Pakistan’s win over India in the Four-Day War was a major milestone and provided the current setup in Islamabad with much-needed breathing room. Pakistan’s foreign policy has pivoted in two ways since then. First, it has capitalised on the victory and secured diplomatic gains by warming ties with the United States and signing a Mutual Defence Pact with Saudi Arabia.
Second, it has adopted a policy of bellicosity towards the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. While I see the first pivot as beneficial to Pakistan, the second one is a mistake. I shall elaborate on my position by first explaining why Pakistan is pursuing such an aggressive policy and then establishing why it is the wrong approach.
Starting with the “why”. Data show that the first three quarters of 2025 have been more deadly in terms of terrorism for Pakistan than the entire year of 2024. The main perpetrator of most of these attacks has been the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which is operating from Afghanistan.
When the Afghan Taliban (TTA) took over Afghanistan, Pakistan celebrated it as a sign of success. It was believed that a friendly government in Kabul would secure the western border, allowing Pakistan to focus on Balochistan and India. However, the inability, or rather the unwillingness, of the TTA to rein in the TTP seems to have shattered Pakistan’s hopes.
This has led to a series of kinetic escalations. Pakistan has moved beyond diplomatic warnings to direct military action, launching intelligence-based anti-terrorism operations inside Afghan territory to target TTP hideouts.
The situation further deteriorated this month with heavy cross-border fire exchanges that left soldiers dead on both sides. Tensions reached a fever pitch in October when frustrated Pakistani officials publicly threatened to obliterate the Taliban regime if it failed to rein in the militants. Such language is typically reserved for total war, not neighbourly disputes.
As a student of International Relations, I consider this foreign policy to be flawed on several accounts.
First, it goes against the balance-of-power logic according to realists. A state facing an external threat has two options. It can either balance internally by arming itself, which, in Afghanistan’s case, would require an air force on par with the Pakistan Air Force. Alternatively, it can balance externally by allying with a third state.
By shutting the Afghan border to “punish” Kabul, Pakistan is effectively closing doors for itself
Afghanistan currently does not possess the capability to establish an air force capable of countering Pakistan. Its only remaining option is to move closer to India. The Taliban have actively pivoted towards New Delhi.
India officially reopened its embassy in Kabul in October 2025. This was accompanied by Indian diplomats holding talks with the Taliban’s Acting Defence Minister, Mullah Yaqoob. Acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi and Trade Minister Nooruddin Azizi have also made high-profile visits to India, seeking enhanced connectivity through Chabahar Port.
The Taliban have publicly labelled India a “significant regional partner”. By alienating the Taliban, Islamabad is pushing them directly into India’s arms. While most of this engagement appears economic in nature, it would not take long to spill over into the security domain. This risk is heightened by the fact that Operation Sindoor has not officially ended. Consequently, Pakistan would face not one but two hostile borders.
Second, the policy is suicidal in economic terms. Recent data reveal an alarming trend. Pak–Afghan trade slumped by 54 per cent in October 2025, with losses exceeding $200 million and exporters losing $4 million daily.
The Sarhad Chamber of Commerce and Industry has confirmed that traders in Peshawar and Quetta have suffered the most. Islamabad is also sabotaging its future as a regional transit hub.
Recent reports indicate that exports to the five Central Asian states have contracted by nearly 10 per cent, while imports have dipped by over 63 per cent. As of today, border crossings remain effectively closed to trade. By shutting the Afghan border to “punish” Kabul, Pakistan is effectively closing doors for itself.
Third, a glance at history shows that states should consolidate their gains rather than aggressively pushing for further victories. Napoleon’s Continental System ended up destroying his own alliances and economy.
Similarly, before the German invasion of Poland in 1939, Hitler had already made enormous gains by occupying large parts of Europe. His strategic miscalculation was assuming that the policy of appeasement would last forever. While history may not repeat itself, it can certainly rhyme.
So, what is the alternative when bilateral talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan have failed to deliver the desired results? Policymakers in Islamabad must realise that restraint is not weakness. It is the prerequisite for strategy.
A policy of unilateral aggression must be replaced with a multilateral approach using the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. The SCO is the ideal regional forum for this crisis, as counter-terrorism is one of its core focus areas.
Pakistan is not the only state frustrated with the Taliban. Iran is locked in a tense dispute over Helmand River waters, with recent clashes killing border guards and escalating tensions. Tajikistan is also concerned about terrorism emanating from Afghanistan, particularly threats to Chinese investments and citizens.
A collective ultimatum regarding the TTP, backed by the economic clout of China and the political weight of the entire SCO bloc, carries far greater legitimacy than unilateral Pakistani airstrikes. Pakistan should frame the TTP issue as a violation of the SCO’s counter-terrorism mandate, of which India is also a member.
This approach diplomatically isolates the Taliban without imposing political or economic costs on Pakistan.
The Four-Day War was a tactical victory, but it must not blind Islamabad to strategic reality. Pakistan cannot afford a hostile western border. The path to security lies in consolidating gains and using the SCO’s collective leverage.
As Sun Tzu said, “He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight”.