Adam Smith is no ordinary person. He was a Scottish economic wizard renowned in economics for fathering the classical version of liberalism we see today. Though his scholastic contributions to economics were prodigious, one specimen of his main argument stands out: individuals should pursue enlightened self-interest under a robust system of the rule of law. If given the right conditions, the self-interest they pursue through investing their resources would benefit society through the invisible hand of the market. In other words, a rising tide will lift all boats.
This is the finest and most fundamental formulation of classic liberalism. Individuals should be allowed to work independently and with minimal interference and dictation. As long as they do not do anything illegal, the government must restrain itself from interfering or prescribing. However, if it does, it will end up distorting the ordinary functioning of the market. This is because governments can easily become prescriptive, hegemonic, and paternalistic – and thus ignorant.
A similar argument with modifications can be a helpful guide in international relations. Many of the conflicts we see today are in part due to the hegemonic imposition of a singular conception of world order dictated by the US-led West. Having its roots in the Cold War, this worldview posits that it was the failure of the Soviets to liberalise (along Western lines) that made them insecure and embroiled them in the persistent strategic competition with the West. Had the Soviets followed the dictums of liberal democracy, much of the Cold War suffering could have been avoided. The reflections of this narrative are manifest in the famous telegram that was written by George F Kennan, former American ambassador to the then-Soviet Empire, which is widely regarded as the first event that sowed the seeds of the Cold War.
The underlying idea of the post-World War era was that, due to the diverse national traditions, cultures, and values, there was no readymade universal conception of a political, economic, or cultural worldview that could be dictated by a single power
One begs the question: What is this Western liberal ideology? Though the precise contours of it are elusive, some common themes can be distilled from Francis Fukuyama’s famous work ‘Liberalism and its Discontents’. Primarily a Western construct, a post-nationalist ideology grounded on individualism, cosmopolitanism, and globalisation, it posits that there is a universal order based on the singular conception of human rights, cultural values, and moral systems common to all nations. The national barriers, though important for purposes of national identity, are a key factor in fostering conflict. So if China is insistent on handling the Uyghurs by their national policies, or if Russians are not democratically electing their regimes in periodic elections, both of them are morally wrong and should be internationally condemned or even ostrasised. In certain cases, there was even an argument for bringing down undemocratic regimes if they were tyrannical and denied people their “universal” fundamental rights.
Moreover, after the emergence of a unipolar era in the 1990s, the calls for Western liberalism to be espoused universally became more strident. It was argued that there was no sustainable, plausible alternative to it. Francis Fukuyama in his book ‘The End of History and the Last Man’ went as far as saying that the collapse of the Soviet Empire meant that the only workable ideology in the world was liberalism as practiced in the West (though he retracted his arguments in his subsequent work ‘Liberalism and its Discontents').
As anticipated, this stirred up raucuous opposition from certain countries, particularly Russia and China, who contended that the US was trying to achieve ideological dominance in the rest of the world by foisting its worldviews.
The resistance also came from small and medium-sized nations, even those included in the West, particularly in Eastern Europe, creating fertile grounds for right-wing populism. It became more strident after the Velvet Revolution, when, after the crumbling of the Soviet Union, there was an ideological discontent with Marxist-Leninism. The Western liberals saw in this ideological vacuum an opportunity to embed their version of liberalism. However, it was resisted by the people who felt that in an attempt to escape from the hegemony of the Soviet empire, they were now being compelled to submit to another hegemony of Western liberal ideology. This produced a feeling that the national heritage and traditions of post-communist societies risked being wiped out. The feeling was fully exploited by right-wing scaremongers who exploited people’s fear and frustration to consolidate their power. The rising popularity of the Fidesz in Hungary, the Law and Justice Party in Poland, and the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands has come on the very heels of this discontent.
Interestingly, this attempt to shape the post-Cold War in the light of Western ideals conflicted with the order built in the post-World War era. The latter was premised on the Westphalian notions of sovereignty, territorial nationhood, non-interference, and respect for diverse cultural practices and pluralism. The underlying idea of the post-World War era was that, due to the diverse national traditions, cultures, and values, there was no readymade universal conception of a political, economic, or cultural worldview that could be dictated by a single power. In other words, as long as America is not sanctimoniously preaching its dictums to China or accusing Russians of being undemocratic, the world will see fewer conflicts and more cooperation.
Therefore the US-led Western powers should resist the urge of prescription, dictation and paternalism. They must realise that all nations have a right to puruse their own enlightened self-interest, within the parameters of international law. Imposing universal standards undermines the very diversity that enriches our global community. It is high time the nations followed in international relations the dictums that Adam Smith preached in economics.