The 2026 Annual Threat Assessment report released by the U.S. intelligence community (IC) diverges from the National Security Strategy (NSS) released by the White House in November 2025. The IC report focuses on global threats ranging from terrorism, cyber threats, artificial intelligence (AI), nuclear proliferation, cross-border migration, and drug trafficking, while reaffirming China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as long-term strategic threats to the country.
Conversely, the NSS highlights core national interests, including safeguarding the Western Hemisphere, rejuvenating the economy, ensuring Indo-Pacific trade, aiding Europe against “civilisation erasure,” preventing the Middle East from being dominated by a single power, and maintaining the United States (U.S.) lead in AI and related technologies.
This contrast highlights a deeper confusion: first, that the U.S. is operating with two contrasting conceptions of national security, and second, that the current policy is an amalgam of both—a tension most visible in the ongoing conflict with Iran.
The primary difference lies in the worldview articulated by the two documents. The NSS is hemisphere-centric, while the IC assessment takes a global outlook. The NSS questions not only the U.S.'s global role but also blames the “elites” for “miscalculating U.S. willingness to shoulder global burdens.”
The document argues that the U.S. will not become embroiled in “forever wars” costing blood and treasure and will not impose Western governance structures abroad. Moreover, the document reaffirms the primacy of nation-states over international institutions working to undermine them. In a way, the NSS is more inward-looking, shunning earlier interventionist campaigns, whereas the IC threat assessments are global in nature.
The Trump administration narrowly defines national security in nationalistic terms by focusing on preserving U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere and fortifying American identity, while the IC assessment warns about broader geopolitical risks and global power competition
The worldview of the IC, on the other hand, reflects a Hobbesian state of nature, encouraging states to nurture Orwellian tendencies and warranting a traditional realist response. The report claims that top concerns for the U.S. are “transnational organised crime, illicit drug trafficking, migration, the threat of Islamist ideology and terrorism, major power competition, and WMD threats”—concerns the NSS does not prioritise.
The fog clears further upon comparing how these documents refer to adversaries. The IC assessment mentions Iran 46 times, while the NSS refers to it only three times. China appears 69 times in the IC assessment compared to 21 times in the NSS. The IC report mentions Russia 82 times, while the NSS makes ten references. Finally, the report mentions North Korea 36 times, while the NSS ignores it altogether. Although frequency alone does not determine priority, it does function as a rough indicator of emphasis for both documents.
Another stark contrast between policy and assessment is the emphasis on preserving Western identity. The NSS argues for safeguarding the American way of life in the Western Hemisphere and protecting European civilisation from “civilisation erasure.” It aims to restore confidence in Western values of pluralism and freedom; however, the IC does not highlight any such risk to American or European identity.
Despite their differences, the two documents overlap. For instance, both acknowledge great-power competition, view China as a strategic challenge, emphasise technological rivalry, support open trade, and stress the need to lead in AI and technology. Another convergence between the two documents is that they both ignore climate change as a threat or a priority. Hence, the two documents converge on various aspects but differ in the extent of their prioritisation.
Thus, the Trump administration narrowly defines national security in nationalistic terms by focusing on preserving U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere and fortifying American identity, while the IC assessment warns about broader geopolitical risks and global power competition. However, both documents, irrespective of their claims, aim to safeguard U.S. interests and its citizens.
This mismatch between strategy and threat assessment generates an incoherent policy that undermines U.S. interests at home and abroad. As a result, the administration will suffer from confusion, as it will not commit to large-scale interventions and, at the same time, will not back down from high-risk stand-offs such as the ongoing conflict with Iran.