All the indicators depicting Pakistan’s fault lines prove that Baluchistan and Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJK) are the country’s dangerous flashpoints. State actors and coalition government partners may deny insurgency in Baluchistan and widespread popular chagrin in AJK. Baluchistan is the oldest case study of launching military operations in Pakistan whereas, uprising against injustices is a recent phenomenon in AJK. Violence and terrorism in parts of KPK and resurgence of ethnic strife in Sindh also shape how flashpoints in almost half of Pakistan are a serious threat to the country’s integrity.
How insurgency in Baluchistan which got an impetus after the assassination of veteran Baluch leader Sardar Akbar Bugti in August 2006 and why in the last 20 years the writ of state on the large parts of Pakistan’s restive province is not to be seen. Why despite claims made by the state that acts of violence in Baluchistan are instigated by India and Afghanistan the situation on the ground is quite critical. In the first half of 2026 hundreds of people have been killed in attacks on law enforcement agencies by the banned Baluch liberation Army (BLA) and how the recent unfortunate incident in Ziarat which took the lives of several policemen exposed the writ of state. How unrest and violence in parts of AJK caused by the movement of proscribed Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) for the fulfillment of their demands like abolishing reserved seats for Kashmiri refugees from Indian held Kashmir, energy and food crisis tends to destabilize AJK and provide India an opportunity to argue that there exists widespread hatred against Islamabad. AJK is certainly a recent flashpoint reflecting popular uprising in parts of Pakistan.
Coming to a dangerous scenario in Baluchistan which is getting from bad to worse in the last few years reflect that the writ of the state is now restricted to military controlled parts including Quetta garrison. Whereas, the rest of Baluchistan is slipping from state’s control. If BLA and other Baluch insurgents are active in Baluch majority areas, Tehrek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is active in the Pashtun belt of the province. Periodic targeting of non-Baluch particularly Punjabi workers in Baluchistan means the writ of state is questionable in that province.
In a report, “‘Army alone can’t neutralize grievances’ published by Al-Jazeera by Osama bin Javaid on February 1, 2026 stated: “As the dust of another deadly conflict settles over the scarred ridges of Sulaiman and Kirthar ranges in Baluchistan, Pakistan’s largest but most sparsely populated province, a volatile mix of long-ignored grievances, a brutal rebellion, proxy wars and high-stakes geopolitics erupts again. For nearly 40 hours, a fierce battle was waged in those ridges in what officials called a “desperate” wave of coordinated separatist attacks across more than a dozen locations in the southwestern province of Baluchistan, claimed by the banned group Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA), which for decades has been fighting for an independent state.” Therefore, Baluchistan can rightly be called as the ‘under soft belly’ of Pakistan where because of more than 1 trillion dollars of mineral resources and the ‘great game’ being played with the involvement of external powers, the province is literally out of control of state authorities. As a security source told Al Jazeera: “A military can neutralize a militant, but it cannot neutralize a grievance. The state sees them as a terrorist network; many here see their sons and brothers who took up arms.”
As far as turmoil in AJK is concerned, it is relatively a new phenomenon amidst Pakistan’s claim of Indian repression in its occupied parts of J&K. For a long time Pakistan used to proudly claim that unlike India’s military controlled and occupied Jammu & Kashmir, AJK is peaceful because it is not occupied by the military and people of AJK have proper representation in power structure. But, such claims made by Pakistan are now being challenged by critics who argue that widespread popular uprising particularly in restive district of Rawalakot is an evidence that the state its losing control in AJK.
As reported in Pakistan’s major English newspaper, “since early June, Azad Kashmir has been on tenterhooks, with routine life severely disturbed, as the regional administration seeks to quell the protests of the now proscribed Joint Awami Action Committee, a coalition of political and civil society groups. Violent confrontations have claimed some 30 lives of both security personnel and protesters since last month. Rawalakot, the focal point of the protest movement, has been under curfew for about six weeks. The JAAC’s demands have focused on governance issues and economic concerns, with most being accepted by the authorities. But its call for the abolition of seats in the AJK legislature for refugees from India-held Kashmir has created a deadlock. Rather than using only administrative and security tools to deal with the situation, the government must keep political channels open with the JAAC and carefully listen to their demands so that normal life can resume in AJK as soon as possible.” Pakistan Tehrek-e-Insaf (PTI) and other opposition political parties have launched a vehement condemnation of state’s handling of crisis in AJK which is political in nature but force is being used to quell popular movement.
Baluchistan and AJK flashpoints need to be examined from three perspectives. First, in both the case studies, state lacks strategy to deal with issues through a process of dialogue and negotiations. Renowned Baluch leader and chief of BNP Akhtar Mengal in a press conference in Quetta the other day made it clear that the writ of state in Baluchistan is over and only by holding dialogue on the issues of missing persons, extra-judicial killings and alleged exploitation of province’s resources, one can expect peace and stability in that province. It is the nationalist perspective which is rational and logical to understand Baluchistan’s predicament.
But the state and its supporters who are the coalition partners in the federal government consider that Baluch issue is patronized by external elements particularly India and allege that BLA and the leader of Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) Mahrang Baloch is a traitor and supported by India. But, such assertions like unpatriotic and terrorist will not solve the problem. Activists like Mahrang Baloch are fighting for a cause and the state must take steps to remove their legitimate grievances. Second, the state perspective on Baluchistan and AJK lacks rationality and adheres to the use of hard instead of soft power. If the state wants to crush popular uprising by using brute force it will be counterproductive. There are countless examples since the formative phase of Pakistan till today that state failed to deal with genuine movements for provincial autonomy and granting of socio-economic rights. Had this not been the case, East Pakistan wouldn’t have transformed as Bangladesh and Baluchistan, Pakistan’s largest province area wise, would not have faced military operations since 1960s till today.
Third, the gap in state and civil society perspective on the issues of Baluchistan and AJK is getting wide with each passing day. It has to do with coercive measures against media and the loss of an independent judiciary. When 26th and 27th amendments tend to limit democratic space in Pakistan and elevate the position of military, voices against repression in Baluchistan and AJK are silenced. As a result, dangerous flashpoints of Baluchistan and AJK along with KPK and Sindh will continue to pose serious challenges to the survival and integrity of Pakistan.