The Pahalgam terror attack, the deadliest since the 2008 Mumbai attacks, claimed 26 lives along with the veneer of normalcy in Kashmir and the uneasy peace between the two perpetually conflicted neighbours. Another casualty of this tragic incident is the Indus Water Treaty (IWT), an Indo-Pak agreement that survived three wars and over six decades of animosity between the twin states. However, the treaty has long been politicised in India and remains a source of resentment for some Indian states. It was about time that hackneyed jingoism and anti-Pakistan rhetoric aimed at winning over a particular vote bank jeopardised the treaty’s future.
The threats to revoke the IWT date back to 2016, as an aftermath of the Uri attack. It’s always easier to blame an external enemy for a terror incident than to highlight your own shortcomings and security lapses. The cherry on top? Dragging into the crossfire a decades-old treaty that some have long wanted to revise. In 2019, again as the aftermath of a terror incident in Pulwama, IWT came under discussion. India stopped sharing data on water flow and upstream activity with Pakistan, which is required by the treaty. This time, it went through with its threats and actually held the treaty in abeyance.
What does it mean for Pakistan?
Contrary to prevailing rhetoric in India and some factions in Pakistan, Pakistan’s water supply wouldn’t be shut down right away. The treaty created a system under which India was allowed to develop storage on the Easter rivers; Beas, Ravi and Sutlej and Beas, Ravi, and Sutlej, while allowing limited use of water from the Western rivers; Jhelum, Chenab, and Indus, Pakistan’s share. Therefore, the current structures built by India on these rivers have limited storage capacity, as they are run-of-the-river projects, and single-purpose.
Besides, the water supply is expected to increase overall in the coming months and even the available storage capacity wouldn’t be utilised by India unless it’s willing to punish Pakistan at the risk of flooding its own regions.
Even if India pushes ahead under the treaty pause, building the necessary storage infrastructure would take years, and cost millions, if not billions, of rupees. So, disrupting water flow isn’t as simple as many assume. It’s not a tap you can twist at will. And in South Asia, transboundary water isn’t just an interstate issue, it’s intrastate too. States conflict over their share of water in India just like the provinces do in Pakistan.
Pakistan’s water insecurity is already exacerbated by erratic weather and climate unpredictability
Therefore, the current actions by India are designed to amplify jingoism and sweep its own flaws under the rug—the flaws being suppression of Kashmiri people, mismanaging the region and being complacent that led to severe security lapses. And yes, to get the treaty renegotiated on its own terms.
India has made several attempts to reopen the treaty on its terms. It sent the first formal notice to Pakistan in this regard in January 2023, then sent a note verbale in June 2023 for a meeting to discuss the issue and then issued a second notice in September 2024 to review and modify the treaty. However, Pakistan remained reluctant to act on these notices.
Pakistan has cited limited capacity as its reason for avoiding formal water talks. A needs assessment and multiple hydrological surveys need to be conducted before getting on the negotiating table. As a downstream heavily reliant on the Indus River Basin, Pakistan has to play its card right. But this felt more like a stalling tactic than a step toward meaningful preparation.
Pakistan has multiple reasons for concern now. In the dry season, even use of limited storage can lead to uncertainty in Pakistan regarding water availability. Pakistan’s water insecurity is already exacerbated by erratic weather and climate unpredictability. Moreover, with the treaty’s suspension, Pakistan has stumbled back to an even weaker position to renegotiate the treaty.
A new battleground opens up
On the other hand, unilateral suspension is not allowed under the IWT, which makes the act illegal, as many water experts have maintained. Besides, India is a lower riparian state itself. Its actions upstream can pave way for imitation by its upper riparian partner, China with whom it already is in dispute over the mega dams construction at the Brahmaputra River. How the situation unfolds over time remains unclear, but it should be a wakeup call for Pakistan. It needs to amp up its preparation for renegotiation, which also is neither going to be simple nor easy.
Given the hostile environment, both governments will be treating the treaty talks as a new battleground. Given the highly politicised nature of the issue, they will have to show their nationals that they came out with more wins than the other, which means they will take the negotiations as a zero-sum game.
This time, the role of third-party, mainly the World Bank or the US (and in extension the Western powers), is also uncertain. The World Bank no longer commands the same esteem it once did in the 1950s and ‘60s. With the US, given its protectionist and somewhat isolationist regime, any intervention would likely be more transactional than mediatory. Above all, the respect for international law is at its lowest currently. With all this in view, it seems that even if the water keeps flowing in Pakistan’s landscapes now, as to how green they will remain in the years ahead is anything but certain.