Pakistan has joined a group of eight Muslim nations that have agreed to participate in US President Donald Trump’s proposed Board of Peace, an initiative formally launched this week on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos. The decision followed a joint statement issued on Wednesday in Amman by the foreign ministers of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Qatar, Egypt, the UAE, Indonesia, and Pakistan, confirming their shared intent to engage with the new framework.
The stated objectives are familiar and appealing: consolidating the Gaza ceasefire, supporting reconstruction, and advancing a political process leading to Palestinian self-determination. Yet the circumstances surrounding the launch demand caution. Gaza remains fragile, Israel continues to test the limits of the ceasefire, and the Board’s mandate is expanding well beyond its original remit. At the same time, the initiative raises broader questions about its relationship with the UN-led system that has underpinned international peace and security since 1945.
Pakistan’s decision reflects confidence and rising diplomatic relevance. It also opens the door to risks that cannot be ignored.
The Board of Peace emerged from President Trump’s 20-point Gaza peace plan, which was unveiled last October at Sharm el-Sheikh and subsequently endorsed by the UN Security Council, enabling the first phase of the ceasefire. Egypt played a central role in facilitating Hamas’s acceptance. However, Israel has since violated the spirit of the ceasefire through restrictions on humanitarian access, military actions inside Gaza, and intensified pressure in the West Bank.
With Washington now announcing the transition to a second phase, new institutional arrangements have taken shape. These include a Founding Executive Board dominated by US officials and close Trump associates, a Gaza Executive Board tasked with overseeing day-to-day governance, and a proposed International Stabilisation Force (ISF). The legal authority, mandate and rules of engagement of this force remain unclear. Hamas has not accepted disarmament, while Israel continues to obstruct Palestinian administrative mechanisms.
Moreover, what was initially presented as a Gaza-specific mechanism is now being framed as a broader instrument for addressing global conflicts.
Pakistan’s Calculus
Pakistan is not acting alone. Dozens of countries (59, claims Trump) have been invited to join the Board, including Saudi Arabia, China, and Türkiye—Pakistan’s core strategic allies. The coordinated announcement by eight Muslim countries suggests extensive consultation among themselves and with Washington.
For Pakistan, the shift reflects a changed diplomatic and security landscape after the May 2025 clash with India. Islamabad has since sought to position itself as a middle power and emerging net security provider in the Gulf and the Middle East, reportedly holding talks with over a dozen countries—including Saudi Arabia, Libya, Indonesia, and Sudan—to export the Chinese-jointly-produced JF-17 fighter jets, highlighting its expanding defence profile.
Collective participation by the Group of Eight reduces exposure and enhances leverage. Acting alone would have carried far greater political and operational risks
In Washington, India’s strategic premium has narrowed, while Pakistan—despite economic fragility—has re-emerged as a relevant security interlocutor for a transactional US administration, driven by renewed engagement on counterterrorism, cryptocurrency, critical minerals, and regional diplomacy, alongside stronger military cooperation and high-level political signalling.
There is also a longer historical dimension. Since its independence, Pakistan has aspired to play a meaningful role in the Muslim Middle East. That aspiration now appears closer to realisation, though under far more complex and volatile circumstances than before.
Pakistan’s participation appears to have been shaped by close coordination with Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and China, reflecting a conscious effort to embed its decision within a collective framework rather than pursue a unilateral course.
Saudi Arabia remains Pakistan’s core strategic and economic partner. Riyadh’s position on Gaza is firmly tied to conflict resolution and Palestinian statehood under the Arab Peace Initiative, and recent Saudi-Pakistan defence cooperation points to growing strategic convergence on managing regional instability while resisting Israeli unilateralism.
Türkiye occupies a complementary role. As a NATO member with active involvement in regional diplomacy, Ankara combines political legitimacy in the Muslim world with access to Western security structures. For Pakistan, working alongside Türkiye strengthens collective leverage and reduces the risk of isolation within a US-led initiative.
China’s role, though less visible, is strategically important. Beijing has approached the Board with caution, consistent with its preference for de-escalation and UN-centered conflict management. At the same time, China appears to understand Pakistan’s need to stabilise ties with Washington, provided this engagement does not undermine Chinese strategic interests. This tacit understanding allows Islamabad to hedge rather than realign.
Recent months have also seen Field Marshal Asim Munir and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif collaborating closely with their counterparts in Egypt, Jordan, and Indonesia. Of course, collective participation by the Group of Eight reduces exposure and enhances leverage. Acting alone would have carried far greater political and operational risks.
The Board of Peace offers Pakistan an opportunity to shape outcomes rather than merely react to them
Risks and Uncertainty
The most immediate risk concerns Gaza itself. Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar recently stated that Pakistani forces would not participate in any mission aimed at disarming Hamas. Yet this assurance rests on uncertain ground. The mandate of the ISF remains undefined, and President Trump has publicly suggested that disarmament of Hamas is central to the second phase—a remark he repeated at Davos on Wednesday, while also alluding to the Lebanese Hezbollah. Gaza is not a post-conflict environment; it is a conflict paused under pressure.
Israel’s conduct further complicates matters. Since the ceasefire, Israel has restricted humanitarian access, carried out military actions inside Gaza, and continued settlement expansion in the West Bank. Attacks on the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and obstruction of Palestinian administrative arrangements suggest tactical compliance without strategic commitment. Foreign forces risk being placed in a position where Palestinians are constrained while Israel retains freedom of action.
The issue of Palestinian statehood presents a deeper political challenge. Pakistan’s participation rests on the expectation that the process will eventually lead to a viable Palestinian state. Yet Israel’s current far-right coalition remains openly hostile to that outcome. Settlement expansion and de facto annexation point towards managing territory rather than ending occupation.
Beyond Gaza, the Board’s widening mandate raises institutional concerns. Pakistan has long anchored its foreign policy in the UN system, particularly for issues such as Kashmir. The Board of Peace, by contrast, is personalised, discretionary, and closely tied to one US presidency. Over-identification risks diluting Pakistan’s multilateral positioning.
Regional realignment adds another layer of complexity. The Gaza war has sharpened an emerging divide between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan on one side and an axis involving Israel, India, and the UAE on the other. This regional realignment has taken concrete shape in the past couple of weeks, with Türkiye reportedly on its way to joining the Saudi-Pak defence alliance. While Pakistan’s strategic alignment with Riyadh is clear, its economic and social ties with the UAE remain significant. India’s growing proximity to Israel and the just-concluded strategic accords with the UAE risk importing South Asian rivalries into the Middle Eastern theater.
Finally, there is Iran. Any expansion of the Board’s mandate towards Iran would place Pakistan in a deeply problematic position. Islamabad cannot afford instability or externally driven regime change on its western border. Experience shows that alignment with the US geopolitical agenda in Afghanistan has imposed long-term domestic costs.
Caution Ahead
Pakistan’s decision is neither reckless nor cost-free. It reflects ambition, confidence, and a calculated belief that renewed global relevance can be leveraged for national benefit. At the same time, it places the country in a diplomatic space where missteps carry real strategic, political and security consequences.
Therefore, its participation in the Board of Peace must remain conditional, narrowly defined and firmly grounded in clearly articulated mandates. Pakistan should resist any drift toward open-ended commitments or roles that blur the distinction between peacekeeping, enforcement and political arbitration. Constant reassessment will be essential as the initiative evolves and its scope potentially widens.
Equally important is sustained coordination with core allies. Acting in concert provides political cover, collective leverage and a mechanism for restraint to ensure that Pakistan is not isolated or overexposed to the shifting priorities of larger powers.
Above all, foreign-policy activism must reinforce internal political stability and economic recovery. Pakistan’s recent diplomatic momentum is valuable but fragile. External prestige without domestic consolidation quickly becomes hollow.
The Board of Peace offers Pakistan an opportunity to shape outcomes rather than merely react to them. Whether it becomes a strategic gain or a costly entanglement will depend on the government’s ability to balance ambition with restraint, relevance with realism, and global visibility with national interest.