Amid rising tensions in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have announced that they will not allow their territories, airspaces, or waters to be used to launch attacks against Iran. These pronouncements come at a time when there is growing uncertainty surrounding the course of action the Trump administration might take against Iran. While US President Donald Trump has repeatedly spoken about the Iran-bound armada, he has not yet shunned diplomacy.
This position is in stark contrast to the one taken in early January, when Trump vowed to invade Iran to help protesters remove the Islamic Republic. This change could be attributed to several factors.
First, the regime is not as feeble as it is assumed to be. The all-powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which is regarded as the strongest pillar of the regime, remains cohesive and loyal. Moreover, it was able to control the recent uprising. This is evidenced by the fact that the protests have dissipated, just like the previous ones did. From a US standpoint, the resilience of the regime is instructive in more ways than one.
Foremost, it shows that Iran is no Venezuela and can withstand a short war. Concomitantly, there is no formidable opposition that can galvanise Iranians against the regime while presenting itself as a credible alternative. All of this means that only a long-drawn, multi-pronged military campaign can create the conditions for regime change. However, neither is Trump enamoured of such military engagements, nor is success guaranteed if they happen.
Second, Iran has categorically stated that, in response to any attack, it would conduct strikes on Middle Eastern countries that host US military bases. The message that Iran has issued is this: while we have brotherly ties with these countries, US military installations and assets located there will be targeted. These warnings have pushed Gulf countries to not only urge restraint but also refuse to lend logistical support to US military operations. This indicates that any US aggression against Iran will not have regional buy-in, complicating the situation for Washington.
Negotiations will be a non-starter if regime change remains the desired goal. Iranian officials cannot negotiate with forces that are preparing to topple them
Third, unlike during the 12-Day War last year, Israel is playing second fiddle to the US. Rather than force Trump’s hand into attacking, Israel appears perturbed by Washington’s unwillingness to go all the way. Reportedly, Israel is also unsure whether the US will use the kinetic option against Iran.
This is not a challenge per se. That being said, with Israel less gung-ho about teaching Iran a lesson, Trump can be dissuaded from taking punitive action. In June, it was Israel that not only initiated the operation but also convinced Trump to hit Iran’s hardened nuclear facilities, including the one in Fordow.
Fourth, any military action against Iran runs the risk of affecting the entire Middle East. While the Axis of Resistance is not a patch on its past, US belligerence against Iran and its Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, will only go on to resuscitate it. Notably, Hezbollah and the Houthis have committed themselves to entering the conflict if Iran is attacked. This means that Trump cannot make quick work of Iran. In other words, the US will get bogged down in a wide-ranging, multi-theatre war of attrition.
All of this means that military options are risky and less likely to achieve the desired results, underscoring the need for robust diplomacy. In this context, Trump’s continued willingness to cut a deal opens a small window for de-escalation. However, what Trump wants is Iran’s capitulation, not a fair deal.
For example, Washington wants Tehran to completely dismantle its nuclear and missile programmes. Iran, it must be stressed, can ill-afford to agree to such a lopsided deal, especially while the US positions itself for a war with the country. This is evidenced by Iran’s latest response to Trump’s ultimatum: we are ready to talk but will defend ourselves if push comes to shove.
To resume substantive negotiations, the US must assure Iran that dialogue will not be derailed by any unprovoked military campaigns. Doing so would be a tall order, primarily because the 12-Day War started even though Iran was having dialogue with the US. That brazenness contributed significantly to increasing mistrust, which is difficult to wish away.
More importantly, negotiations will be a non-starter if regime change remains the desired goal. Iranian officials cannot negotiate with forces that are preparing to topple them. Similarly, Iran is unlikely to reduce the stockpiles and ranges of its ballistic missiles, which continue to be the country’s main offensive weapons. Therefore, Washington’s obduracy over these demands will vitiate tensions further.
Only by accepting Tehran’s sovereignty-related concerns can Washington create the necessary environment for a fair deal. Absent that, a wave of violence and chaos will engulf the region and beyond.