this backdrop, the allegation that such a fundamental qualification defect could remain undetected throughout his professional ascent is deeply troubling. It reflects a grave institutional failure - judge being elevated to the High Court without meeting essential academic requirements, raises serious questions about the credibility of the entire appointment process and casts a shadow over other judicial elevations made through the same mechanisms, and calls for accountability of all those who at the initial stage were unable to uncover this defect.
This removal also raises profound concerns about the prevailing state of constitutional governance in Pakistan. It sets a deeply troubling precedent: that judicial dissent, particularly when it intersects with politically sensitive matters, may be neutralized through extraordinary and even coercive measures. Such actions risk conveying a clear and unsettling message to the judiciary at large—that independence is tolerated only to the extent that it does not inconvenience the executive.
More broadly, this development reflects an erosion of judicial independence as a lived constitutional principle rather than a mere textual guarantee. When judges operate under the persistent apprehension that unfavourable decisions may invite transfer, or removal, adjudication itself becomes constrained. The fear of institutional retaliation has a chilling effect, not only on individual judges but on the judiciary as a whole, subtly reshaping judicial behaviour from principled constitutional adjudication to cautious self-preservation.
In this climate, judicial office risks being reduced to one of conditional tenure, contingent upon executive acquiescence. If allowed to persist, this trajectory threatens to hollow out the judiciary’s role as a check on executive power, leaving constitutional promises vulnerable to political expediency rather than protected by judicial resolve.