The protracted hostility between India and Pakistan has persisted for over seven decades, becoming an entrenched feature of South Asian geopolitics. Yet this hostility is not solely the product of historical grievances, religious cleavages, or territorial disputes. Rather, a more profound explanation lies in India’s sustained construction and reinforcement of Pakistan’s identity as an “enemy.” Drawing from constructivist approaches in international relations, which emphasise the formative role of identity in shaping state behaviour, this essay argues that India’s perception of Pakistan as an inherently antagonistic actor drives its adversarial policies. This enemy identity becomes particularly salient in the aftermath of terrorist attacks, wherein India’s responses are often emotionally charged and confrontational. The perception of Pakistan as a threat is thus not merely a reaction to material provocations, but the manifestation of a deeply embedded identity construct that sustains a self-reinforcing cycle of enmity.
From the Indian perspective, Pakistan is not simply a geopolitical rival but a cultural and ideological “other.” India’s self-identification as the world’s largest democracy, grounded in secularism and pluralism, stands in sharp contrast to Pakistan’s Islamic ideological foundations and centralised religious identity. This civilisational divergence exacerbates India’s tendency to frame bilateral tensions in terms that transcend conventional political disputes. In moments of crisis—particularly following terror incidents—India’s political discourse, public sentiment, and media narratives rapidly converge to project Pakistan as a rogue state, one allegedly complicit in the proliferation of terrorism. This conflation of non-state violence with state sponsorship serves to blur the lines between specific perpetrators and the Pakistani state itself. A case in point is the 2008 Mumbai attacks, after which India not only suspended diplomatic engagement but also undertook a sustained campaign to delegitimise Pakistan on the global stage. Such reactions are not merely defensive; they are deeply symbolic acts rooted in India’s broader discursive framework that constructs Pakistan as an existential threat.
More significantly, the identity of Pakistan as an enemy is not passively held but actively produced and reaffirmed through repeated interaction. India’s confrontational posture often triggers reciprocal reactions from Pakistan, which in turn appear to validate India’s initial assumptions. This process gives rise to a classical security dilemma: as India intensifies its defensive and offensive measures based on perceived threats, Pakistan responds in kind, thus feeding the very narrative that justified India’s initial stance. Over time, this cyclical pattern fosters a durable antagonism that transcends individual political regimes or isolated incidents. It becomes a structural feature of bilateral relations, resistant to diplomatic resets and insulated from shifts in regional dynamics. The psychological logic of “mutual hostility,” once internalised, restricts the policy options available to both states and forecloses pathways to de-escalation.
Rather than distinguishing between non-state actors and the Pakistani state apparatus, Indian political elites frequently portray terrorism as a direct extension of Pakistan’s foreign policy
India’s allegations linking Pakistan to terrorism constitute a critical component of this enemy construction. While it is true that several extremist groups operating in the Kashmir region—such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed—have origins in or connections to Pakistani territory, the Indian state often engages in a strategy of undifferentiated attribution. Rather than distinguishing between non-state actors and the Pakistani state apparatus, Indian political elites frequently portray terrorism as a direct extension of Pakistan’s foreign policy. This narrative not only legitimises India’s coercive responses, including military strikes and cross-border operations, but also plays a key role in domestic political consolidation. The 2019 Pulwama attack, for instance, occurred in the lead-up to India’s general elections and prompted a swift retaliatory strike by the Modi government—an action widely interpreted as both a security measure and an electoral strategy. In such contexts, the discourse of terrorism becomes instrumentalised, serving to entrench enemy identities and suppress alternative interpretations of security threats.
For decades, the India-Pakistan conflict has been framed as an intractable geopolitical rivalry rooted in historical trauma and strategic competition. However, a closer examination of the identity dynamics at play reveals a more complex picture. The perception of Pakistan as a permanent enemy is not a given; it is a product of sustained discursive practices that shape and are shaped by political action. Once embedded in national narratives and institutionalised through policy, this identity becomes remarkably resilient. It fosters a sense of inevitability about conflict and delegitimises any gestures of reconciliation.
Breaking this cycle requires more than military restraint or diplomatic engagement—it demands a fundamental reconfiguration of how each state views the other. India, in particular, must critically interrogate the discursive and cognitive foundations of its foreign policy toward Pakistan. Without such introspection, the relationship is likely to remain trapped in a closed loop of hostility, with each new crisis merely reinforcing the logic of antagonism. Only by disrupting this cycle at the level of identity can a sustainable path toward coexistence and strategic stability emerge in South Asia.