When the US and Israel attacked Iran last Saturday, they did not anticipate that the Islamic Republic would be striking military targets across the Persian Gulf six days into the war. Apparently, the expectation was that, after the killing of its long-time Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the regime would capitulate.
Far from it, the regime remains intact, is in the process of selecting Khamenei's replacement, and is conducting military operations against Israel, Gulf countries, and the US. Moreover, there have been no protests in Iran that could threaten the regime. More importantly, Khamenei's assassination has made him a martyr, galvanising the regime to fight back.
All of this, coupled with the loss of US personnel and materiel, means that the chances of de-escalation have been reduced precipitously. There are a number of reasons that account for this.
First, both the US and Israel have made no effort to show that regime change is off the table. If anything, toppling the regime is a bigger goal than eliminating Iran’s nuclear programme. US President Donald Trump has also stated that he must get to choose the next Supreme Leader, further underscoring that he would not accept whoever the Assembly of Experts selects.
This has made the ongoing war an existential one for Iran. Therefore, the regime, imbued with the spirit of resistance, has rejected the idea of negotiating with the US, vowing to teach it, its Gulf allies, and Israel a lesson. Hence, so long as regime change remains the primary objective, Iran will continue its war of attrition, shutting the door on diplomacy.
Second, the scope and scale of the war have increased. Gulf countries that host US and Israeli military assets are being relentlessly targeted. This plank of Iran's strategy has complicated crisis management, not least because of the involvement of more actors. This is why Iran is trying to assure Gulf countries that its attacks are against US assets, not them.
In recent days, Cyprus, Azerbaijan, and Türkiye were aggressed against. While Iran immediately denied perpetrating any of these incidents, such incidents can lead to uncontrollable escalation and, resultantly, the widening of the conflict
However, with countries like Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates committed to retaliating, the war is only likely to intensify. As a result, Gulf countries, including Oman, might find it difficult to offer their good offices for negotiations. That being said, if Gulf countries’ missile and air-defence assets deplete quickly, they may find it propitious to convince the main warring parties to step back.
The chances of this delivering positive outcomes, however, are low. This is primarily because the US and Israel would face reputational damage if they stopped their operations while the regime continued to function as before.
Third, other subversive actions are denting the already dim prospects of de-escalation. These include Israel's invasion of southern Lebanon, increasing Hezbollah's involvement and stakes in the war. However, what is more dangerous is the fog of war, thickened by disinformation and false-flag attacks.
In recent days, Cyprus, Azerbaijan, and Türkiye were aggressed against. While Iran immediately denied perpetrating any of these incidents, such incidents can lead to uncontrollable escalation and, resultantly, the widening of the conflict.
Another action that will certainly exacerbate tensions is Washington’s bid to arm the Kurds against Iran. Other than adding another dimension to the war, this step would make Türkiye uneasy and concerned. Therefore, if the Kurds take on Iran, Türkiye would find it necessary to partner with the country to crush them.
Thus, it is reasonable to argue that rather than bringing an end to the war on US terms, this gambit will backfire. The Kurds are not ready to join the war, highlighting how dangerous this proposition is.
All in all, there is no pathway to any sort of de-escalation. With the US and Israel bent on crushing the regime, Iran has no choice but to fight for its survival. These two opposed objectives militate against de-escalation, especially if one takes into account the trust deficit created as a result of the penchant for using force at the expense of diplomacy.
In order to start any de-escalatory process, Washington and Tel Aviv must renounce regime change. Absent that, the cycle of violence will continue, engulfing not only the Middle East but also other regions. That being said, even if regime change is taken off the table, Iran is unlikely to trust the US, not least because of the latter’s litany of breaches.