Contrary to the general perception that before the Taliban captured Afghanistan in August 2021, the previous Afghan governments under Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani were controlling the entire area of Afghanistan, the Taliban, in a very shrewd move, were busy starting to install a ‘Shadow Government’ in areas they began capturing from 2005 until August 2021.
According to Western sources, in 2014, the previous Afghan government was controlling 80% of Afghanistan, while the Taliban were controlling 6% of Afghanistan. But after six years, in 2020, the previously government-controlled areas were reduced to 44% of Afghanistan from 80% in 2014, while Taliban-controlled areas had gone up to 22% of Afghanistan in the same year.
In 2014, 14% of Afghanistan’s areas had emerged as contested between the previous Afghan government and the Taliban, while in 2020, the contested areas massively extended to 34% from 14%.
According to Taliban claims, in 2017, 10% of districts were under complete control of the Taliban, 48% were contested areas, 15% were under significant Taliban control, and 27% were under previous government control.
SIGAR, the Overseas Development Institute, the Danish Embassy in Kabul, and International Human Rights Associations were explored by the author of this report, following which structured tables were prepared showing the control of the Taliban from 2014 to 2020, much before capturing the whole of Afghanistan in August 2021.
| Year | Government Controlled Area | Taliban Controlled Area | Contested Area |
| 2014 | 80% | 6% | 14% |
| 2015 | 72% | 7% | 21% |
| 2016 | 64% | 8% | 29% |
| 2017 | 56% | 14% | 30% |
| 2018 | 52% | 14% | 34% |
| 2019 | 48% | 22% | 30% |
| 2020 | 44% | 22% | 34% |
Taliban’s own estimates of captured districts in Afghanistan released in 2017:
| Taliban-Completely Controlled Area | Afghanistan Government-Controlled Area | Contested Areas |
| 25% | 27% | 48% |
The Taliban established a sophisticated system of shadow cabinet, parallel government, and parallel governance across Afghanistan from 2005 onward until capturing Kabul on 15 August 2021.
In 2006, the Taliban code of conduct set out 30 rules to instil discipline among its fighters in compatibility with the shadow government. The Taliban had started installing provincial shadow cabinets/parallel governments headed by a shadow governor, district shadow cabinets, and local shadow cabinets soon after 2005.
The shadow cabinet does not come after the capture of territory but, in many cases, precedes it.
By 2012, most provincial shadow governors could not stay in their provinces for fear of being killed by the US-led assassination campaign against Taliban commanders. Later, shadow governors could take up residence in the provinces after the reduction and withdrawal of international forces.
With the withdrawal of international forces, the Taliban became less war-like and started focusing more on running their own governments in various provinces of Afghanistan. After fighting, succeeding, and capturing territory or gaining influence in areas, the Taliban focused on providing services and good delivery to the people of those areas.
Three levels of courts were established in the areas after occupying them: the Supreme Court, provincial-level courts, and primary courts. Dispute resolution was the Taliban shadow government’s primary non-military form of engagement with civilians
After the death of the first Amir, Mullah Omar, Mullah Akhtar Mansur took control of the Afghan Taliban as Amir and actually transformed the insurgency into parallel Taliban shadow governments in various provinces of Afghanistan.
Mullah Akhtar Mansur also prompted several Taliban groups to resolve their internal conflicts and cultivated and favoured his own networks within the Taliban. The Taliban sought to correct many of the flaws and shortcomings that undermined their role in their first tenure from 1996 to 2001.
Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada became the third and present Amir and Supreme Commander, functioning more as a spiritual and political leader than as an operational commander. Beneath Mullah Haibatullah, two deputy Amirs — Mullah Omar’s son Yaqoob and Jalaluddin Haqqani’s son Sirajuddin Haqqani — were appointed in the shadow government.
The Taliban were successful in establishing major components of the shadow cabinet, including Finance, Health, Education, Judicial, Culture, Media, and Taxation, much before capturing Afghanistan in August 2021.
Finance
Finance was headed by Gul Agha, who remained active in Balochistan after the first Taliban government. Health was headed by Abbas Akhundzada, and Education kept changing. Branches under the Finance Commission included Zakat, Ushr, Electricity, Mining, Customs, and Narcotics.
Education
Many felt that the Taliban had improved the running of the government education system. Education monitors checked teachers’ and students’ attendance, amended the curriculum, removed Western-style education elements, and allowed women’s education with certain amendments.
In February 2018, the Taliban and the Helmand Provincial Ministry of Education signed a ten-point MoU imposing penalties for absent teachers and reopening closed schools. Teachers were selected by both the Taliban shadow government and the previous government, but teachers unapproved by the Taliban could not be appointed in Taliban-controlled areas.
A principal suggested a teacher, the previous Afghan government accepted, and the Taliban investigated the background.
During the previous government, many schools suffered from high levels of corruption, teachers were absent, and textbooks were sold rather than distributed. During the previous government, four in ten of Afghanistan’s schools had no building at all, while one in twelve were ‘ghost schools’ that existed only on paper. Schools were closed for years, but budgets were spent elsewhere rather than on actual educational needs.
Ministry officials doubled the number of schools actually enrolled for personal gain. The Taliban feared internal revolts within the movement and fighters leaving the ranks by hardcore Taliban.
In 2009, the Taliban removed the provision authorising attacks on schools from their code of conduct, and by 2011 the number of incidents had dramatically declined. The Taliban suspected that school buildings were being used to spy on them.
Health
The Taliban established health monitors in clinics, checking staff attendance and inspecting equipment and medicine stocks. In August 2007, the Taliban allowed the World Health Organisation and UN Children’s Fund to conduct polio campaigns. A letter issued in Mullah Omar’s name, and similar letters for subsequent campaigns, instructed fighters to allow vaccination and urged parents to have their children vaccinated.
By 2011, the Taliban had signed agreements with 26 aid organisations.
Health focal points checked whether medicine stocks and equipment had expired or were functional. In Helmand, the Taliban shadow government also regulated medicine prices. The Taliban objected when female health workers were replaced by men. The Taliban’s ten military command zones had medical treatment corridors and transport.
Justice System
An estimated 500 judges formed the first functional component of the shadow government in 2006. The Judicial Commission had three core branches: the Ulema Council, Darul Ifta (Fatwa Council), and the Courts.
Three levels of courts were established in the areas after occupying them: the Supreme Court, provincial-level courts, and primary courts. Dispute resolution was the Taliban shadow government’s primary non-military form of engagement with civilians.
Due to corruption in the previous government, even people in government-controlled areas were referring cases to the Taliban for justice. Spying was declared a capital offence, and only the provincial shadow governor could approve an execution.
Judges used motorbikes to reach the spot within hours and settle disputes within a day.
Revenue Structure
The Taliban stole official records for accurate accounts of land ownership. The Taliban asked those persons who had a son or son-in-law in the Afghan police or security forces to bring them to the Taliban within three days. If they failed, they had to leave the area, forfeiting their land and property.
Collecting Electricity Bills
The Taliban were collecting the vast majority of the bills of the state electricity company in at least ten provinces. In Kunduz, the state-owned electricity company Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat was losing an estimated $50,000 in revenue every month during the previous Afghan government of Ashraf Ghani.
In Helmand, Taliban obstruction accounted for an estimated 45% loss in electricity revenues.
Controlling Mobile Phone Coverage
The Taliban controlled around a quarter of the country’s mobile phone coverage. The mobile provider Salam was banned in Taliban areas. Afghan government-controlled Salam SIMs were destroyed, and the owners received minor punishment.