One of the renowned military strategists, Carl von Clausewitz, in On War (Book 1, Chapter 7), argued that “Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult.” It is imperative to note how fast the global nuclear order is evolving and becoming more complex when a nuclear-weapon state, an outlier to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in this case Israel, carries out preventive strikes against a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT, Iran. Similarly, the US also carried out preventive strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025, claiming that it had “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear-enriched facilities.
Many security analysts wrongly contextualise the term “pre-emptive strike” without distinguishing it from the phrase “preventive strike”. There is a difference. Pre-emptive strikes are carried out by State A against State B when the threat is imminent, while a preventive strike is used when the threat from the perceived adversary is not imminent and is therefore considered illegal.
Iran’s nuclear programme, largely perceived to be for peaceful purposes, falls under the protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which remains credible enough to keep a check on its development. Many security analysts argue that Iran is not an existential security threat to either the US or Israel. It is still far from developing a credible nuclear weapon. In fact, Iran has not developed nuclear weapons.
Iran remains a full-fledged member of the NPT while complying with the IAEA’s required protocols. It has also agreed to continue the nuclear dialogue process to reach a logical conclusion. It was the US under Donald Trump, not Iran, that abrogated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which had been successfully concluded as a win-win during Barack Obama’s administration. That opportunity to gradually contain Iran from developing nuclear weapons was missed. The world continues to struggle to revive the JCPOA.
In the meantime, Israel has unnecessarily developed a “hyper fear” regarding its existence, which may not reflect reality, by targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities with relentless efforts aimed at regime change. In fact, Israel does not want any state in the broader Middle Eastern region to acquire nuclear weapons, as it perceives such developments to threaten its very existence.
Regime change or sanctions may not weaken Iran; rather, such measures could further aggravate the situation in the Middle East
Israel has already carried out preventive strikes against the Osirak Iraqi nuclear facility in 1981 and the Syrian embryonic nuclear facility in 2007. Israel, an outlier to the NPT and while practising nuclear opacity, is the only country in the region possessing nuclear weapon capability. It does not align with the proposed Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, as aspired to at each NPT Review Conference, and thus becomes one of the important causes of the failure of the NPT Review Conference.
Israel is dragging the US into an unwanted, prolonged war that the US and its allies may not be interested in. Iran remains far from developing a credible nuclear weapons programme, along with a sophisticated delivery system to carry a bomb. However, consistent strikes on Iran and its nuclear facilities, along with aspirations for regime change, may embolden Iran like never before to rescind its NPT membership and develop a bomb.
Students of international security understand that, among all causes and factors, security remains the predominant driver in explaining why states acquire nuclear weapons. Hypothetically, the more Iran is attacked, the more the world paves the way for it to develop a bomb, and the harder it becomes to prevent this outcome.
Many security analysts argue that Iran is not like Iraq, Libya, or Syria, whose embryonic nuclear capabilities were destroyed. Given this experience, Iran’s nuclear programme appears to be far more dispersed, hidden, sheltered, and concealed as part of a strategy for nuclear safety and security. Therefore, Iran may need to be treated differently.
Both history and geography afford Iran greater geopolitical and geostrategic options than many perceive. Advisers in the Trump administration appear to lack the historical and geographical understanding that Iran has embodied for centuries. Regime change from the air, and the idea of controlling the Iranian population through aerial dominance is a flawed strategy that the US and its allies appear to be pursuing.
In nearly two weeks of war, Iran appears to hold a greater strategic advantage, particularly over the Strait of Hormuz, while the US and its allies have limited options to bring down the Iranian regime, despite decapitating its longstanding supreme leadership.
A war against Iran will have grave consequences for the entire region, affecting vital security and economic interests globally, including those of major powers such as the US and China. Regime change or sanctions may not weaken Iran; rather, such measures could further aggravate the situation in the Middle East.
The way forward should be dialogue, restraint, patience, political and diplomatic modesty, and the revival of the JCPOA to reach a nuclear agreement acceptable to all parties.