In the evolving global nuclear order, all nuclear-weapon states are not only increasing but also modernising their nuclear forces, bolstered by the integration of sophisticated emerging and disruptive technologies across the conventional and nuclear force domains. All these strategic imperatives have far-reaching policy implications for the strategic rivals competing with each other. The current evolving global order is further moving away from the perceived nuclear disarmament as pledged by the established nuclear-weapon states at the formation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 and its enforcement in 1970.
Despite the 1995 extension of the NPT, the aspiration for nuclear disarmament is fading, even though the world community has successfully adopted the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), with 95 signatories as of early 2026. It is unclear how effective the TPNW is in convincing the major powers to pursue nuclear disarmament. To date, there is no evidence that nuclear disarmament is underway. Also, arms control processes between the US and Russia are rapidly dwindling. That said, the characteristics of geopolitics and geostrategy remain predominant among the competing rivals, helping us understand why these characteristics may prevail over everything related to nuclear arms control and disarmament pledged by the member states.
The question is: why has the New START Treaty, the only arms control treaty left between the US and Russia since the peak of the Cold War, expired without being extended? This could embody the elements of fear of being declined, mistrust, the over-ambition of the US to bring others on board, such as China, and the evolving complex global politics beginning from the protracted Russian-Ukrainian war.
The US and Russia could extend the treaty for a couple of logical reasons: one, it could increase the chances of arms control, crisis stability, and broader strategic stability between the US, Russia, and their supporting allies. Two, this could pave the way for others to get on board with an aspiration for a regional arms control regime, as encouraged by the NPT. Third, it could ease the strategic pressures on other nuclear-weapon states for demonstrating strategic restraint. Finally, this could pave the way for non-proliferation, perceived nuclear disarmament, and regional arms control regimes among other nuclear-weapon states.
For sustainable peace and broader strategic stability, the extension of New START should be pursued, paving the way for more regional arms control regimes that aim to prevent war, reduce crisis instability, and minimise the risk of war
Since the treaty is not extended for another five years, the primary objective of bringing down the Russian and the US nuclear forces to 1,550 may further be delayed. Also, there is a risk of increasing the arms race between the US and Russia, undermining strategic stability between the two traditional nuclear rivals. This, in turn, could impose strategic pressures on other deterrent forces and their doctrinal force posture, thereby threatening one another. Such imperatives could further increase the security dilemma, reliance on nuclear weapons, and the risk of both vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation amongst the aspirant nuclear-weapon states.
If one critically examines New START, it has a number of loopholes. For example, without being punished, either party can unilaterally withdraw from the treaty, even though it is legally binding. Moreover, the broader structure of the treaty does not prohibit either party from developing sophisticated conventional forces equivalent to nuclear forces, ballistic missile defence systems, or tactical nuclear weapons, or from acquiring and integrating emerging and disruptive technologies in both the conventional and nuclear force domains.
Yet many security analysts argue that extending New START may allow the US and Russia to bring others on board, if not so soon. Currently, the US is eyeing China, leaving France and the UK to show how quickly they are increasing and modernising their nuclear deterrent forces, while the US-led NATO alliance in Europe provides a security guarantee aimed at containing Russia. It is good to engage China responsibly, and China is not adamant about such engagement, but China may not soon become part of the broader arms control mechanism, let alone the perceived aspiration for nuclear disarmament.
This is for a couple of reasons: one, despite China’s force modernisation and its reported increase of nuclear forces, it still does not match the US and Russia nuclear forces. Two, either China has to reach the level of the Russian and the US nuclear forces to then become part of an effective arms control mechanism, so to speak, from the position of strength, and/or both Russia and the US need to bring their forces down to the level of the Chinese total nuclear forces. Both aspirations appear quite ambitious given the complex global nuclear order.
In the meantime, many countries, including the recognised nuclear-weapon states by the NPT, continue to increase the value of nuclear deterrence. They rely on their nuclear forces as the ultimate guarantor of security, preventing large-scale war against their potential rivals. Nonetheless, for sustainable peace and broader strategic stability, the extension of New START should be pursued, paving the way for more regional arms control regimes that aim to prevent war, reduce crisis instability, and minimise the risk of war.